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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the performance of hybrid forces - forces
containing both irregular and regular components - in protracted, theater-level
campaigns. It seeks to determine how the hybrid force commander should employ his
force to achieve the highest probability of operational success. Accepting that force
efficiency is the critical path to operational success, this research focuses on the role of
two variables which are often in "tension" in hybrid forces: coordinating the efforts of
the two components, and decentralizing the operations of the irregulars. It explores the
influence of these variables in four historical hybrid campaigns.
This study demonstrates that the most efficient hybrid force is created by high
degrees of both coordination and decentralization. Hybrid forces shaped by these
variables maximize costs inflicted on the enemy, while minimizing costs incurred by
themselves, by exploiting the enemy's dilemma over whether to disperse to quell the
hybrid irregulars, or to concentrate to defeat the hybrid regulars. This research also
suggests, however, that coordination and decentralization will only produce the most
efficient hybrid force possible when that force enjoys two preconditions in the theater of
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis examines the performance of hybrid forces - forces containing
both irregular and regular components - in protracted, theater-level campaigns.
It seeks the answer to a central question: how does the theater commander
employ his hybrid force to achieve the highest probability of operational success?
Answering this question is relevant to U.S. policy makers and military
leaders for at least three reasons. First, hybrid warfare can be a more efficient use
of limited resources than traditional, conventional warfare. Second, emerging
technologies are substantially increasing the firepower available to small units,
and small units are at the heart of hybrid warfare. Finally, more frequent
cooperation between special operations forces and general purpose forces means
that the U.S. will increasingly rely on de facto hybrid forces to achieve its goals.
Thus accepting that the central question is relevant, this research initially
demonstrates that the critical path to operational success is efficiency. Increasing
efficiency - which is defined as the ratio between the costs inflicted on the enemy
and the friendly resources employed to produce those costs - directly increases
the chance that the enemy will suffer the requisite amount of damage which
forces him to capitulate or permanently withdraw from the theater of war.
Because of this relationship between force efficiency and operational
success, this research subsequently focuses on how to utilize a hybrid force most
efficiently. It hypothesizes that the most efficient hybrid force is produced when
the theater commander balances two independent variables which are often in
"tension:" coordinating the efforts of the two components, and decentralizing
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the operations of the irregulars. It explores the influence of these variables in
four historical hybrid campaigns.
First, it examines the efficiency achieved by a hybrid force which is poorly
coordinated and highly centralized - the Anglo-Arab hybrid force which fought
in Palestine, Arabia, and Syria during World War I. It then examines the
efficiency resulting from a coordinated and decentralized force - the Anglo-
Iberian hybrid force which fought the Peninsular War. Next, it analyzes the
performance of an uncoordinated, yet decentralized hybrid force - the Boers of
the Second Boer War. Finally, it examines the efficiency of a coordinated, yet
centralized hybrid force - the Northern Combat Area Command under General
Joseph Stilwell in World War II Burma. Since these cases test every combination
of the independent variables, one is confident that together they create a solid
evaluation of the hypothesis.
These four cases demonstrate that the most efficient hybrid force is
created by high degrees of both coordination and decentralization. Hybrid
forces shaped by these characteristics maximize costs inflicted on the enemy -
and minimize costs incurred by themselves - by exploiting the enemy's dilemma
over whether to disperse to quell the hybrid irregulars, or to concentrate to
defeat the hybrid regulars. This research also suggests, however, that
coordination and decentralization will only produce the most efficient hybrid
force possible when that force enjoys two preconditions in the theater of war:
local popular support, and minimum strategic vulnerability for the regulars.
I. INTRODUCTION
Yet we shall always find fierce enemies in front of us, and we leave
even the worse ones behind. Our armies will pursue elusive armies
that always flee and disappear toward the sea, only to reappear a
few leagues beyond, while invisible hands destroy everyone who
does not remain with the army.
~ Captain Jean Jacques Pelet, French Officer in the Peninsular War
With 2,000 years of examples behind us, we have no excuse, when
fighting, for not fighting well. ...
~ T.E. Lawrence to B.H. Liddell-Hart, 1933
To many British commanders, the American Revolution was not only a political
upheaval, but a military revolution as well. For the United States' nascent armed forces
prosecuted a new kind of war upon their colonial masters. On the one hand, George
Washington labored tirelessly to forge and field a conventionally-oriented force capable
of meeting and defeating the British through the "well-executed set-piece maneuvers" 1
which were the essence of eighteenth century warfare. On the other hand, at the same
time the colonials repeatedly confronted the British with "units which issued suddenly
from the swamps or the forests, moving silently and quickly and behaving with touches
of the savagery of the Indians whom they imitated." 2 Whether deliberate or not, this-
fusion of two disparate forms of war - European style conventional tactics and
"frontier" style unconventional operations - presented the British with a dual threat
which they could not overcome.
Following the Revolutionary War, a multitude of distinguished commanders
have been bedeviled by, or benefited from, the merging of regular and irregular
operations which George Washington and his lieutenants employed with such telling
effect. Under the Duke of Wellington, the British (and their Iberian allies) employed the
same combination which had defeated them in America to create an incurable "Spanish
ulcer" for Napoleon. During the same period, the Russians employed both regular and
irregular forces, with a significant assist from the climate, to defeat Napoleon's invasion.
A century later, Arab irregulars unleashed by their Revolt of 1916, principally under the
leadership of T.E. Lawrence, combined with the conventional campaign of General
Allenby's British regulars to drive the Ottoman Turks from the Middle East. Similarly,
from the 1950s to the 1970s, an alliance of Vietnamese Communist irregulars and
conventional North Vietnamese Army units eventually defeated both French and
American efforts to subdue them.
But not all "hybrid" campaigns have achieved the successes of Washington or
Wellington. The American Confederates of the 1860's, the franc-tireurs of the Franco-
Prussian war of 1870-71, and the South African Boers at the turn of the century all
conducted daring, and often highly successful, irregular operations during otherwise
conventional campaigns. In the end, however, each of them was defeated.
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this research is to determine how the theater-level commander of
a force containing both regular and irregular components - the hybrid force - employs
his force to achieve the highest probability of operational success.
B. RELEVANCE
1. A More Efficient Approach
If a nation or coalition possesses relatively limited resources, hybrid warfare can
be a more efficient use of those resources than traditional, conventional war. This
assertion clearly hinges on the issue of "limited resources." Most likely, if given the
choice, any combatant nation or alliance would prefer to have such overwhelming,
widespread conventional combat strength that it could overwhelm or smother its
opponent in short order. But reality - in the form of limited defense budgets, domestic
political concerns, or multiple international threats — often places tremendous
constraints on available military strength. Given such constraints, past hybrid
campaigns suggest that a combination of regulars and irregulars can be the most
efficient method of employing available resources. In other words, hybrid warfare has
often been an outstanding example of "doing more with less." Indeed, if properly
managed, a hybrid force can produce greater military results than an equal, or often
greater, number of regulars or irregulars alone.
One cannot dispute the fact that militarily, the U.S. is in the midst of an era of
limited resources. There is no prospect for significant DoD growth in the foreseeable
future. In such an era, the U.S. military must capitalize on any methods which
maximize the combat effectiveness of smaller force packages. It must place a premium
on "doing more with less." As CinQ USSOCOM notes, "constrained
resources... continue to demand improved levels of effectiveness and efficiency." 3
Hybrid warfare's efficiency can fulfill this demand. Consequently, studying hybrid
campaigns is relevant because, given the dwindling resources of the U.S. armed forces,
adopting the principal tenets of successful hybrid war will provide them with a most
efficient fighting doctrine for the future.
2. Increasing Firepower in Small Units
Hybrid warfare is also worthy of contemporary consideration because of what
the future holds for the firepower of the small unit. Emerging "technology trends will
provide an order of magnitude improvement in lethality.... Individual warfighters will
be empowered as never before, with an array of detection, targeting, and
communications equipment that will greatly magnify the power of small units."4 Small
units are at the core of hybrid warfare, for the irregular components of historical hybrid
forces have almost universally fought as company-sized units or smaller. Moreover,
smaller units appear to also be at the core of the United States' future military, for the
limited resources emphasized above imply that we will have no choice but to rely on
smaller force packages to accomplish missions. Fortunately, the increases in firepower
provided by modern technology promise only to multiply the capabilities of such small,
irregular units. This would in turn increase the efficiency of hybrid warfare, making it
even more relevant for study.
3. Increasing Cooperation Between U.S. General Purpose & Special
Operations Forces
While the previous two factors recommend hybrid campaigns as a form of war
which U.S. military analysts should choose to study, a third factor virtually requires them
to do so. Namely, the "build down" of the U.S. military will compel U.S. special
operations forces (SOF) and general purpose forces (GPF) to work together more often.
Simply put, getting the most out of a shrinking military will demand more frequent
combination of the distinct capabilities of SOF and GPF. In the words of former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, because "America's
Armed Forces are smaller than we have been in over 40 years, and....[because we are]
faced with flat budgets and increasingly more costly readiness and modernization,....we
will need to wring every ounce of capability from every source. That outcome can only
be accomplished through a more seamless integration of Service capabilities."5
If U.S. SOF are viewed as a rough equivalent to hybrid irregulars, then this more
frequent cooperation between GPF and SOF means that the U.S. will increasingly rely on
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what are essentially hybrid forces to achieve its military goals. Studying hybrid
campaigns to ascertain the most efficient use of those forces thus becomes immediately
relevant. For the cases examined in this study demonstrate how to make the interaction
of regular and irregular/SOF units complementary instead of supplementary. This
finding may be even more worthy of consideration since it is derived from studying the
protracted, operational-level employment of irregulars. Up to this point, almost all
studies of SOF or combined SOF/GPF operations have focused on the keys to achieving
single minion, tac tl success.6
C. DEFINING THE ISSUE
Having demonstrated the relevance of hybrid warfare to current and future U.S.
military operations, I will now establish the parameters of this study with some key
definitions:
• Hybrid Force: a military force containing both regular and irregular
components.
• Conventional Opponent: the hybrid force's opponent, usually composed of
solely conventional units.
• Regular Force/Unit/Element/Component: Professional military forces
employing the conventional tactics of their era. Regular forces are usually
distinguished by characteristics like a common uniform, rank structure, and
standard of discipline.
• Irregular Force /Unit/Element/Component: Other than regular military
forces which are usually distinguished by four characteristics.
• Stealth - irregulars are virtually "invisible" to the conventional
opponent except while engaging him (either because they are local
residents who can "melt" into a population at will, or because they
are foreign detachments who retreat into "safe areas" located in
inaccessible terrain, or a combination of both).
• Mobility - irregulars are almost always light cavalry or light infantry
type forces which have a limited range of mobility but are capable of
traversing almost any terrain.
• Logistics - irregulars typically require minimal logistics support, in
contrast to the often vast logistics trains which accompany regular
forces.7
• Firepower - irregulars, being light forces whose survival often
depends upon their ability to disengage at will and to conceal
themselves rapidly, typically possess much less firepower than
similar sized regular detachments.
• Note: It is important to recognize that irregular units can be manned
by professional or citizen soldiers. Furthermore, irregulars and
regulars can, but usually do not, perform the same missions. Either
for example, could perform a raid or an ambush. The key distinction,
as described by the four characteristics above, is the ability of
irregulars to strike unexpectedly much more often than their regular
compatriots. Consequently, the presence of both irregulars and
regulars in the same force compels the conventional opponent to
focus simultaneously on the threat of a "visible" regular enemy
possessing substantial conventional combat power and on a
practically "invisible" irregular enemy who can strike almost
anywhere.
TheaterIoyerational-level: this study will focus on the combined use of regulars
and irregulars at the theater level of analysis /operational level of war. This
is the most appropriate level of analysis because every conflict in which the
U.S. has participated since WWII has been confined to single theater.
Moreover, current U.S. doctrine lists the "theater of war" as the primary
focus of a warfighting CINC.8 This is consequently the level of analysis
which could provide the most readily useful recommendations for
employing U.S. military forces.
Operational success: enemy capitulates or permanently withdraws from the
theater.
Campaign-length: what follows will address the best use of hybrid forces in
terms of protracted, campaign-length operations. This is appropriate first
because this study is focusing on theater-level employment of hybrid forces,
and campaigns are at the heart of theater/ operational warfare.9 It is also
appropriate because the answers which this study seeks to provide about the
best use of hybrid forces cannot be extracted from the result of a single
mission, or even several operations, but only by reviewing the outcome of an
entire campaign. 10
NOTES ON CHAPTER I
1 Forrest C. Pogue, The Revolutionary Transformation of the Art of War, Washington, D.C.
American Enterprise Institute, 1974, p. 3.
2 Pogue, p. 7.
3 SOF Vision 2020, p. 2.
4
Joint Vision 2010, p. 13.
5
Joint Vision 2010, p. 8-9.
6 For examples, see William McRaven's Spec Ops and Lucien Vandenbroucke's Perilous Options.
Martin Van Creveld notes that one key difference between irregular and regular forces, "and
one whose importance is becoming increasingly obvious, is the fact that [irregulars] do not
require heavy weapons and large quantities of mechanized transport. As a result, their logistical
load - including various kinds of supply maintenance, and administration - is cut by a factor of
90 percent or more. Of the commodities that constitute the remaining 10 percent, a great many
can normally be found almost anywhere and taken away directly from the surrounding
population...." "Military Strategy for an Era of Transition," in Turning Point: The Gulf War and
U.S. Military Strategy, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 273
8 Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1993, p. 4-5.
9
Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1991, p. 45.
10 For example, American Revolutionary General Nathanael Greene, who employed a hybrid
force to reconquer almost the entire colonial South in only six months, did not enjoy a single
tactical victory with his regular component during the campaign. Similarly, the Tet Offensive of
the Vietnam War virtually destroyed the irregular component of the Vietnamese Communist's
hybrid force, but played a crucial role in their eventual campaign success. Thus, it is not the
success or failure of individual tactical operations but the overall results of the campaign which
provide the most reliable indicators of how best to employ a hybrid force.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. DEVELOPING A HYPOTHESIS
Guided by the above parameters, I have sought to determine how a hybrid force
should be employed to achieve the highest probability of operational success. Two
modern metaphors serve as a departure point for developing my hypothesis.
• The Boxer: Just as hybrid force commanders have usually had to make do with
limited resources, so a boxer is limited in advantages he has over his opponent.
With the often decisive asset of size legislated away through weight classes, and
assuming that both boxers enter the ring in excellent physical condition, a
premium is placed on better employing available combat power - the left and
right hand. Should a fighter possess a potent jab but a weak array of power
punches — or vice versa — he is vulnerable to an adversary strong in both types of
attack. Furthermore, even if a fighter possess robust jabs and devastating power
punches, he must also link them together in effective combinations. If he does
not, he will leave many openings for a more disciplined opponent to land telling
blows. Victory thus appears to go not necessarily to the strongest fighter, but to
the one who most efficiently combines the efforts of his two strike assets.
• Developing AirLand Battle Doctrine: Obviously, efficient employment of limited
resources is even more important in a conflict fought outside the regulated
confines of the boxing ring. U.S. military doctrine writers recognized this as they
sought, just like many historical hybrid commanders, to develop a strategy for
defeating a numerically superior foe - in this case, the Warsaw Pact of the late
1970/ s. The resultant U.S. strategy, AirLand Battle doctrine, emphasized that
victory in modern war "will demand complete unity of effort and thoroughly
synchronized air and ground action." Of even greater interest to my study of
often outnumbered historical hybrid forces, the creators of AirLand Battle
doctrine asserted that "a fully synchronized small force can defeat a much larger
enemy force that is poorly coordinated." 1 Once again, albeit in a much deadlier
level of conflict, victory seemed as closely correlated to efficiency as it did to
strength.
Viewed together, these two examples of contemporary conflict illustrate many of
the distinguishing characteristics of past hybrid campaigns. Just as a hybrid force has
two offensive components - the regulars and the irregulars - so the boxer has two
hands, and AirLand Battle has both air and ground assets. Additionally, boxing
highlights one familiar hybrid force problem — maximizing limited assets — while the
AirLand Battle concept underscores another - winning though outnumbered. Given
these strong similarities, I deductively accepted that the emphasis in both cases upon
efficiency would be of equal importance to a hybrid force. Consequently, my initial
answer to the central question of this study was that a hybrid (or any military) force
would have the greatest likelihood of achieving operational success when it was
employed to maximum efficiency.
1. What is Efficiency?
The military definition of this term derives from two considerations. First, the
objective of a theater commander is to achieve operational success in the least time at the
lowest cost. Second, this objective is accomplished by inflicting enough damage (or
costs) upon the enemy to force him to capitulate or permanently withdraw before he does
the same to friendly forces. Efficiency, therefore, is the ratio between the costs inflicted
on the enemy (output) and the friendly resources employed to produce those costs
(input).2 The more efficient the use of a given amount of friendly resources, the greater
the costs inflicted upon the enemy. A senior American military historian accentuates the
role of efficiency in military operations when he summarizes that the Allies, in World
War II,
...[won] mainly through the application of overwhelming, unsubtle brute
force. Not only did the Allies rely on sheer material and manpower
superiority to overcome the Axis, but they did so clumsily, lumberingly,
with at best mediocre and too often inept generalship.... The conclusion
for the future is evident enough, but well worth pondering. "Unless our
histories take full cognizance of just how big a margin was required in the
Second World War, we shall leave ourselves without adequate capacity in
any future war." 3
2. The Relationship Between Operational Success & Efficiency
Other things being equal, a more efficient use of a given amount of friendly
resources will increase the costs inflicted on the enemy from those resources. Thus,
efficiency increases the chance that the enemy will suffer the requisite amount of
damage to force him to capitulate or permanently withdraw. Efficiency improves the
chance of winning.
3. A Hypothesis
If one accepts this relationship between operational success and efficiency, the
central question for this study now becomes how the theater commander of a hybrid
force utilizes it most efficiently, for utilizing a hybrid force most efficiently will give it
the best chance for operational success. I contend that to produce the dependent
variable of efficiency with a hybrid force - to inflict the most cost on the enemy with a
given amount of friendly resources - one must provide the independent variables of
coordination of efforts and decentralization of the irregulars. Consequently, I offer the
following hypothesis:
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Maximizing coordination of efforts and decentralization of the
irregulars will produce the most efficient hybrid force. Given that only
limited resources are available to a hybrid force, if that force
coordinates its efforts, yet decentralizes its irregular operations, it will
inflict maximum costs on the enemy for the least expenditure of
friendly assets.
• Coordination of efforts: intentionally combining the actions of allied regular
and irregular components into a single framework of operations in order to maximize
the contributions of each. 4
• Decentralization of the irregulars: granting the irregulars in a hybrid force the
broadest discretion in planning, executing, and recovering from tactical operations. The
hybrid force commander who decentralizes his irregulars will provide them with
operational-level goals, but will place as few restrictions as possible on which tactical
targets they attack in what manner, to the point that he may occasionally have to accept,
from foreign irregulars, breaches of the law of war.5
B. AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE
To illustrate an application of my hypothesis, I will examine a campaign from
World War I. Over 29 months, a hybrid force of British regulars and Arab irregulars
drove the conventional forces of the Ottoman Empire back from Egypt and Arabia to the
southern borders of Turkey. First under a split military/ civilian command, and then
unified under British General Edmund Allenby, the Anglo-Arab hybrid force ably
demonstrates the affect of both coordination and decentralization upon efficiency.
1. Formation & Initial Employment of the Hybrid Force
For over a year after Turkey declared war on the Allies, major operations in
Europe and the Gallipoli Peninsula precluded large-scale military action in the Middle
East. The British in Egypt, however, still sought ways to attack the Ottoman foe which
confronted them in Palestine and Arabia. For over a year, British agents negotiated with
Arab tribesmen in those provinces, trying to transform latent Arab nationalism into
tangible military opposition to the Ottomans. These efforts bore fruit when the Arab
Revolt erupted in "the Hejaz - the skinny Arabian province flanking the Red Sea" - in
June, 1916.6 So was born the Anglo-Arab hybrid force: approximately 20,000 British
regulars under General Archibald Murray in the Sinai; and less than 10,000 Arab
irregulars in the Hejaz. They faced a combined total of perhaps 35,000 Turks.7
At first fighting conventionally, the Arabs under Sharif Hussein captured Mecca
and laid partial siege to the Turkish garrison at Medina. "But [Hussein's] force as well
as those commanded by his sons, Feisal, Ali and Abdullah, were badly organized and
lacked arms and equipment. By September, Feisal's and Ali's armies were marking time
southwest of Medina; Abdullah...hovered northeast of Medina with his warriors." 8 The
Turks then counterattacked, seeking to capture the port of Yenbo through which the
British were supplying the Revolt:
The hill tribes that formed Feisal's barrier forces [around Yenbo] gave
way to the first major Turkish assault. A Turk cavalry column...pushed
on, nearly captured young Prince Zeid's [Arab] force and now was
looking hungrily at the Yenbo base. This unexpected success brought
Feisal with his five-thousand-strong camel corps to screen Yenbo, but he
in turn was attacked and driven back into the town, where he was
protected by the guns of the hastily concentrated British warships. These
proved too much for the Turks, who backed off to sit like a hungry dog,
one eye on Yenbo, one eye on [its sister port of] Rabigh.9
To British observers, "the Revolt now seemed to be so near collapse that it was
necessary to reconsider British policy towards it." 10 The British High Commissioner in
Egypt, Sir Reginald Wingate, concluded "that the only hope was to send British troops
as soon as possible." 11 One British advisor recently assigned to the Arabs, had a
different view, however:
[Captain (CPT) T.E.] Lawrence talked Feisal into moving [from
Yenbo] 200 miles farther north to the port of Wejh, which would give a
base closer to Suez, making it easier for the British to bring in supplies.
Despite an arduous march through the desert, Feisal's men arrived at
Wejh after a seaborne attack by a small force of Arab infantry and British
marines had seized the port [on 23 January 1917], with the help of six
British warships.
The Turks had insufficient mobility to pursue such far-ranging
groups of Arabs, aided by British sea-power, and fell back on Medina,
where half the force guarded the city and the remainder protected [their
only source of supply,] the [Hejaz] railway. 12
Meanwhile, by early 1916 the British had diverted enough resources to Egypt for
Murray to initiate an "eastward extension of [the] Suez Canal defenses into the
Sinai...." 13 But while the Arabs launched the Revolt and proceeded to Wejh, he had only
pushed the Turks out of the poorly defensible Sinai and stalled at Gaza on the
Mediterranean coast. 14 Preparing to assault Gaza, he learned the town was about to be
reinforced by Turks withdrawn from Medina via the Hejaz railway. Murray thus
requested (he had no direct control over the Arabs) that Hussein's forces make "every
effort" to prevent Turkish troops "from going north" along the railway. 15 Although the
Arabs successfully "derailed" the reinforcements, Murray's assault failed. In two
separate attacks in March and April, 1917, he lost over 10,000 troops without winning
the Turkish position. "An exasperated [British] War Office... relieved Murray. In his
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place came General Allenby...." 16 Before detailing how Allenby affected the conduct of
the Anglo-Arab campaign, it is important to note the extent of the hybrid force's
coordination and decentralization, as well as its overall efficiency, during Murray's
command.
From its inception until Murray's relief, the hybrid force was largely
uncoordinated. That this was primarily due to political concerns is evident in a reply by
General Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, as to whether Murray should
control the Arab forces:
There are many interests involved in the Arab [Revolt]. The Foreign
Office, India Office, and the French and Russian[s]...are all interested and
there are many ramifications of the question.... [Mjilitary assistance must
for the present be confined to provision of munitions and supplies,
and... I do not think the time has yet come to make a change as to the
general control and supervision of the [Arabs'] operations. 17
Hence, Murray controlled the British regulars in the Sinai, while the Arab Bureau of the
High Commissioner for Egypt worked with the Arabs. But although it was the British
government which originally imposed a split command on the hybrid force, one must
also note that Murray did not protest the arrangement. "Sir Archibald Murray...wanted
naturally enough, no competitor and competing campaigns in his area. He disliked the
civil power [of the High Commissioner and sought]....to make the spectacle of the High
Commission running a private war [look] sufficiently ridiculous....When he found
opportunity he bent his considerable powers to crab what he called the rival show." 18
Consequently, excepting the Arab interdiction of Turkish reinforcements for Gaza, the
British and the Arabs executed separate operational plans from the outbreak of the
Revolt to Murray's relief.
A lack of close coordination, however, did not translate into freedom of action
for the Arab irregulars. Far from encouraging them to operate in stealthy, mobile
guerrilla operations, the "original purpose" of the first British advisors to the Revolt was
to train the Arabs to fight as regulars. 19 This is not surprising given contemporary
military doctrine: 'The books gave it pat - the destruction of the armed forces of the
enemy [should be accomplished] by the one process - [decisive] battle. Victory could be
purchased only by blood."20 Therefore, the "professional British and French officers
raised in the Napoleonic tradition" serving as the Arabs' advisors saw as their ultimate
objective training the Arabs to operate like a traditional European army.21
Moreover, while most of these advisors may have been conditioned by their
military education to avoid decentralizing Arab operations, the French contingent had
an ulterior motive for constraining Arab efforts - France sought to take over most of the
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Ottoman Middle East after Turkey was defeated. France, capitalizing on the fact that the
British valued French cooperation on the Western Front more than satisfying Arab
nationalist concerns, had signed a secret agreement with the British which virtually
guaranteed French control of Syria after the war. Looking to minimize difficulties in
post-war occupation of her new Middle East possessions, France directed her advisors to
contain the operation of Hussein's forces - and the spark of Arab nationalism - as far
south in Arabia as possible. During General Murray's tenure, these surreptitious
attempts at containment were often successful.
It is thus clear that Arab irregulars were not given broad discretion in planning
and executing their tactical operations. They were restricted, by both the training
program and the political intrigues of their European advisors, to conducting essentially
conventional operations along the Red Sea coast. Combined with the lack of
coordination also highlighted, this centralization of irregular efforts meant that the
Anglo-Arab force during General Murray's command illustrated exactly the opposite of
the qualities recommended by my hypothesis. One next asks, how efficient was this
uncoordinated, centralized hybrid force?
As for costs suffered by the Turks, Murray's regulars had pushed them out of the
Sinai and inflicted 11,000 casualties.22 The Arabs meanwhile had taken over "the greater
part of the Hejaz" and, according to a probably over-enthusiastic estimate of the Arab
Bureau, eliminated the equivalent of a Turkish division.23 But inflicting these costs had
not come cheap. Murray's regulars had suffered 12,000 casualties, and two bloody
repulses at Gaza emphasized that the Turks now occupied defensible terrain. Also, with
the Revolt limited to the Hejaz, they faced little threat to their lines of communication
north of Arabia. So while Murray had inflicted appreciable, costs on the Turks, the
resources he had expended in making only limited territorial gains suggest that the
hybrid force had not been highly efficient. Allenby's appointment clearly sprang from a
desire to inflict greater costs on the Turks for less expenditure by the Allies.
2. A New Approach
Not long before Murray's relief, the enigmatic CPT Lawrence had been musing
over this very issue of improving Anglo-Arab efficiency. 'The Arabs would not endure
casualties," he said, because they "fought for freedom, and that was a pleasure to be
tasted only by a man alive."24 Worse yet, because they "had no generals skilled in
conventional war and their tribal structure rendered them incapable of the military
discipline and organization necessary to confront the Turks in open battle," they
performed poorly as regular soldiers.25 In early 1917, then, the consensus was that
12
"efforts to train and organize an Arab force capable of meeting the Turks in the field
have been unsuccessful. . . ," 26
Even with these deficiencies, Lawrence still believed the Arabs were "the most
elusive enemy an army has ever had, and inhabit[ed] one of the most trying countries in
the world for civilized warfare." 27 Focusing on these assets, he "did not insist on
grafting his... country's military standards on a body incapable of reception.
Instead... [he] hit on a type of war compatible to [existing Arab] leadership, [and]
capabilities...." 28 Rather than Arabs attacking "like an army with banners," which the
Turks could stymie "by a trench line," Lawrence posed an alternative: "suppose we [the
Arabs] were an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or
back, drifting about like a gas?...We might be a vapor, blowing where we listed.... It
seemed a [Turkish] soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat
on, and subjugating only what...he could poke his rifle at." 29 Instead of a building a
conventional army to drive the Turks out of Arabia into Syria, the Arabs should operate as
guerrillas and pin the Turks down to Arabia and Syria. For so pinned down,
The Turk was harmless....We wanted him to stay at Medina, and every
other distant place, in the largest numbers. Our ideal was to keep his
railway working, but only just, with the maximum of loss and discomfort.
The factor of food would confine him to the railways, but he was
welcome to the Hejaz Railway, and the Trans-Jordan railway, and the
Palestine and Syrian railways for the duration of the war, so long as he
gave us the other [999] thousandths of the Arab world....His stupidity
would be our ally, for he would like to. . .think he held as much of his old
provinces as possible. This pride in his imperial heritage would keep him
in his present absurd position - all flanks and no front.
Soon after developing these concepts, Lawrence independently led an Arab force
to cap-ture the vital port city of Aqaba. That "a force of Arab tribesmen had been able to
take Aqaba without British foreknowledge or support" stunned the British high
command in Cairo, and gained Lawrence an audience with Allenby less than a month
after the latter assumed command.31 At the meeting, Lawrence "sketched the future
military value" of an extensive Arab guerrilla campaign- 'There were rumors that the
[British] Cabinet wanted Jerusalem captured by Christmas, and he stressed the
contribution that the Arabs could make to such a victory...."32 Lawrence also stressed
that unlike the earlier limited employment of the Arabs, utilizing them on a vaster scale
to gain greater results had to be tied to Allenby's conventional operations:
[Such] operations are entirely contingent on a decision to undertake
major operations [by the British regulars] in Palestine with which the
movement of the Arabs must synchronize. If minor [conventional]
operations only are intended in Palestine, the Arab [guerrilla]
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operations...would probably lead to the destruction of many of the Arab
elements, and most certainly to that of the [Syrian Arabs], were they to
take action. Unless operations of such magnitude as to occupy the whole
of the Turkish Army in Palestine were undertaken the proposed Arab
operations must be abandoned.33
Allenby saw "the possible benefits" of such a campaign "to British efforts in Sinai
and Palestine were obvious," and requested the War Office approve Lawrence's plan
(which would take the Arabs well north of Arabia).34 Since possessing Aqaba placed the
Arabs in a position to much more substantially assist the British regulars, the War Office
— discounting French interests - approved the plan, and placed Allenby over the Arab
forces as well. In planning to resume the offensive at Gaza, Allenby wrote that "the co-
operation offered by [CPT] Lawrence," "if successfully carried out...in conjunction with
[conventional] operations in Palestine, may cause a collapse of the Turkish campaigns in
the Hejaz and in Syria and produce far-reaching results...."35
3. The Hybrid Force under General Allenby
Thus, as the summer of 1917 waned, "Lawrence and Arab parties now
commenced a series of blows against the [Turkish] railway[s], tearing up track, blowing
up culverts, and occasionally stopping and assaulting trains."36 While these attacks
disrupted Turkish communications and distracted their attention, a reinforced Allenby
massed 88,000 troops to attack 35,000 Turks in Palestine. His six week campaign
culminated with the capture of Jerusalem on 9 December.37
Although drafts of Allenby's force to halt German offensives in France restricted
him to "minor operations" around Jerusalem for much of 1918, "Arabia to the south and
east was in flames." Arab guerrillas continued to play "hob with the Hejaz
Railway....[keeping] more than 25,000 Turkish troops pinned down to blockhouses and
posts along this line." When Allenby resumed the offensive in September with 69,000
British troops against 36,000 Turks, even closer coordination with the Arab irregulars
overwhelmed the Ottoman forces and swept them all the way north to Aleppo.38 Turkey
surrendered on 30 October 1918.
4. Tentative Conclusions Emerging from this Campaign
a. Increased Efficiency from Coordination of Efforts &
Decentralization of Irregulars
The hybrid force under General Allenby had clearly inflicted much
greater costs on the Turks than they had under the split command of General Murray
and the Arab Bureau. In the 10 months after the Revolt created an Anglo-Arab hybrid
force, General Murray had gotten only to the walls of Gaza, and the Revolt had not left
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the Hejaz. Even without factoring in the spectacular success of 1918, Allenby in just
seven months of 1917 had advanced over the very defensible terrain of Palestine to
capture Jerusalem, and inflicted 25,000 Turkish casualties. The Arabs which he
unleashed throughout Syria and Arabia had at the same time "killed, captured or
contained...some 35,000" Turks.39 When the 1918 offensive is also counted, the Anglo-
Arab force would go on to inflict a further 76,000 Turkish casualties and knock Turkey
out of the war. At a total cost of less than 30,000 Allied casualties, Allenby had
unquestionably improved the efficiency of the hybrid force. What had made the
difference?
While the role of Allenby's numerical superiority cannot be discounted,
one must also give considerable credit to the redesigned Allied strategy. Whereas
Murray and the Arab Bureau had not coordinated the operations of the hybrid force's
components, the very core of the concept which Lawrence advocated, Allenby adopted,
and the War Office approved had been a unified strategy incorporating both the Arabs
and the British. In this strategy, the Arabs "became the right wing of the Egyptian
Expeditionary Force...and [their] task henceforth was to carry the war into Syria in
conformity with General Allenby's plans."* But they were not a right wing of the army in
the traditional sense. Unlike the initial attempts to employ the Arabs, which focused on
training them to fight with European tactics and constraining them to the Hejaz, under
Allenby they were given great freedom to strike at the Turks throughout Arabia and
Syria. Consequently, Arab irregulars conducting decentralized operations within a
coordinated plan tied down or destroyed more than 30,000 Turkish troops. These Turks,
if not so occupied, would have decidedly reduced Allenby's numerical superiority in
Palestine. One thus sees that Allenby's strategy for employing his resources was just as
important as his numerical advantage, if not more so, in improving his hybrid
command's efficiency.
b. Coordination & Decentralization Increase the Costs Inflicted
(on the Enemy) Through the Dispersion/Concentration
Dilemma
Allenby's changes in the independent variables — coordination of efforts
and decentralization of the irregulars — increased the costs inflicted upon the Turkish
opposition through the mechanism of the dispersion/concentration dilemma. This is the
dilemma created when enemy is compelled to both disperse his forces to neutralize the
threat posed by the hybrid irregulars yet concentrate his forces to defeat the threat of the
hybrid regulars. 41 How did the independent variables cause the
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dispersion/ concentration dilemma? Relatively high levels of Allied coordination forced
the Turks to deal with both Allenby's regulars and the Arab irregulars on the least
favorable terms, and sometimes nearly simultaneously. Great decentralization of the of
the Arab irregulars meant that the Turks faced two distinctly different types of threat: a
British regular threat in Palestine requiring concentrated conventional combat power for
traditional engagements; and an Arab irregular threat which could only be neutralized
by substantial dispersion throughout Syria and Arabia. With their strength dissipated
between these two opposing requirements, the Turks suffered greater losses of troops
and terrain, regardless of whether they concentrated or dispersed (see diagrams below).
Thus, by increasing the costs inflicted on the Turks, the dispersion/ concentration







Turks concentrated against Allenby's hybrid force
(Arab irregulars exert politico-military control over
any territory which Turks do not occupy)
Turks concentrated during Murray's command
(Arabs are contained to Hejaz and Turk losses are
limited)
Time
Figure 1. Costs to Turks of Concentration
• "...guerrilla forces' main importance is their ability to deny an enemy
permanent or real control of any area not physically dominated by military
presence, and to demoralise [sic] the foe by inflicting a steady drain of casualties.
Whatever their possible contribution to regular operations, their greatest use is to
keep the foe off-balance and dispersed. A blow threatened is often more valuable than
one delivered."42
Turks dispersed against Allenby's hybrid force (British
regulars face less than the maximum available Turkish
conventional power, since many Turks are tied up
guarding against Arab raids; thus British penetrate
deeper into Turkish territory)
Turks dispersed during Murray's command
(after initial Arab uprising, British and French
restricted Arab operations, so Turks did not have









Figure 2. Costs to Turks of Dispersion
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c. Importance of Antecedent Conditions
Two antecedent conditions, or preconditions, allowed Allenby's
coordinated yet decentralized approach to produce such tremendous efficiency: local
popular support and minimum strategic vulnerability for the regulars.
(1) Local popular support. As Lawrence wrote after the War,
"irregular warfare....must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but
sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy."43
Consequently, I contend that within the contested theater, the hybrid force requires a
sizable portion of the civilian population which is at least neutral toward the force.
Neutral is defined as a local population which will not oppose the movements of the
hybrid force, but will sell or give supplies to the hybrid force. Furthermore, the local
population must be willing to maintain these preferences over the course of a potentially
lengthy campaign where the conventional opponent will probably subject them to
hardship or reprisals. As popular support for the hybrid force increases - for example, if
local inhabitants are willing to provide intelligence on the enemy to the hybrid force or if
local inhabitants are willing to become combatants themselves - the maximum possible
efficiency for the hybrid force increases.
(2) Strategic vulnerability of hybrid regulars. The hybrid force
cannot present the dual-natured threat which is indispensable to employing the
dispersion/ concentration dilemma without possessing both a regular and an irregular
component. But while the irregulars can use their stealth to avoid significant losses, the
hybrid regulars have no such option. Instead, hybrid regulars must avoid significant
losses - must minimize their strategic vulnerability - through use of geography,
transportation assets, or discriminating leadership.
If either of these preconditions do not exist for a hybrid
commander, then his force will be negatively impacted in one or both of the following
ways. First, the hybrid force may not be able to survive over the long term. Second, the
hybrid force will not be able to achieve the maximum efficiency possible from its
available resources. Moreover, the hybrid commander lacking one or both of the
preconditions may find that his force produces its best possible efficiency (which, it
must be stressed, will be less than the maximum efficiency possible for that force)
through an alternative combination of the independent variables. For example, a hybrid
force lacking local popular support may produce its best efficiency when its two
components are coordinated, but irregular operations are centralized.
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C. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
1. Introducing the Hypothesis Matrix
This review of the Anglo-Arab hybrid campaign appears to reinforce my
hypothesis that coordination of efforts and decentralization of the irregulars will
produce the most efficient hybrid force. I now look to test my hypothesis against other
cases of hybrid warfare. As an aid to selecting appropriate tests of my hypothesis, I
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Figure 3. Initial Hypothesis Matrix
Each of the independent variables forms an axis. On the grid created, one can
then place various types of hybrid forces based on the degrees of coordination and
decentralization which they possess. Hence, a highly coordinated, or "integrated,"
hybrid force whose irregulars are highly decentralized, or given great "freedom of
action," would be placed in the upper right portion of the matrix (as represented by
Allenby's force). According to the hypothesis, any such force would produce great
efficiency. In contrast, a segregated and overcontrolled hybrid force would be placed in
the lower left of the matrix (as represented by Murray's force) and be expected to
achieve only moderate efficiency. Using this matrix, I selected three cases with which to
test the tentative assertions drawn from the Anglo-Arab hybrid campaign.
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2. The Test Cases
First, I will test my hypothesis against a case demonstrating relatively high
coordination and decentralization from the outset — Wellington's campaign with the
Spanish guerrillas against the French from 1809 to 1813. Second, I will examine a
campaign demonstrating a "failure" in one variable - in this case a lack of coordination
of efforts. I selected the Boer War of 1899 to 1902 for this case. Finally, I looked for a test
demonstrating a "failure" in decentralization. A number of factors beyond a lack of
decentralization recommended the Sino-Anglo-American campaign under General
Stilwell in Burma during WWII. For example, this campaign appears worthy of
contemporary U.S. consideration because it features the employment of an American
hybrid force in a modern campaign with significant use of airpower. Moreover, half of
the irregulars employed were U.S. SOF (i.e. Merrill's Marauders), not native irregulars.
These points make the case an outstanding one for study, particularly for what it may
suggest about the protracted use of SOF and GPF together in modern war.
I would like to emphasize that each of the cases selected also represents other
historical hybrid forces which possessed similar degrees of coordination and
decentralization. The high coordination and decentralization of the Spanish case
correlate closely to the cooperation in Vietnam between Communist regulars and the
Viet Cong. The segregation and decentralization of the Boers can also be found in the
relationships between the southern partisans and Continental regulars of the American
Revolution, the Confederate raiders and Confederate high command in the Civil War,
and the franc-tireurs and French high command during the Franco-Prussian War. The
integration and overcontrol of StilweH's force is roughly analogous to the relationship
between U.S. GPF and SOF in the Gulf War. Because the cases selected typify a great
many other hybrid forces, this study will hopefully reach conclusions based not simply
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Figure 4. Hypothesis Matrix with Selected Cases
Placing these cases, including the Anglo-Arab hybrid campaign, on my
hypothesis matrix demonstrates how they test every combination of my independent
variables. Hence, I am confident that in examining these cases together I will have
conducted a solid evaluation of my hypothesis. To begin that evaluation, I move to my
first case study - the Anglo-Iberian hybrid campaign against Napoleon.
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III. THE PENINSULAR WAR, 1808 - 1814
A. HISTORICAL SUMMARY
1. What Was the Theater of Conflict?
The Iberian Peninsula:
Much of the area is an immense plateau of between 2000-3000 ft [sic],
bordered by [mountains] .... The main ranges run east to west.... So
movement from east to west is easier than from north to south. The
rivers, partly navigable, conform.... The barren nature of much of Spain ~
"a country where small armies are defeated and large armies starve"
(Henry IV of France) makes only a few areas suitable for cavalry action....
In sum a rugged, barren country of few roads....
As for Portugal, the barren frontier regions restricted practicable
routes for invasions [from Spain] to five.... Two-thirds of the area is
mountainous — only south of the Tagus [River] is there any really fertile
country....
To summarize - the Peninsula was well-suited in geographical




a. Who Were They?
The conventional opponent were the French. Under Napoleon's direct
command from October, 1808 until January, 1809, French forces were otherwise under
the nominal command of his brother Joseph, the King of Spain. "The French
forces...fluctuated between a peak of 340,000 (1810) and a low of 200,000 (1812 and
after)." 2
The hybrid force was composed of British and Portuguese regulars under
the command of the Duke of Wellington,3 and Spanish irregulars under numerous
leaders.4 "Wellington's English [regular] army never surpassed 40,000 men, perhaps
plus a further 25,000 attached and trained Portuguese and Spanish 'regular' forces." 5
Furthermore, "it is calculated that never were more than 50,000 guerrillas under arms in
global terms: some sources assert that there were only 36,500 at most." 6
b. Why Were They Fighting?
The Spanish Insurrection began in early 1808, when Napoleon moved to
take over the governments of Spain and Portugal so as to strengthen his position relative
to Britain. Napoleon initiated the takeover by deploying almost 100,000 troops into
Spain and Portugal. When some members of the Spanish royal family refused his
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"invitation" to negotiations in Bayonne, France, Napoleon ordered French troops to
forcibly transport them there.
Learning that members of the monarchy were about to be kidnapped,
citizens of Madrid took to the streets to attack their French occupiers. About 150
French were killed, but they ruthlessly restored order the next day. Word of the
uprising, and of the Spanish civilians executed by the French in reprisal, spread like
wildfire across Spain. "Proud, easily offended, and spurred on by the minor clergy, the
Spanish were obsessed with the idea that the French were instruments of the devil." 7
Consequently, "spontaneous popular insurrection" erupted across the countryside as
the fiercely independent Spanish fell upon the occupying French.8
While the Spanish and Portuguese fought to free themselves from French
oppressions, Britain may also have seen her own survival entangled in the developing
Iberian conflict. The prospect of French success in Spain and Portugal presented
England with the danger "which her foreign policy had striven for centuries to avert.
The European mainland, with its manpower, wealth and shipyards, was dominated by
a single nation, indeed by the will of a single man." 9 Thus, Britain chose to intervene in
the Iberian conflict because, while her earlier attempts to eliminate this "danger" had
been mere "pinpricks on Napoleon's hide," the "outbreak of risings in [the
Peninsula]...offered the British the opportunity to wound him hurtfully." 10 This
opportunity was legitimized by "the junta of Seville's appeal to the British government
for armed and financial support...." 11 Alternatively, B.H. Liddell-Hart contends that
intervention "was undertaken by the British government more from the hope of saving
Portugal," one of Britain's oldest allies, "than from any deep appreciation of its grand-
strategic potentialities in aggravating [Napoleon's position]...." 12 Taken together, these
contrasting views cover the major explanations for Britain's participation in the
Peninsular War.
c. What Was the Relative Quality of Each Opponent?
Napoleon's army was the finest in Europe. "In the three years before
Wellington went to Portugal, Napoleon had entered Vienna [and] Berlin.. .as a
conqueror." 13 Thus, the army which Napoleon "brought into the Peninsula in the autumn
of 1808.. .was....composed of his finest old regiments from the Rhine and Elbe, the flower

















Figure 5. The Peninsular War
(from David Chandler's On the Napoleonic Wars, Collected Essays)
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I have not seen them since the campaign in Flanders [in 1794], when they
were capital soldiers, and a dozen years of victory under Buonaparte
[sic] must have made them better still. They have besides, it seems, a
new system of strategy which has out-manoeuvred and overwhelmed all
the armies of Europe. Tis enough to make one thoughtful....15
In contrast, as they seized upon the opportunity to "wound" Napoleon
"hurtfully," the British dispatched a mediocre army to the Peninsula. Although
"Wellesley's infantry...were the best England had assembled in memory," 16 "best" was
altogether relative:
The record of the British Army since 1793 had been patchy at best; some
successes had been achieved, [but] the years after these...had been
littered with dismal failures and farcical tragedies, Egypt (1807) and
Buenos Aires (1806-07) being amongst the more infamous examples....
When the British Army under... Wellesley landed in Portugal in August
1808 it was still reeling from these failures.... The army was inexperienced
and largely untried. . .
.
Even after initially defeating a French force at Vimeiro in August, 1808, Wellington
would still rate his army the next spring as "a rabble who cannot bear success any more
than Sir John Moore's army could bear failure." 18
The Spanish army, characterized as it was by "undrilled and half-clothed
soldiery,...unhorsed squadrons,...empty arsenals,...[and] idle and ignorant subalterns," 19
was a significant step down in quality from the British. As Charles Oman writes,
Summing up the faults of the Spanish army,...we find that its main source
of weakness was that while the wars of the French Revolution had
induced all the other states of Europe to overhaul their military
organization and leam something from the methods of the French, Spain
was still, so far as its army was concerned, in the middle of the eighteenth
century.
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Since the Spanish guerrilla forces would be composed of former members of this archaic
army, and peasants, one certainly feels justified in rating their quality as unknown at
best. Similarly, at the outset of the campaign, the quality of the Portuguese armed forces
was comparable to that of the Spanish.
3. How Did the Campaign Progress & What Were the Decisive
Events?
In attempting to summarize the Peninsular War, particularly when assessing the
Anglo-Iberian hybrid force, one is acutely aware of "the traditional tendency of
historians to become obsessed with battles." 21 "Indeed, by treating the Peninsular War
as a chronicle of Wellington's battles and sieges it becomes meaningless." 2 Instead, a
more profitable approach is to view the campaign in phases, each delineated by the
character of the Anglo-Iberian resistance. This method reveals those erstwhile focal
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points - Wellington's battles - as only the conventional indicators of what was actually
a vast hybrid resistance to the French.
a. Phase I - Conventional Defeat, 1808
The first phase of the Peninsular War, ironically, is a tale of conventional
battles. In 1808, the Anglo-Iberian resistance took the form independent conventional
campaigns against the French:
[T]he waves of spontaneous popular insurrection...provided Great Britain
with the opportunity to...send Sir Arthur Wellesley and a small British
army.. .to the region in early August of 1808. Within three weeks he had
broken the French hold on Portugal and induced the French to
evacuate....Meanwhile the as yet unaided Spanish armies (amalgams of
regular units and local militias)...had driven King Joseph and his armies
back beyond the Ebro [River]. These unpropitious events...caused
Napoleon to intervene in person in October...and in a whirlwind
campaign of conquest the Emperor defeated a clutch of half-trained and
ill-led Spanish armies, restored his fratello to his throne in Madrid, and
forced Sir John Moore (Wellesley's temporary successor) precipitately to
evacuate the British army through Corunna...before leaving the Peninsula
for ever to turn his attention to new central European crises...handing
over the final stages of pacification to a group of his marshals. 23
With every English or Spanish regular force which had opposed him either decisively
defeated or withdrawn from the theater, Napoleon cannot be readily faulted for
proclaiming, as he departed for France after defeating Moore, that "the Spanish business
is finished." 24
b. Phase II - Establishing the Hybrid Force, 1809 through 1811
Yet even before Napoleon had finished with Moore, irritants which would
fester into his "Spanish ulcer" were already at work. In "December 1808, the Supreme
Junta... gave legal existence to what they called a 'new kind of militia' ~ the partides or
guerrillas, and the Tittle war' was born." 25 Hence, hard on the withdrawal of Moore's
army - what the French assumed was the end of Anglo-Iberian resistance — what is
often called the first modern guerrilla war was born.26
So began the second phase of the Peninsular War. "Hitherto the defeat of
an enemy's main army and the occupation of his capital had always proved decisive.
But Madrid had been conquered, the Spanish armies were smashed, the legitimate
sovereign was in the hands of the French; and yet the struggle continued." 27 Two
subsequent events combined to characterize the surprisingly resilient Anglo-Iberian
resistance during this phase.
First, the British introduced another regular Army to the campaign in
April, 1809. Under Wellington again, the tedcoats arrived to challenge the
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"pacification" forces Napoleon had left behind. Wellington quickly "established his
base near Lisbon...won the battle of Oporto, drove the French out of Portugal, followed
them into Spain and fought the bitter but successful battle of Talavera." 28 Wellington's
success clearly indicated that the bitterly disappointing withdrawal of Moore's army
nine months earlier had not marked the end of British commitment to the conflict.
Second, as Wellington prepared to defend his gains at the end of 1809,
the reconstituted Spanish regular forces were eliminated. In "November, this [last]
Spanish army was utterly broken to pieces at the battles of Tamames and Ocana." 29
These defeats served to finalize the composition of the Anglo-Iberian force for the rest of
the campaign. Britain would provide the regular component under Wellington,30 while
the Portuguese and Spanish, with their hordes of guerrillas, would provide the irregular
component. As Liddell-Hart notes somewhat sardonically,
The worst misfortune for Spain, and hence for England, was the
temporary success of [Spanish] attempts to form fresh regular forces.
Fortunately these were soon beaten [at Tamames and Ocana], and as the
French dispersed them so, coinadently, did they disperse their own good
fortune. The poison spread again instead of coming to a head.31
At the outset of this phase, the two components of the Anglo-Iberian
hybrid force did not demonstrate substantial cooperation. This was primarily due to
the extremely disjointed nature of the Spanish and Portuguese popular resistance. A
weak central government (the Junta), ruthless French occupiers, and the independent
nature of the Spanish people combined to produce a myriad of guerrilla bands operating
without coordination.
[G]uerrilla attacks proliferated rapidly in many areas of the country, but
with a wide variety of leaders and in a wide variety of forms. Owing to
the strongly particularist proclivities of the proud Spaniards, regional and
local loyalties predominated over any sense of a "nationalist" cause,
making coordination all but impossible to achieve.32
But soon after he landed back in Portugal, and initiated the maneuvers
which would achieve the victories of Oporto and Talavera, Wellington set about taking
best advantage of the guerrillas for the overall Anglo-Iberian cause. "Wellington himself
was the first to appreciate" these irregulars' untapped potential for supporting his
conventional efforts. 33 At first, Wellington's contact with various irregular bands was
limited to "clear, simple advice...which proved effective when taken." 34 Simultaneously,
he also began "to provide [them with] money, arms, ammunition and vital supplies. He
rapidly came to receive better cooperation from reward-seeking guerrilla chieftans...."
3
While these early efforts at coordination gradually increased the overall
combat power with which the Anglo-Iberians could confront the French, Wellington
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focused on causing the most damage to the enemy arrayed directly against him. After
Talavera, a concentration of French manpower forced him on the defensive.
Accordingly, he "undertook the construction of a fortified system around Lisbon, the
Lines of Torres Vedras...and fought the battle of Busaco to cover his retreat inside the
Lines. Starvation outside drove the French back across the Spanish frontier...." 36 During
this retreat and defensive stand, only a year after Wellington's return to the Peninsula,
his efforts at coordination were already paying off. Portuguese irregulars "proved their
value in carrying out the 'scorched earth' policy...during the retreat to Torres Vedras,
and then harassed the French mercilessly through the late autumn and winter
in...operations...which eventually induced Massena [the French commander] to
retreat."
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Although the English and French "armies fought inconclusively against
each other throughout 1811...Wellington, by the victories of Fuentes de Onoro and
Albuera...had the better of things strategically." 38 More importantly, this lack of
spectacular gains by the regulars masks the growing strength of the Anglo-Iberian hybrid
approach:
In the summer of 1811. ..the French used 70,000 troops to maintain the
lines of communication in the zone of guerrilla activity between Madrid
and the French border. Many of the men diverted to this task had been
intended for Marshal Massena at one of the war's most critical junctures.
Massena lost Portugal, while his reinforcements chased guerrillas
fruitlessly around... [Spain].39
In other words, Wellington's regulars got "the better of things strategically" only because
of the strain the Spanish irregulars placed on the French in other regions. The Anglo-
Iberian force had progressed significantly from the dark days of Corunna.
c. Phase III - The Hybrid Offensive, 1812 through 1814
In the third phase of the war, the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force was
characterized by greatly improved, often closely orchestrated, cooperation between the
two components:
In early 1812 — as Wellington at last prepared to go onto the
offensive as Napoleon ordered large transfers from the Peninsula to swell
his armies in eastern Europe — extensive plans were made for utilizing the
guerrillas for diversionary attacks. The aim in 1812 was to isolate the
target - Marmonfs Army of the North in north-central Spain - from
reinforcement once Wellington launched his offensive. An orchestrated
furore of guerrilla attacks was inspired not only by British supplies but
also by British soldiers and sailors in direct cooperation with them.
Guerrilla attacks - and threats of naval activity from the sea - kept Soult
in Andalusia and Suchet in Valencia off-balance and
apprehensive.... Even [King] Joseph's Army of the Center was effectively
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pinned down by...bands of mounted guerrillas who for twelve days
captured every dispatch sent out either by Jourdan or Marmont. At the
time of the battle of Salamanca, the two forces were only fifty miles apart
but neither had the least idea where the other was situated. This
guerrilla-induced isolation permitted Wellington to fight and win on equal
terms in numbers at Salamanca: but whereas he had 70 per cent of the
total Allied regulars in the Peninsula on that battlefield, Marmont had
barely 20 percent of his overall French forces present.40
While the French finally "achieved a superior concentration of force
[which]... obliged [Wellington] to retreat to the Portuguese frontier where he spent the
winter," 41 the events of 1812 demonstrated a pattern which made eventual Anglo-
Iberian victory almost certain.
Although [Wellington] was back once more on the Portuguese
frontier, and thus, superficially, no further forward, actually the issue of
the Peninsular War was decided. For by abandoning the greater part of
Spain to concentrate against him, the French had abandoned it to the
Spanish guerrillas — and lost the chance of shaking their grip. On top of
this disaster came the news of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, which
led to the withdrawal of more French troops from Spain. Thus when the
next campaign opened the situation had completely changed.42
1813 brought further cooperation with the guerrillas, as well as
reinforcements of British regulars, which allowed Wellington "to resume the offensive,
retake Madrid, win the victories of Vitoria and Sorauren and so drive the French across
the Pyrenees into France."43 When Wellington resumed operations in the spring of 1814
in southern France, he "soon had to decide to send the Spanish formations back to
Spain, for their actions on French soil were hardly commendable. So ended the long
relationship of Wellington and the Spanish guerrillas."44 And so ended the Peninsular
War as a hybrid campaign.
B. CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS
1. Applying the Hypothesis
a. Did the Hybrid Force Commander coordinate*5 the efforts of his
Force?
David Chandler argues unequivocally that Wellington sought to combine
the actions of the British regulars and the Spanish irregulars: "it is today quite clear that
he...set the greatest store on exploiting the opportunities offered by the guerrilla war."46
Elizabeth Longford's synopsis of Wellington's own papers show that his intention to do
this was a key tenet of his plan for victory: "The conditions of [ensuring British] success
[on the Peninsula], he continued, were 20,000 British troops ...; a reconstituted
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Portuguese army; and the Spaniards to keep at least some of the huge French armies pinned
down in their country."' More importantly, it is just as clear that Wellington acted on his
intention to combine the actions of his regulars with the guerrillas. "Only two days after
his arrival [in April, 1809]," he was already focusing his attention on just one of the
major French forces which confronted him while leaving the other, under Marshal Ney,
"'to the war of the peasantry which has been so successful....'"48 As recounted in the
summary of the war above, Wellington continued to pursue coordination throughout the
conflict. Without question, he "was well aware of the central significance of the
[irregulars'] War of Independence and [through]. ..1813 adapted his strategy accordingly. " 49
b. Did the Hybrid Commander decentralize the Irregular
Component?
Yes. ''Wellington set himself to exploit the advantages the widespread
popular resistance...could confer." 50 Note that Wellington sought to "exploit the
advantages" of a "widespread popular resistance" as a popular resistance, not as a
source of recruits for additional regular armies. This was undoubtedly due in part to the
fiercely independent nature of the Spanish guerrillas. He himself wrote that the typical
Spaniard "'obeys no law, despises all authority, feels no gratitude for benefits conferred
or favours received and is always ready with his knife or firelock to commit murder/"51
Wellington would most likely have had little success in conscripting such people for
regular formations even if he had tried. But for the most part, Wellington did not
"regularize" the guerrillas.52 He instead sought to make the most out of what the
Spanish seemed naturally adept at, irregular operations. As Longford writes,
Wellington despised 'enthusiasm' in the Spanish army and government;
he prized it in the irregulars. Indeed the partisans represented the one
form of 'irregularity' which he not only prized but paid for, whenever an
intercepted French despatch [sic], often gruesomely bloodstained, was
brought into his camp.
c. What level of efficiency would one expect from this Hybrid
Force?
Due in large part to Wellington's efforts, the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force
was increasingly coordinated and, in the end, often integrated. Additionally, the
independent nature of the Spanish people, and Wellington's tolerance, ensured that the
irregulars had great freedom of action in conducting their operations. Consequently, this
























Figure 6. Expected Efficiency of the Anglo-Iberian Hybrid Force
d. How efficient was the Hybrid Force in actuality!
When evaluating the efficiency of any military force, one must first select
a point from which to begin measuring the costs inflicted on the enemy. For the Anglo-
Iberian hybrid force, the most logical starting point is the spring of 1809. Given the
almost complete destruction of the Iberian regulars late in the previous year, the
reintroduction of a British regular contingent in April, 1809, marks the first time when
both components of the hybrid force were operating in the theater.
The next step in estimating efficiency is calculating the costs a force
inflicts upon its opponent. Prior to April, 1809, in almost any measure of cost -
conventional battle victories, troop casualties, or territory controlled are examples — the
Anglo-Iberian forces had accomplished little against the French. With the withdrawal of
Moore's army in January, the French controlled the entire Iberian peninsula. Although
the British and Spanish had caused French casualties, the total number was minor when
compared to French forces remaining. From this inauspicious beginning, the thoroughly
outnumbered Anglo-Iberian hybrid force ended up bleeding the French white and
reconquering the entire Peninsula. 54
There is no question that the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force inflicted far
greater French casualties than any comparison of their initial strengths would have
predicted.55 As King Joseph's aide-de-camp, General Bigarre, bitterly remarked: "The
guerrillas...caused more casualties to the French Armies than all the regular troops during
the whole course of the war in Spain; it has been proved that they murdered a hundred
of our men daily. Thus, over the period of five years they killed 180,000 French Soldiers
32
without on their side losing more than 25,000.
'
,56 Additionally, Wellington's regulars
"gave" far more than they "got," although perhaps in an unexpected fashion:
...Wellington's battles were materially the least effective part of his
operations. By them he inflicted a total loss of some 45,000 men only...on
the French during the...campaign..., whereas Marbot reckoned that the
number of French deaths alone during this period averaged a hundred a
day. Hence it is a clear deduction that the overwhelming majority of the
losses which drained the French strength, and their morale still more, was
due to the operations of the guerrillas, and of Wellington himself, in
harrying the French and in making the country a desert where the French
stayed only to starve.57
In total then, this hybrid force achieved a tremendously efficient casualty ratio:
It is estimated that the eight-year...struggle cost the French 240,000
casualties.... This was certainly an economic cost-effective effort
considering [the relative size of the forces]....These [relative force sizes]
speak for themselves. The "Spanish Ulcer" tied down a wholly
disproportionate amount of the French and their allied forces — and bled
them white: with dire psychological repercussions.58
But Vietnam demonstrated the pitfalls of measuring efficiency solely in
terms of casualties. Consequently, it is important to note that the Anglo-Iberian hybrid
force was also efficient when measured by a number of alternate means:
Armed peasants made chaos of French communications and performed
other tasks of value to both the English and Spanish regular forces.
Partisans scoured the countryside of French spies and sympathizers and
brought a continuous stream of information to the Allies....In the regions of
insurgency, where each peasant was a potential guerrilla, there could be
no campaigning season, no safe havens, no truces. Everywhere and
always there existed the possibility of a hostile encounter. This constant
terror made the Spanish war uniquely exhausting to Napoleon's armies
and ruined their effectiveness in battle?9
Furthermore, the hybrid force was efficient in obtaining the ultimate goal
of the fighting - control of terrain. Essentially, the hybrid force controlled whatever
terrain the French did not physically occupy. For, as a French cavalry officer later
recalled, as soon as French forces departed an area, "the partisans immediately
reorganized the country we had abandoned." 60 This imposed tremendous costs on the
French: "In Spain, the guerrillas denied the enemy systematic peaceful contact with
much of the countryside, making the collection of taxes fitful, costly, and in some areas,
impossible for the French....When[ever French] troops were withdrawn, the territory
reverted to the guerrillas, becoming valueless to the French, if not a positive drain on their
resources."
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Eventually, of course, the hybrid force proceeded from controlling little
terrain in early 1809 to controlling all of the peninsula less than five years later. Indeed,
once the Anglo-Iberian alliance had regained control of the peninsula at the end of 1813,
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they were able in the following year to carry the war into France proper. Could there
then have been a more complete contrast between the military efficiency gained by the
hybrid force and its conventional predecessors?62
In summation then, the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force was tremendously
efficient in not only destroying enemy combat power, but in numerous other measures to
include controlling terrain. As Liddell-Hart aptly concludes about the force's overall
efficiency, "as a strain on Napoleon... it bore fruit tenfold." 63
e. Was the high degree of coordination and decentralization
responsible for the efficiency achieved?
One thus comes to the critical question in relationship to testing my
hypothesis against the Peninsular War. On the one hand, the components of the Anglo-
Iberian hybrid force were increasingly coordinated, with great freedom of action given to
the irregulars as well. On the other, the hybrid force was highly efficient. Quite simply,
to what degree are these relatively high levels of coordination and decentralization
responsible for the high level of efficiency?
In brief, the significant coordination and decentralization of this hybrid
force were the decisive factors in producing its tremendous efficiency. John Tone reveals
the causal relationship, from high coordination and decentralization to high efficiency,
when he ponders how Wellington's (at most) 60,000 troops could escape destruction at
the hands of a French opponent several times their size:
The answer to this riddle is that the Allies never faced the bulk of
Napoleon's armies. Most of the time, French troops were not fighting
Wellington or the Spanish regulars. Rather, they were assigned to the
occupation of a nominally pacified Spain, where a guerrilla insurgency
threatened the French regime at its roots. Spanish guerrillas forced
Napoleon to expend hundreds of thousands of French troops in
occupation duties, eliminating the emperor's numerical superiority over
the Allies....The implications of French military dispositions in garrisons,
requisition parties, convoy duty, and antiinsurgency units rather than in
facing Allied concentrations cannot be mistaken. Guerrillas, in symbiosis
with the regular Allied armies, destroyed Napoleon.. .in Spain.64
A coordinated, dual-natured threat thus confronted the French with the
same dilemma which plagued the Turks fighting Allenby and the Arabs: simultaneously
disperse to deal with the guerrillas and concentrate to deal with Wellington. This
instance of the dispersion /concentration dilemma stemmed almost entirely from the
coordination and decentralization of the Allied hybrid force. Decentralization ensured
that the French faced not only an identifiable, potent regular threat, but an almost
invisible, resilient irregular one as well. Coordination repeatedly forced the French to
confront each of these threats on the least favorable terms. As the war progressed, the
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efficiency produced by this dilemma - itself the direct result of high coordination of
efforts and decentralization of the irregulars — became more strikingly evident.
In early 1810, as the French prepared to drive Wellington back after
Talavera, they "had concentrated nearly 300,000 men in Spain — with more to come.
[But] Of this total, [only] 65,000 were assigned to Massena for. . .driving the British out
of Portugal. While the number is large, its small proportion to the whole is illuminating
evidence of the growing strain of the guerrilla war in Spain." 65 Thus, less than a year
after the hybrid campaign opened, the French were already constrained by the
dispersion/concentration dilemma. The following year, as already mentioned,
simultaneous requirements to disperse troops to quell the guerrillas, yet mass troops to
defeat Wellington, left the French without enough power to defeat the latter "at one of
the war's most critical junctures."66
By 1812, Wellington was skillfully manipulating the French dilemma, as
evidenced by the coordination of guerrilla offensives which paved the way for the his
triumph with the regulars at Salamanca.67 1813, the final full year of the hybrid
campaign, demonstrated perhaps the most efficient returns from the
dispersion/concentration dilemma. After Wellington drove the French from Madrid for
the final time, they "withdrew over a period of several months through the territory
controlled by the [guerrilla] Division of Navarre, making the presence of the guerrillas
more important than ever, as they disrupted the retreat, [and] pinned down thousands
of troops that would otherwise have entered the fight against Wellington...." 68 When
Wellington finally caught the retreating French and defeated them at the battle of
Vitoria, guerrillas "had succeeded in occupying 19,000 troops that could have turned the
tide against Wellington. Another 35,000 troops in Aragon had been similarly
entertained...." 69 "Once again, two French armies in central Spain were kept apart
until..." one — Jourdan's ("in fact the remnants of three former 'armies'") - was
"eliminated as an effective force at Vitoria." 70
Thus, "it was in cooperation between the two very different types of
struggle that were being waged simultaneously and the high degree of coordination of effort
achieved — sometimes consciously and sometimes almost unconsciously — that the
secret of [Anglo-Iberian] success ultimately lay." 71 In short, an integrated hybrid force,
which gave great freedom of action to its irregulars, repeatedly confronted its opponent
with the dilemma of simultaneously having to disperse and concentrate.72 Moreover,
that hybrid force inflicted costs on the opponent in either type of deployment.
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On the one hand, guerrilla activity forced the French "to disperse into
town-garrisons, convoy-escorts, bridge guards, and 'seek-and-destroy' punitive units." 73
Yet even dispersed, the French were still subject to losses. For as the bitter remarks of
General Bigarre testified earlier, "the basic force of 200,000 veterans which Napoleon
was compelled to keep, year after year, in Spain, would never be safe from the noon-day
ambush and the things that went bump in the night."74 At the same time, offensives by
the British regulars made lengthy dispersion impossible. For "when Wellington
undertook a strong probe, raid or serious invasion from his secure sanctuary of Lisbon
into Spain...the French were compelled to concentrate...."75 One comes to recognize,
when considering these guerrilla-inflicted losses and the opportunities such dispersion
presented Wellington, that "the wider and the longer the French were dispersed
throughout Spain, the more sure and more complete would be their ultimate collapse." 76
On the other hand, however, there were also costs associated with French
concentration. First, there was the loss of territorial control already discussed.
Whenever French troops pulled out of a region to mass elsewhere against Wellington, the
vacated territory immediately became guerrilla-controlled ~ and stayed guerrilla-
controlled ~ until the French, if ever, returned. Moreover, lengthy concentrations of
sizable French forces were not sustainable logistically ~ the hostile, barren countryside
did not provide enough food for a French supply system dependent on foraging.77
In the end, it was "the inter-action of regular and irregular warfare that
posed the French an insoluble poutico-rrtilitary problem."78 A relatively small hybrid
threat, coordinated and decentralized, forced the French to pay high costs ~ in troop
casualties and terrain controlled — for either dispersing to quell the guerrillas or
concentrating to defeat Wellington.79 While the French may have had enough troops to
defeat either of the Anglo-Iberian threats singly, neither Wellington nor the guerrillas
remained dormant long enough for the French to eliminate the other. Consequently, after
April, 1809, the French had to defeat both threats simultaneously. Simply put, with the
troops available, "the French could not both contain the guerrillas and win the
conventional war against Wellington: as a result, they lost both struggles, and the result
was cataclysm." 80
2. Other Tentative Conclusions Emerging From This Hybrid
Campaign
a. Necessity of Local Popular Support for the Hybrid Force
As in the Anglo-Arab hybrid campaign, three aspects of the Anglo-Iberian
effort reinforce the necessity of steadfast popular support to both sustaining a hybrid
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force and maximizing its efficiency. First, it is certain that Wellington's outnumbered
army alone — which was only exempt from imminent destruction when embarked upon
the ships of the Royal Navy — could not have survived to conduct extended operations
without the crucial advantage of accurate, timely intelligence - an advantage only local
civilians could provide. As John Tone notes, popular support meant that "the Allied
armies could rest securely in the midst of a vigilant peasantry." 81 Second, the irregular
combatants forming almost one half of Wellington's highly efficient force could only have
come from the local population; Britain did not have any extra manpower to provide,
even if they could have been employed as irregulars. Third, the Iberian irregulars could
not have survived without further substantial popular support. Spanish and Portuguese
peasants, despite ruthless reprisals, had to continue to provide the guerrillas with
supplies, information, and anonymity. Taken together, these three points demonstrate
the necessity of local support for a hybrid campaign to succeed.
b. Minimizing Strategic Vulnerability of Hybrid Regulars
The Peninsular War also reinforces the imperative for preserving the
regular component of the hybrid force. If the regulars are permanently eliminated or
driven from the theater, the conventional opponent no longer will face the
dispersion /concentration dilemma, and stands a good chance of defeating the irregulars.
In this case specifically, "with a maximum of 340,000 troops (as in mid-1810) at their
disposal, the French might have been able to combat the guerrilla war on its own and
overwhelm it." 82 Therefore, the maintenance of a regular threat was imperative to
Anglo-Iberian success.
Wellington recognized this fact and "deemed it.. .his supreme duty to
preserve [his regular army]." 83 Thanks to his judicious leadership, he never had to call
upon the ultimate guarantor of his strategic invulnerability, the Royal Navy. But even if
Wellington had been forced to withdraw from the Peninsula, such a withdrawal would
likely have had little effect on the eventual outcome of the campaign. Command of the
seas would have allowed Britain to land Wellington and his regulars back on the
Peninsula at a subsequent time to resume the fight. The only concern would have been
reintroducing them soon enough to prevent the destruction of the presumably hard-
pressed irregulars.
c. Impact of Conventional Opponent's Efficiency
Although the Anglo- Iberian hybrid force achieved high efficiency as a
result of its coordination and decentralization, the same cannot be said of the French.
Actually, in this campaign, the conventional opponent's inefficiency aided the hybrid
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cause in at least two ways. First, as the Peninsular War progressed, French leadership
became ever more factious and disjointed. After Napoleon's departure from Spain, "the
history of the French command in the Peninsula is a study in itself. Even though [King]
Joseph and [his Chief of Staff] Jourdan had nominal command for some long time,
Napoleon had in fact been exercising overall control of half a dozen armies from Paris.
This was ridiculous during active campaigning, for dispatches could take a month or
more each way." 84 An example from 1812 serves to demonstrate how significantly this
"remote control" command system diminished the efficiency of French operations. For
in that year,
...[even though Napoleon] told Joseph that, with the assistance of
Jourdan, he was to have the supreme command of all the French armies in
Spain... .the Emperor failed to make the king's supremacy clear to the
various army commanders, and the Army of the North...received no
orders on this subject. Suchet, commanding the Armies of Aragon and of
Catalonia, claimed that the orders could not apply to Catalonia since
most of that province had been annexed by France.... [His] attitude [was]
also adopted by Marmont with the Army of Portugal. Soult, with the
Army of the South, paid less attention to Madrid than anyone else. 85
1812, one will recall, opened of the third phase of the war - a phase
distinguished by more and more effective coordination of the Anglo-Iberian force - and
culminated in the thorough defeat of Marmont at Salamanca. As these passages reveal,
the isolating effects of the guerrillas prior to Wellington's regular victory were only
enhanced by the fractured French leadership. Undoubtedly, such inept French command
and control reduced their efficiency not just in 1812, but throughout the campaign. One
can only wonder how successful Wellington's efforts at exaggerating the French
dispersion /concentration dilemma would have been against a more resourceful
commander with unchallenged control of all French forces in theater.
Second, the inefficient French handling of the Spanish and Portuguese
populations also helped the Anglo-Iberian cause. At the start of the campaign, the
portion of the Spanish population sympathetic to the rule of France was "not negligible
in size." 86 As guerrilla activity intensified, however, the French sought to destroy the
irregulars by discouraging the population through reprisals. Such violence had the exact
opposite effect from what the French intended. "Their attempts to terrorize the Spanish
and Portuguese populations failed lamentably....French depredations and severity bred
hatred, mounting resistance and ever more brutal atrocities - which in turn led to
counter-atrocities and an ever-increasing level of violence." 87 Violent resistance to the
French was further encouraged by Napoleon's edict that "war must nourish war" 88 —
that the Spanish and Portuguese would provide, without compensation, food and
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workers to French units. One wonders what would have happened if the French had
sought instead to win over the Iberians with reforms based on those Napoleon had
enacted in France. After all, winning them over just to neutrality would have drastically
curtailed the effectiveness of any remaining guerrillas and perhaps have freed up enough
French troops to make Wellington's position untenable.
d. Most effective use of indigenous manpower
Both the Anglo-Arab and Anglo-Iberian hybrid forces illustrate that
exploiting the dispersion/ concentration dilemma requires both a regular and an irregular
component. Unlike preserving the regular component, however, fielding an irregular
component does not appear to be an issue of rninimizing strategic vulnerability (a la the
British withdrawal at Corunna), but rather an attitude of command. While the
importance of an attitude which decentralizes the irregulars has already been addressed,
the hybrid commander must also recognize that in some cases, like the Arabs or the
Spaniards, choosing to employ his indigenous combatants as irregulars is far more
effective than employing them as regulars.
In 1808, Spain fielded close to 100,000 combatants, all as regulars. 89 They
were crushed, without inflicting significant costs to the enemy, within six months.
Following these regulars, less than 50,000 Spanish irregulars went on to exact nearly
200,000 French casualties from 1809 to 1813. The implied conclusion is that an equal
number of indigenous irregulars will be significantly more effective than the same number
of regulars.
What accounts for this increased effectiveness? For one, regular forces
possess little of the "stealth" of irregulars, and therefore made a much easier quarry for
Napoleon's forces to track, corner, and defeat in detail. The dreadful quality of the
Spanish regular army accounts for yet a further portion of the difference. While Oman
highlights the contribution of poor training, poor equipment, and poor leadership to
creating such a deficient army, the nature of the individual soldier also played a role.
The Spanish peasants, like the Arab tribesmen, were fiercely independent and strongly
resistant to the harsh discipline which had been the lot of a conscript for centuries.
Neither was willing to undergo the rigorous training which preceded battles, the shock of
close range infantry combat, or the often austere conditions of the long periods between
engagements. Thus, the character of the individual Spaniard was much more suited for
irregular, rather than conventional, warfare. A rueful reflection by French Peninsular
commander Gouvion St. Cyr explains this:
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[The Spanish] formed irregular corps, chose their leaders, operated by
whim, attacked anywhere that numbers or conditions favoured them, fled
without shame whenever they were not strongest, and disappeared by a
combined dispersion...In the long term, such a system of implacable
hostility must suffice to destroy the most numerous and valiant of armies,
obliged as they were to fritter their strength away in mobile columns and
convoy escorts. 90
In this case, then, there were at least two reasons that made local
combatants more efficient as irregulars than as regulars. One, they were ill-suited by
nature for service as traditional soldiers. Consequently, training them for, and using
them in, high casualty conventional engagements was a waste of assets. Two, employing
local combatants such as the Spaniards or Arabs as irregulars not only plays to their
strengths but, as St. Cyr complains, presents an opponent with a quandary which even
multiple, credible regular threats could not. The opponent must fight two different wars
simultaneously ~ one against an identifiable regular threat possessing powerful, but
localized, combat potential; and one against an invisible irregular threat with less
combat potential but virtually no geographical limits.
e. Importance of Cultural Awareness for the Hybrid Commander
Given that local popular support is a requirement for hybrid force
success, Wellington's actions in this case demonstrate how a commander's cultural
awareness can cultivate such support. From the outset of the Peninsular War he
demanded, with the threat of severe punishment or even execution, that his troops
respect the customs and property of the Portuguese population.91 Additionally, in stark
contrast to Napoleon - whose "war must nourish war" edict meant that French "armies
lived off the country, by forcible requisitioning amounting to robbery" - Wellington
refused to advance across the Peninsula until he had enough cash in his war chest to
purchase supplies from the locals. 92 Only through essentially honest dealings with the
Portuguese and Spanish did he believe he could maintain their indispensable support.
Judging by their by their active resistance, and the wealth of intelligence they provided
him over five years, his measures were effective.
Cultural awareness similarly loomed large in getting the most out of his
guerrilla allies. Wellington, as discussed previously, did not dismiss the Spanish for
their obstreperousness or savagery, but accepted their culture and sought to motivate
them to assist him. Comparable views played an equally important role in maximizing
the contribution of the Arabs in the Anglo-Arab hybrid force. Many British officers
working with the Arabs came to share the viewpoint of a Major Garland, who wrote
that,
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It is of course obvious to anyone knowing Arabs at all, that military work
of any kind is difficult with the best of them. The majority of them show
no respect, tending rather to insolence... .In military operations they
continually incur unnecessary risks by their stupid conduct. ..[I]t is quite
useless for the Britisher to endeavor to introduce military ideas, or in any
way to command; he can only make tactful suggestions, and hope by
example to get them to do as he wants. 93
Had men with Garland's appreciation for the potential contribution of the Arabs
toward British victory continued to supervise their fighting, it is likely that the Turks
would have held most of Palestine and Arabia until the Armistice. It took an awareness
of Arab culture, and a willingness to rethink the Arab mission, to create an irregular
component which so masterfully complemented the British Army's conventional efforts
in driving the Ottomans almost back to Turkey. These two examples suggest that a
hybrid commander must be culturally perceptive to obtain the greatest results from
foreign irregular allies.
f. Hybrid Warfare as the only Viable Means of Resistance
A final conclusion from the Peninsular War is that a hybrid force may not
only be the most efficient method of inflicting costs upon the enemy, it may also be the
only method capable of inflicting costs at all. In other words, the Anglo-Iberian hybrid
force was the only type of force which could have survived over the long term.
Recall that as 1808 came to a close, Napoleon had trounced every
Spanish regular formation, and chased the British off the peninsula entirely. At that
point, the only available method of resisting the French was guerrilla war by the
Portuguese and Spanish populations. But, as pointed out above, guerrilla resistance
alone was a tenuous proposition at best. History shows that "guerrillas cannot win
against a determined enemy unless they are supported by a foreign regular force...or
unless they solve the difficult task of creating regular units of their own." 94 Napoleon
was determined, and the Spaniards had no hope of creating effective regular units of
their own. Consequently, it is at least questionable, and possibly improbable, that
Iberian guerrillas alone could have mounted sustained, widespread resistance to a
French army undistracted by a British regular force. Thus, when compared to the
efficiency of the conventional forces which preceded them, and to the solely irregular
forces which could have operated in their stead, the hybrid force waged not only an
efficient fight, but an otherwise unsustainable one as well.
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IV. THE SECOND BOER WAR, 1899 - 1902
A. HISTORICAL SUMMARY
1. What Was the Theater of Conflict?
Essentially present day South Africa. When the war opened, the British occupied
the southern half of South Africa with two colonies, Cape Colony and Natal. The Boers
controlled the northern half with their two republics, the Orange Free State and the
Transvaal.
2. The Combatants
a. Who Were They?
The British were the conventional opponent. In 1899, their commander
"Sir Redevers Buller commanded a dispersed British army of about twenty thousand
[men] supported by some ten thousand ancillaries - colonials, volunteers, and police." 1
By the time the war came to a close, however, "it ended as the greatest British military
effort hitherto made on land. Nearly 450,000 soldiers ultimately served on the British
side." 2
In this case, a single nationality - the south African "trekboers" or Boers -
provided both components of the hybrid force. Opposite Butter's initial strength, at the
war's outset the Boers "mustered a total force of about fifty thousand, mostly mounted
men thoroughly at home in the vast land [of south Africa]." 3 But while British strength
would steadily grow, "the Boers never mobilized more than some 87,000 men." 4
b. Why Were They Fighting?
Put briefly, "the prize of victory was political supremacy in South
Africa...." 5 About 5000 Boers — descendants of Dutch, German, and French immigrants
who arrived in the second half of the seventeenth century — had left Cape Colony after
the British outlawed slavery there in 1834. These emigrants formed the two republics of
the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Although the British recognized the
independence of both states by 1854, they still harbored visions of a British-controlled
greater South Africa. Consequently, "in 1877 Britain annexed the Transvaal as the first
step in an attempt to federate South Africa." 6 This precipitated the First Boer War,
fought from 1880 to 1881. Predominantly a conventional war, it culminated "in the
defeat of the British at [the battle of] Majuba [Hill]. The Transvaal's independence was
restored, subject to conditions, including British supervision of its foreign policy."7
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After this settlement, the Boers "might have existed indefinitely on their
livestock and grain farms without British interference except for the discovery of
enormous deposits of gold near Johannesburg in Transvaal in 1886.
"
8 While "the Boers
wanted to maintain their way of life, limit rights to 'uitlanders' or foreign whites who
flocked in, and preserve their domination of the blacks," the British "wanted control of
the gold." 9 "Thus a...confrontation became inevitable and it commenced in October,
1899." 10 What popular history commonly knows as the Boer War was thus actually the
Second Boer War.
c. What Was the Relative Quality of Each Opponent?
At the end of the nineteenth century, Britain "stood at a point in history
and occupied a place in world affairs analogous to that of the United States sixty years
later. She was, or conceived herself to be, the greatest power in the world: a belief as yet
uncontested and thus untested." 11 When one considers the large numbers of British
troops across the Empire available to be deployed to South Africa, one understands that
British "strength consisted of their much larger army with much greater firepower." 12
Compared to the previous case study, "the British [facing the Boers] were in the same
situation as the French in Spain during the Napoleonic wars...." 13
The British and many contemporary observers considered the Boers as
"an enemy hardly... superior to warlike Indian moutaineers." 14 Such disdain is not
surprising in view of the fact that the "Boers possessed no officer corps. Their leaders
were almost wholly amateurs and their armed forces consisted simply of all males aged
sixteen to sixty...." 15 Moreover, "they enjoyed (or endured) neither formal military
training, [nor] discipline...and their ranks bore little resemblance to European
standards." 16
But the British could so disparage the Boers only by ignoring available
evidence to the contrary. "That the Boers could fight and fight well was already proved
by the first Boer War...when mounted settlers had run rings around Sir George Colley's
small British army." 17 Indeed, three years prior to the Second Boer War, British Colonel
C.E. Callwell, in his widely distributed work Small Wars, described an adversary far









Figure 7. The Second Boer War (from Byron Farwell's The Great Anglo-Boer War)
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The Boers [of the 1881 war] were armed with excellent firearms, were
educated and were led by men of knowledge and repute, but they had at
that time no real organization. They were merely bodies of determined
men, acknowledging certain leaders, drawn together to confront a
common danger....As a rule adversaries of this nature prefer guerrilla
warfare, for which their weapons and their habits especially adapt them,
to fighting in the open. The Boers, however, accepted battle readily and
worked together in comparatively speaking large bodies even in 1881.18
3. How Did the Campaign Progress & What Were the Decisive
Events?
The war is usually divided into two parts, a conventional fight followed by a
guerrilla struggle. Bevin Alexander's depiction is typical: "The war started out as a
conventional affair between two European peoples. But the Boers... lost quickly when
they challenged British arms head to head. Only... after they abandoned traditional
warfare. . .were they able to bewilder and defeat British regular forces. From then on, the
[Boer] guerrillas dictated the pace and the course of the action." 19 But I found that an
overlap between these two parts of the Second Boer War actually created three phases:
an almost purely conventional phase; a hybrid phase; and an almost purely guerrilla
phase.
a. Phase I - Conventional Resistance, October, 1899 to
March, 1900
The Boers opened the war following Transvaal President Paul Kruger's
strategy: attack the "British forces immediately at hand. In short order, [Boer]
commandos invested British garrisons at Ladysmith, in the Northeast, and Mafeking
and Kimberley, in the Northwest. These moves, Kruger reasoned, would bring the
British north, where he could fight them on his own terms." 20 The British reacted per
Kruger's prediction by dispatching one column of troops to relieve Kimberley, another
to relieve Ladysmith, and a third to capture the Orange Free State capital of
Bloemfontein.21 British progress, however, was far from smooth:
Buller's....columns had to cross an area the size of France and Germany.
Lack of animal transport and almost no roads tied infantry to single-line
railroads. Lack of communications and distance between railways caused
Buller to forfeit tactical control. Lack of training and dubious command
procedures caused columns to proceed without flank or frontal security. 22
Surmounting these formidable obstacles proved much less deadly for the
British, however, than overcoming their own doctrine. For when they finally brought
their forces to bear against the Boers, the British expected to win handily with
"conventional field-day tactics, the Aldershot set-piece in three acts."23
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First, the artillery duel and the preparation of the ground. Second, the
infantry attack and the infantry charge. Third, the cavalry charge to cut
off the enemy's retreat....These were the tactics in which all regular
armies of the period were trained, on the Continent as well as in Britain
and India. And they were the tactics that had served Germany well
enough against France in 1870, and Britain well enough against the ill-
armed tribesmen of the North-West Frontier.24
Unfortunately for the British, the Boers refused to fight in this fashion.
First, they employed technologies, like the Mauser rifle, which the British had never
faced. "In the whole of Europe there was no body of soldiers that had ever seen the
concentrated fire of the magazine rifle, with the muzzle end facing them. The people
who knew this end of the rifle best from personal experience were the Dervishes of
Omdurman - those that survived."25 At Omdurman, just one year earlier, Dervish frontal
assaults against British magazine rifle-armed troops had resulted in over 20,000 Dervish
casualties with only 500 British losses. Moreover, thanks to another new technology —
Boer rifles and artillery "fired the new smokeless powder, only invented in the late
[eighteen] eighties" 26 - the British faced an invisible enemy. This was a "characteristic of
the new smokeless war" which the British would discover "to their cost." 27
Second, the Boers employed unanticipated tactics. They complicated the
first act of the Aldershot script - the artillery duel - by refusing to deploy their artillery
pieces on open ground. "This was the first basic tactical principle of late nineteenth-
century warfare - British, French or German. It was assumed that the field-guns would
fight it out in the open. But [Boer] field-guns were...concealed behind
emplacements...." 28 Such concealment made British counter-battery fire virtually
impossible. The Boers also upset Aldershof second and third acts by evacuating their
positions when the situation became too threatening.29 This meant that British infantry
and cavalry charges all too often fell upon nothing but abandoned terrain.
Thus, when Buller's columns finally overcame the inhospitable south
African terrain and launched their initial assaults, they found an even more implacable
obstacle in the Boers themselves. The Boers repeatedly dug in at the top of small hills, or
kopjes, and "looking out on superb fields of fire for their Mausers, dared the British to
evict them." 30 "The fundamental error of the original British generals was to send their
infantry directly against these kopjes." 31 To correct this error, the British paid substantial
costs in both time and lives.
At the first battle of the eastern front, Talana Hill on 20 October 1899, the
British lost 51 killed and 203 wounded frontally assaulting a Boer position.32 In the first
major clash in the west a month later, they suffered 460 casualties in a frontal assault at
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the Modder River, while inflicting only 80 on the Boers.33 These losses represented over
three percent of the initial British regular force in the field, yet they were still well short
of their primary objectives. Such stiff losses for such incomplete accomplishment were a
rude awakening, but the British plight would get worse.
The British columns resumed the advance, but in the second week of
December, each "was badly mauled and...stopped short of its goal."34 The twin
reverses of frontal assaults at Magersfontein and Colenso, occurring in the same week,
shocked British military leaders and the public. The British lost almost 300 dead and
another 1500 wounded, compared to fewer than 400 Boer casualties, in the two defeats
which the "press lumped...together in the eye-catching term 'Black Week/" 35 The final
blow occurred in January 1900, when the British suffered a further 1800 casualties — to
less than 400 for the Boers — in the campaign which led to the bloody draw at Spion
Kop.36 One assumes that at least the surviving British infantrymen no longer equated
their opposition to "Indian mountaineers."
At the highest levels of command, British generals also began to
recognize that defeating the Boers would require fundamental reassessments. "Victory,"
the British commanders learned, "...was a question of method. From their mistakes,
humiliating as they were, Butter's nineteenth-century army - GOC [the CINC], generals,
officers and men - were all learning how to fight a twentieth-century war."37 A new
British GOC, Field Marshal Roberts, arrived in January, 1900 with two commodities
which would quickly compel the Boers to change their approach - better tactics and
fresh reinforcements. As for tactics, "Roberts...and his chief of staff, Major
General... Kitchener, saw the futility of direct assaults and broke the static war on the
march to relieve Kimberley with a wide flanking movement to the east." 38 As for
reinforcements, "the sheer scale of [Robert's] army... took away one's breath. Roberts
and Kitchener had five divisions - about forty thousand men, with one hundred guns,
including a whole division of cavalry...." 39 The British were well on their way to the
overwhelming numerical superiority so common amongst the opponents of hybrid
forces.
Roberts' new tactics and troops produced results quickly when, in
response to the British flanking maneuver, "the commander opposing Roberts, Piet
Cronje, refused to move from his 'impregnable' position on the railway above the
Modder River until it was too late....The result was inevitable: Cronje's force was
surrounded and...Cronje surrendered 4,100 Boers east of Paardeberg in the Orange Free
State on February 27, 1900." 40 The Paardeberg disaster so demoralized the Boers that
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even those in the east "streamed back in confusion and disorder, abandoning the siege
of Ladysmith, and climbing up on the heights of the Drakensberg Mountains, forming
the Transvaal-Natal frontier." 41
"Boer morale collapsed everywhere. Except for [one] fierce fight..., the
Boers put up only sporadic resistance during the subsequent British march to the
Orange Free State capital, Bloemfontein, seized by Roberts on March 13, 1900." 42 But just
as in the Peninsular War, the apparent end of conventional resistance did not signal, as
many assumed, the end of the war. Instead, a new form of resistance emerged and the
war entered its second phase.
b. Phase II - Hybrid Resistance, March, 1900 to December, 1900
After the fall of Bloemfontein "Marthinus...Steyn/ president of the Free
State, and some of the younger [Boer] leaders prepared to wage guerrilla war. Their
decision changed the nature of the conflict. . . Z' 43 Soon, Kruger also agreed to guerrilla
operations, "although [the Boers] did not abandon conventional strategy." 44 Thus, a
hybrid force was born. Steyn and Kruger worked to rally the morale of the Boer regulars
and "Boer spirits, always mercurial, rebounded." 45 As for the irregulars, Free Stater
Christiaan De Wet now gave, "less than three weeks after the fall of Bloemfontein, a
sensational demonstration of what [guerrilla warfare] meant, by taking a mere fifteen
hundred men to operate on the flank of the British army of thirty thousand." 46
In two raids on the eastern flank of the British advance, De Wef s men
killed or wounded over 200 British and captured nearly a thousand. 47 When Roberts
resumed his advance out of Bloemfontein to eliminate the rejuvenated Boer regulars,
guerrilla attacks by De Wet and other Free Staters "caused more than 1,500
casualties...." 48 Pursuing the retreating Boer regulars, and tormented by growing
irregular resistance,
[Roberts' advance] began to resemble Halleck's and Grant's march
through Tennessee with Forrest and Morgan tearing at their lines of
communication. As fast as Roberts' soldiers repaired the tracks, Boer
guerrillas tore them up. Out of seventy five thousand troops, Roberts
was forced to use nearly half guarding his single line of communications!
And these were none too many. Upon reaching Johannesburg,...his
troops '...were living from hand to mouth,' the result of short supply.49
While Roberts' numerical superiority allowed him to eventually resupply
and resume the advance, when he finally captured Transvaal's capital of Pretoria in
early June, he allowed the Boer regulars to withdraw from the town unmolested.
Roberts was "confident that this was a gentleman's war," and that his capture of both
enemy capitals "had won it." 50 The Boers, however, had no intention of giving up the
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fight. Roberts' confidence had served only to ensure that both components of the Boer
hybrid force would survive. Consequently, as 1900 wore on, the British began to face
the same dilemma which had plagued French commanders in Spain. As Thomas
Pakenham paraphrases Roberts' letters of early August:
Six weeks ago, he had been convinced that the war was virtually over.
Now he was not so sure. Once again, there were two basic choices. Give
priority to rounding up the guerrilla leaders...west of Pretoria? Or press
on with regular warfare: that is, march against the last real Boer army in
the field, Botha's army,...and push on eastwards along the railway
towards Mozambique?5
Unlike the Anglo-Iberians, however, the Boer hybrid force lacked a
foreign ally who could provide support and a regular component which, at this point,
could pose a serious threat. Indeed, "just as the guerrilla war was emerging from its
gestation, the conventional war was coming to an end."52 Hence, when Roberts
"decided to attempt both a round-up of [the irregulars] and [to] try to push on to the
Portuguese border,"53 he was able to accomplish what the French never could -
conclusive success against one of the hybrid elements. Botha's regulars conducted a
righting withdrawal through October but, with the irregulars operating far to the west,
saw no prospect for the dispersal of the British army which pursued them. By late
October, the British had split the remaining Boer regular force in two: Botha's northern
component, "now only 2,500 strong, concentrated on flight;" 54 and the southern
component "surrendered to the Portuguese colonial authorities after making a
spectacular bonfire of fifteen hundred railway trucks and their contents - and
abandoning their last [artillery pieces]." 55
Just over a month later, Roberts pronounced to an audience in Durban*
that the war was "'practically' over."56 And "so it was: the war of set-piece battles. But a
new war - just as costly in time and money and human lives, and far more bitter,
because it directly involved civilians - had only just begun." 57 For Roberts had casually
disregarded the combat power "of the thirty thousand Boers still at large in the Free
State and the Western Transvaal...."58 These guerrillas put the lie to Roberts'
pronouncement the very month he made it by raiding into the British Cape Colony and
by inflicting almost a thousand losses on various British detachments in the Boer states.59
The final phase of the war had opened. But the Boers, thanks to tactical blunders like
Paardeberg and to increasingly energetic British pursuit of their regular forces, would
fight this last phase of the Second Boer War with only their irregulars.
* Durban was a port in the British colony of Natal. Natal bordered the Cape Colony to the east.
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c. Phase III - Irregular Resistance, January, 1901 to May, 1902
Still convinced the war was over, Roberts departed for England in
January, 1901, turning command over to Lord Kitchener. As Kitchener soon discovered,
however,
Far from being over, the war was heating up. Living off the land, the
Boer commandos, sometimes separately and sometimes in harmony,
continued to strike throughout the Transvaal and the Free State, blowing
bridges, pulling up railway tracks and derailing trains, falling on isolated
garrisons, burning stores, destroying convoys - all in mocking denial of a
British claim to victory.60
Confident of the British people's resolve, however, "Kitchener knew that
ultimately he would win...."61 Thus, after the failure of an early peace initiative from
Botha, Kitchener devoted his efforts to subduing the Boer irregulars by turning "the
entire vast territory into an armed camp - a British camp." 62 His first step was to build
blockhouses. He did so for two reasons. First, to protect the railroads, whose
importance to sustaining "the British forces in South Africa had been obvious to all
commanders from the beginning."63 Second, the British unexpectedly discovered that
the initial line of blockhouses "served as a barrier of sorts which restricted the mobility
of the Boer commandos." 64
Kitchener saw that his task would be made easier if he could prevent the
Boers from moving freely about, if he could prevent them from
combining forces and hinder their communication with one another. By
extensive use of blockhouses... he could divide the sea of the population
in which the guerrillas swam (to use Mao Tse-tung's analogy) into
polders which could be drained of supplies and population and in which
the fighting burghers might more easily be caught. So the blockhouse
system was extended until some 8,000 were built, stretching for 3,700
miles along the railways. By November 1901 some 14,700 square miles of
the Transvaal and 17,000 square miles of the Orange Free State were
enclosed.65
With the construction of the blockhouses well underway, Kitchener
enacted the next measure of his campaign to destroy the Boer irregulars - "mounted
'flying columns'....on 'drives' of the increasingly segregated [countryside]...."66
Kitchener himself "did not expect great bags of prisoners" from these forays.67 Rather,
their value lay in keeping "the commandos off balance and out of touch with each
other."68 At this, the blockhouse-and-column combination was eventually quite
successful, as "the Boer commandos were kept on the move, worn down and defeated in
detail."69 One wonders how the existence of a substantial Boer regular force may have
impacted the operation of the blockhouse-and-column system. If the French experience
in Spain is any indication, such a force could have compelled the British to either
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abandon great sections of the blockhouse line as being too vulnerable, or reinforce them
to the point that the columns were too weak to chase irregulars.
Finally, to deprive the remaining irregulars of intelligence and food,
Kitchener cleared "key areas of people, moving women and children into concentration
camps....[and] burned farms in the best Sherman tradition." 70 Consequently, though the
Boer irregulars continued to conduct successful raids, they "lacked food, mounts, and
medicine. Continual hardship, desertions, [and] pursuit had flagged once-ebullient
spirits. Peace seemed inevitable and. . .even enviable. They quit in the spring of 1902."71
B. CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS
1. Applying the Hypothesis
a. Did the Hybrid Force Commander coordinate the efforts of his
Force?
No. The Boers' very nature worked against the establishment of a single
overall commander and the coordination of their forces. They "suffered from an
inefficient council-of-war system which itself reflected their entire socio-political
structure, with its insistence on decentralization and popular control."72 This made "the
commandos...awkward in conventional war," in large part because they lacked "a
command hierarchy that could control and deploy commandos when several came
together."73 Such lack of coordination had long been a characteristic of the Boers, as
even in the First Boer War, they had "no real organization. They were merely bodies of
determined men...."74 Consequently, other than Kruger's initial directive to besiege the
three British garrisons, the Boers did not coordinate their operations during the first
phase of the Second Boer War. Their failure to coordinate continued into the hybrid
phase, with "the commandos having fought more or less separately for months." 75 Not
surprisingly, the switch to solely guerrilla operations brought no improvement, for the
commandos continued to strike "sometimes separately and sometimes in harmony...." 76
b. Did the Hybrid Commander decentralize the Irregular
Component?
Yes, although this was due once again not to the decision of an overall
commander, but to the nature of the Boers, whose "entire socio-political structure"
insisted on decentralization. Thus, while Boer "laws supposedly governed call to action,
desertion, and leaves," they "were seldom enforced." 77 Instead, "the Boer army was
volunteer in the full sense of the term....A commandant could never be sure precisely
how many men he had, but the system emphasized self-reliance and thinking for
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oneself. Indeed, Boers simply disregarded orders if they found them unacceptable."78
This decentralization became, according to Bevin Alexander,
a strength when the conventional war failed and the commando returned
to its local base [to conduct irregular operations]. There it could operate
on its own, requiring little or no direction. Its independence encouraged
members to exploit opportunities to attack small British detachments or
posts, while it could mobilize, strike, and disappear or disperse within
hours.79
c. What level of efficiency would one expect from this Hybrid
Force?
Due almost entirely to the nature of the Boer people, the Boer forces were
segregated throughout the Second Boer War. That same nature ensured, however, that
the Boer irregulars had complete freedom of action in conducting their operations.
Consequently, this hybrid force is placed in a region where I hypothesize it would not









Figure 8. Expected Efficiency of the Boer Hybrid Force
d. How efficient was the Hybrid Force in actuality?
Evaluating the efficiency of the Boer hybrid force again begins with the
selection of a starting point. For the Boers, that starting point occurred in March, 1900.
Urged on by younger commanders like De Wet, after the fall of Bloemfontein the senior
Boer leaders agreed to sanction guerrilla warfare. De Wet's initial raids later that month
marked the first time the Boers had employed both components of a hybrid force.
The next step in estimating efficiency is calculating the costs a force
inflicts upon its opponent. Unlike the Peninsular War, where the French suffered
minimal losses prior to facing a hybrid force, the Boer regulars had extracted a
significant toll from the British invaders during this war's conventional phase.
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Additionally, the Boers had sustained their resistance far longer than the British
imagined that a "'trumpery little State'" filled with "'impudent burghers'" ever could
have.80 Given this background, what further costs did the Boer hybrid force extract from
the British?
On the positive side, outnumbered no less than 5 to 1 (and from the
second half of 1901 onward about 12 to 1), the Boers sustained a fight for over two years
after adopting a hybrid approach.81 Also, by the war's end the Boers were directly or
indirectly responsible for "over a hundred thousand [British] casualties...." 82 Perhaps
most importantly, the Boers inflicted some political costs on the British:
Although Britain finally won the South African War in theory, it actually
granted the Boers what they had been fighting for: ultimate
independence; guarantee that their Dutch-dialect language, Afrikaans, an
essential element of their cultural identity, would be retained, and an
agreement not to allow the overwhelmingly more numerous blacks in
South Africa to gain political rights.83
On the negative side, however, the enormous amount of resources
employed to inflict costs on the British reduced the Boers' overall military efficiency.84
The South Africans "lost an estimated 4,000 killed, [and] thousands more wounded...."85
Another 25,000 Boer combatants were captured and deported overseas.86 But the Boers
lost some of their greatest resources off the battlefield. For example, Kitchener
eventually "herded 120,000 Afrikaners, mostly women and children, into filthy
concentration camps... where more than 20,000 people died...."87 Moreover, by war's
end, Boer "survivors returned to homesteads devastated almost beyond recognition."88
As a British officer wrote in September, 1901: 'The country is now almost entirely laid
waste. You can go for miles and miles - in fact you might march for weeks and weeks
and see no sign of a living thing or a cultivated patch of land - nothing but burnt farms
and desolation." 89
On balance then, one cannot argue that after adopting a hybrid approach,
given the great amount of Boer resources employed, the Boers inflicted great costs on the
British.
e. Was the Boers' minimal coordination, yet tremendous
decentralization, responsible for the mediocre efficiency
achieved?
One again reaches the most important question in evaluating my
hypothesis: to what degree was the Boers' lack of coordination, yet great
decentralization, responsible for the relatively mediocre level of efficiency achieved by
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their hybrid force? In short, while the Boers' decentralization enhanced their irregular
operations, their lack of coordination crippled their overall efficiency.
Because the size of the Boer regular component had been greatly reduced
by the time they adopted a hybrid approach, one would think they had a hard time
employing the dispersion /concentration dilemma. The British mitigated this Boer
handicap, however, by almost always remaining concentrated to attack the Boer regular
component, regardless of its dwindling relative strength. This presented aggressive
guerrilla commanders with outstanding opportunities. In late June 1900, for instance, a
series of attacks by De Wet "caused panic along the line of Roberts's communications."90
De Wet experienced such success that Roberts decided that "the main advance had now
become of secondary importance to the task of hunting down the twin leaders and
symbols of the Boer resistance, Steyn and De Wet."91 But the lack of coordination
amongst Boer commandos meant that other guerrillas did not follow up on De Wet's
success. Boer irregular operations thus became independent and aggravating, instead of
orchestrated and threatening. De Wefs June raids excepted, they did not compel the
British to drain troops away from the effort to destroy the remaining Boer regulars. One
can only imagine what a sequence of coordinated guerrilla strikes back along Roberts'
line of communication, and perhaps into the Cape Colony, might have done to the
British campaign. Such a campaign would almost certainly have slowed, if not halted,
the pursuit of Botha.
Yet even on those few occasions during the early months of the Boer
hybrid approach when irregular attacks actually threatened the British, the lack of
coordination also meant that Botha did nothing with his irregulars to exploit the
opportunity. Thus, after De Wefs attacks refocused the British in June, Roberts' forces
were free to hunt down and capture more than 4,300 Boer irregulars.92 Botha's regulars
east of Pretoria apparently did nothing to improve their situation. Without question, the
Boer commandos' tendency to fight "more or less separately for months" crippled their
ability to inflict costs on the British foe.
It is thus evident that the Boers' lack of coordination reduced their
efficiency - their ability to use their limited resources to inflict costs on the British. But a
more important influence on the Boer hybrid force's inefficiency may have been just
how limited their resources were. When hybrid operations began, the British fielded
tens of thousands of regulars - a force "that took away one's breath" ~ while their Boer
counterparts numbered no more than 7,000.93 The ratio only got more lopsided as 1900
wore on. Consequently, the Boer regulars did not possess enough combat power to
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make the British pay for concentrating. Aside from suicidal attacks, which Boer soldiers
would have refused to conduct,94 Botha could not take the offensive even if a
coordinated irregular offensive had been effective enough to force Roberts to disperse.
Hence, the British simply remained concentrated in overwhelming numbers until they
destroyed Botha's regulars. Then the British dispersed in similarly overwhelming
fashion - over 8,000 seven man blockhouse squads were spread across the Boer states,
and a further 60,000 men scattered in mobile columns - until they strangled the Boer
irregulars.95 Almost before it was launched, the Boer hybrid force was too weak, even
had it been coordinated to the same degree as Wellington's, to employ the
dispersion/ concentration dilemma.
I believe that the overwhelming impact of British numerical superiority
points toward the most important implication about efficiency one can draw from this
case study - the Boers adopted the hybrid approach too late. In short, the Boers would
have inflicted far greater costs with their given resources by adopting a hybrid approach
from the start of the conflict. If they had also addressed their coordination problems,
thus conducting integrated hybrid operations from the outset, they may very well have
improved their efficiency to the point where they could have achieved operational
success.
How could a Boer hybrid campaign, launched in October, 1900, have so
influenced Boer efficiency? Essentially, this speculation envisions the Boers,
simultaneous to besieging Ladysmith, Mafeking, and Kimberley, immediately launching
irregular operations to attrit and slow the advancing British columns.96 The initial
British columns, already struggling without communications or "flank or frontal
security," would have been extremely vulnerable to the same Boer raiders who seven
months later "caused panic along the line of Roberts' [much stronger column's]
communications." These then reduced columns would have marched into the disasters
of Magersfontein, Colenso, and Spion Kop and most likely received even a worse
beating. As the Boer regulars withdrew from these initial battlefields, the irregulars
could have fallen upon the British columns yet again. It is not hard to imagine a British
halt well short of the besieged garrisons and the Boer capitals.
Significant evidence supports this counterfactual scenario from both the
Boer and British perspective. For the Boers, such an approach would have played to the
strengths of their national character. While the Boers performed poorly in conventional
offensive operations, they excelled at tactical defense right up to the dissolution of their
regular forces. 97 Similarly, they seemed naturally gifted at irregular operations; though
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thoroughly outnumbered and virtually without refuge, they repeatedly scored guerrilla
success until almost the day the war ended.98 Moreover, the Boers did conduct
successful offensive irregular operations into the Cape Colony, albeit later in the war.99
Also, had the British advance still carried the war into the Boer homelands, despite the
harassment of Boer irregulars and the staunch resistance of Boer regulars, the Boer
people did demonstrate a willingness to endure tremendous hardship.
Postulating more British costs from an earlier Boer hybrid approach is
also consistent with much of the British historical record. Gross inefficiency did
characterize early British maneuvers as they advanced in vulnerable columns directly
toward their besieged countrymen. Completely discounting Boer resolve and
equipment, the British repeatedly launched high-casualty frontal assaults against
entrenched Boer regulars. The British also had great difficulty in suppressing Boer
irregulars, particularly during their first year of operations. During their early abortive
operations against the irregulars, the British often found
...that they frequently became the hunted, for the Boers, who could
usually outride them, captured British scouting parties with great
regularity. The British also suffered because they insisted that their
hunts, often involving half a dozen or more columns, must remain under
central command. By the time the leader could be found to make a
decision, the quarry had often flown. 100
Finally, history shows the British were weakened even by the Boers'
tardily initiated, poorly coordinated hybrid approach. After Roberts' captured.
Bloemfontein, he was still "extremely short of supply...." 101 Worse yet, "he '...had no
cavalry, no mounted infantry and no artillery with horses in effective condition.' Enteric
fever continued its violent course and he had to clear Boer partisans from his right flank.
He took seven weeks to put matters to his satisfaction before advancing north along the
railway toward Pretoria." 102 Moreover, by the time Roberts' forces reached Pretoria, he
himself admitted that they "'...were living from hand to mouth.'" 103 One can only
imagine the condition of Roberts' troops if, instead of experiencing only a few weeks of
limited Boer guerrilla attacks, they had been subjected to relentless hounding from the
beginning of their march over six months before. Botha's regulars, having suffered
fewer losses from the reduced-strength British columns, may have even found it within
themselves to pounce upon Roberts' exhausted force and score a conventional offensive
victory.
Thus, this case study not only highlights the importance of both
coordination and decentralization (as opposed to just the latter) to efficient hybrid
warfare, but that hybrid warfare itself can be the most efficient form of war available.
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As it was, the Second Boer War "proved to be the longest, the costliest, the bloodiest and
most humiliating war for Britain between 1815 and 1914." 104 Had the Boers adopted a
hybrid approach from the start, the war could have become one of Britain's most
humiliating defeats of all time.
2. Other Tentative Conclusions Emerging from this Hybrid
Campaign
a. Necessity of Local Popular Support for the Hybrid Force
This conclusion, drawn from analyzing both the Anglo-Arab and Anglo-
Iberian efforts, is reinforced by the events of the Second Boer War. Boer "civilians"
provided the commandos with intelligence, supplies, and anonymity. The beginning of
the commandos' admittedly protracted end occurred when Kitchener recognized this
and, in 1901, "hit upon virtually the only method that will defeat a people who refuse to
bow to an invader: their eradication one way or another." 105 His combination of farm
burnings and forced relocation aimed to "drain" the "sea of the population in which the
guerrillas swam...." 106 Slowly but relentlessly, as Kitchener's measures physically
denied them a population for support, "the Boer commandos were kept on the move,
worn down and defeated in detail." 107 Consequently, it is once again clear that a hybrid
force, particularly its irregular component, cannot survive without local popular
support.
b. Minimizing Strategic Vulnerability of Hybrid Regulars
Unlike the Peninsular War, where the Royal Navy and wise leadership
preserved the outnumbered British regulars, in the Second Boer War, the Boer regulars'
strategic vulnerability either could not, or would not, be minimized. In regards to
"could not," "superior sea power allowed the British to defy all foreign sympathizers
with the Boers." 108 Playing the exact opposite role than it had fulfilled in the Peninsular
War, the Royal Navy this time prevented either foreign regulars from reinforcing the
Boers or the Boers from evacuating their own hard-pressed regulars. If the Boers could
not augment nor save their regulars, and therefore could not for long employ the
dispersion /concentration dilemma nor shield their irregulars, was their hybrid force not
doomed? If so, is the counterfactual scenario presented earlier not fatally flawed?
One response to these legitimate questions is the possibility that an earlier
hybrid approach may have ended hostilities before the British could destroy the Boer
regulars. A second response arises from the "would not" mentioned above: namely,
some Boer commanders sped up the destruction of the Boer regular component. Simply
put, "Boer military leadership was [often] extremely unimaginative and hesitant." 109
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General Cronje's poor moves prior to the surrender of 4,100 Boers near Paardeberg have
already been mentioned. Similarly, General Prinsloo's resolute inaction led directly to
the capture of 4,100 more Boers in the Brandwater Basin five months later. 110 Increasing
Botha's strength with these more than 8,000 men, and avoiding two morale-crushing
surrenders, could have markedly changed the progress of Roberts' advance to
Bloemfontein and Pretoria, to say nothing of the course of the war. So, even given the
dominance of the Royal Navy, the Boers could have done far more themselves to
preserve the strategic vulnerability of their regulars. With or without the earlier
adoption of a hybrid approach, such preservation would have undoubtedly improved
their efficiency.111
c. Impact of Conventional Opponent's Efficiency
The inefficiency resulting from the Boers' lack of coordination,
inconsistent leadership, and late start of hybrid operations was certainly mitigated by
British inefficiencies. The initial British inefficiencies in closing with and attacking the
Boer regulars have already been emphasized. Lord Roberts addressed the most glaring
of these problems by introducing maneuver to British operations. Similarly, as also
detailed earlier, the British were also inefficient in the early months of the guerrilla war.
Over time, however, Kitchener recognized how to defeat the guerrillas - essentially
through severe population control measures ~ and then acted on his recognition. In the
end then, unlike the French in Spain, the British addressed their inefficiencies with
measures which reduced their own costs and increased the costs inflicted on the enemy.
It is hard to overemphasize, however, the combined effect that the sheer
numbers of British troops and the great strategic vulnerability of the Boer regulars had
on compensating for British inefficiency. Indeed, these two factors combined to make
British inefficiency almost irrelevant because they were virtually certain of eventually
destroying the Boer regulars. With no regular opponent left to threaten them, the British
thus had the one luxury the French in Spain never possessed - a one dimensional
enemy. They then proved the validity of David Chandler's comment cited in the
previous chapter: freed from a regular threat, a conquering power might be "able to
combat the guerrilla war on its own and overwhelm it." 112 So the point here is that
Kitchener's efficient population control measures for defeating the guerrillas cannot be
employed against a viable hybrid threat. While Kitchener, if he had been the French
commander in Spain, may have recognized the inefficiency of reprisals for cowing a
hostile population, the fact is that he could not have employed any of the population
control measures which proved so effective in South Africa. Dispersing his troops to
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man blockhouses and herd Spaniards into concentration camps would have given
Wellington free rein to strike decisively anywhere on the Peninsula. Thus, the British
may not have been any smarter than the French, they simply obtained a position of
advantage (i.e. no regular opposition) which the former never enjoyed.
d. Most effective use of indigenous manpower
While both previous cases emphasized the impact on efficiency of placing
indigenous manpower in its proper role (as regulars or irregulars), this case (with
indigenous manpower filling both components) underscored the importance of utilizing
manpower effectively once it was in the proper role. For example, stubbornly foolish
leadership needlessly sacrificed Boer regulars at the surrenders of Paardeberg and
Brandwater Basin. Also, a lack of vision among senior Boer leaders delayed
implementation of hybrid operations until their opportunity to be decisive had passed.
The problem in this case, then, was not manpower utilization, but operational
leadership.
It is important to note, however, that a failure in either of these aspects of
employing indigenous manpower produces similar results. Arab tribesmen and
Spanish peasants misutilized as regulars achieved minimal efficiency. Alternatively,
Boer farmers idly awaiting encirclement by superior forces, or passively allowing their
enemy an unmolested approach march of several hundred miles, also achieved poor
efficiency. Consequently, the most efficient use of indigenous manpower is not just a
question of placing them in the proper role, but in competently employing them within
that role.
e. Hybrid warfare as the only Viable Means of Resistance
On this issue, there are strong parallels between the Peninsular War and
the Second Boer War. In both cases, the initiation of hybrid operations followed the
virtual destruction of one side's regular forces. As such, it is unequivocally clear that
neither Anglo-Iberian nor Boer regulars alone could have maintained long term
resistance to their opponents. But unlike the Peninsular War - where British
reinforcements replaced the defeated Spanish regulars - the Second Boer War portrays
the fate of a hybrid force which could not replace its regular losses; a force which indeed
eventually lost its regular component entirely. The fact that Boer irregulars alone were
able to sustain resistance for only sixteen months, while Spanish guerrillas with British
regular support were able to fight for five years, appears to reinforce the conclusion that
a hybrid approach offers the only chance to maintain long-term resistance to a
numerically superior foe.
66
But one could argue that this conclusion is suspect, drawn as it is from
just two comparable, but far from exactly similar, cases. One could point to Britain's
domination of the sea, her vastly superior numbers, and the inconsistent quality of Boer
leadership and argue that even an earlier launched hybrid campaign would have done
nothing to extend the life of the Boer resistance. While I cannot absolutely refute this
contention, a closer examination of the course of the Boer resistance reveals that even an
ineffective hybrid approach will sustain resistance longer than solely conventional or
solely irregular efforts.
Boer regular resistance, one will recall, ended in late 1900. If doubtful
that a hybrid approach extends a resistance's longevity, one could simply assume the
Boers delayed launching irregular operations until that time. One could then make a
reasonable argument that the war would still have continued for quite some time,
because eliminating a guerrilla movement in a land as vast as South Africa was bound to
be a lengthy process. Hence, one could conclude, the impact of the hybrid approach on
lengthening the Boer resistance was minimal. The problem with such a scenario,
however, is that without the irregular operations which commenced after Bloemfontein,
Botha's remaining regulars would probably have been eliminated much more rapidly.
And without the morale boost which irregular successes provided to the Boer people,
Botha's defeat would have probably brought the Boers to the peace table in the middle
of 1900, without ever launching irregular warfare. From this examination, it is clear that
even the Boers' less than efficient hybrid force significantly extended the period through
they were able to sustain the fight.
So on two counts, then, the Second Boer War recommends hybrid warfare
as the only way to maintain viable long-term resistance against a numerically superior
foe. First, the Boer guerrillas operating alone survived for less than a third of the life of
the Spanish guerrillas operating as part of a hybrid force. Second, while the actual Boer
resistance, bolstered by a period of admittedly inefficient hybrid operations, lasted for
thirty months, it appears that a Boer resistance without any hybrid operations would
have lasted for less than twelve.
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Two related issues regarding the strategic vulnerability of the Boer regulars deserve mention.
The first is whether, had they chosen to do so, the Boers could have withdrawn their
regulars to a "sanctuary" to preserve them for later operations against the British. Excluding
consideration of the coordination this would have required, geography makes it doubtful. On
the eastern front, Britain demonstrated during the war that it would pursue the Boer regulars
right to the border of Portuguese East Africa, where the South Africans surrendered rather than
cross into foreign territory. Had the Boers instead chosen to go west, they would have run into
the border of British controlled Bechuanaland, where, if they had not surrendered, the Kalahari
Desert would have presented immense survivability issues.
This left only the north, which may have provided a potential sanctuary - "the
Magaliesberg, a high, jagged, grey crescent of mountains running for a hundred miles west from
Pretoria" (Alexander, p. 104). "(D]ominated by [Koos] De la Rey and 7,000 [Boer irregulars]...the
British feared to enter [the Magaliesberg] without mounting a large expedition" (Alexander, p.
104). The Boers might have been able to retreat there and, given the rugged nature of the terrain,
mount a stiff defense. One has to believe, however, that if the Magaliesberg held the only
remaining Boer regulars, the British would have concentrated their overwhelrning conventional
strength and defeated them. Deft leadership, then, would seem the only "sanctuary" available to
protect the Boer regulars.
The second issue is the impact that the lack of a geographical sanctuary and the fact of a
naval blockade had on the disposition of British soldiers captured by the Boers. While the Boers,
especially with their guerrilla raids, captured great numbers of British soldiers, "in most
cases,...the Boers [had] to abandon their prisoners of war, because they could not move at the
pace of the commandos - and there was no Boer sanctuary where prisoners could be held in
compounds. The usual solution was to strip the captured men of clothing and weapons and send
them marching towards the nearest British detachment. The likelihood that they would be
released safely and soon, although shorn of their dignity, doubtless induced many British
soldiers to surrender when they otherwise might have fought to the end" (Alexander, p. 101).
Had the Boers been able to transport their POWs to holding areas, the not unsubstantial
reduction in British troop strength could have affected the course of the war.
in Chandler, p. 171.
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CHAPTER V -THE CAMPAIGN FOR MYITKYINA, 1943 - 1944
A. HISTORICAL SUMMARY
1. What Was the Theater of Conflict?
Northern Burma. General Stilwell, the hybrid force commander,
described the terrain traversed by the campaign as a "rat hole." 1
The rat hole was a series of three valleys: the Hukawng, terminating in a
ridge called the Jambu Bum; next the Mogaung valley leading to the main
north-south railroad; and on the other side of the railroad the broad
Irrawaddy [River] valley, Burma's central corridor. Myitkyina, the
northernmost major Japanese garrison and air base, lay on the railroad
and river 40 miles below Mogaung .... The slot assigned to NCAC,* thick
with jungle growth and threaded by overgrown trails which allowed
progress of sometimes as little as a mile an hour, and edged by mountain
ranges carved in directionless ridges by the run offs from heavy rains,
was as forbidding fighting country as any in the world.2
2. The Combatants
a. Who Were They?
The conventional opponent was the 18th Division of the Japanese
Fifteenth Army. Under General Shinichi Tanaka, the 18th Division and its supporting
units apparently mustered less than 10,000 fighting men.3
The hybrid force was composed of Chinese* regulars and both American
and British irregulars, all under the command of American General Joseph Stilwell.
Organized into the 22nd and SS^Infantry Divisions, the Chinese regulars totaled
approximately 24,000 men.4 The British irregulars — the Chindits — numbered about
three thousand men. They had been established in late 1942 to test the idea "that a
relatively small force working behind enemy lines could cause damage out of all
proportion to its numbers, confuse and demoralize the enemy, and wreck his
communications."5 The American irregulars, three thousand volunteer troops of the
5307th Provisional Infantry Regiment, were "America's answer to the Chindits" and
were usually referred to either by their code name "Galahad" or by the popular moniker
"Merrill's Marauders." 6
* NCAC, the Northern Combat Area Command, was the official designator of Stilwell's hybrid
force.
* Unless otherwise noted, references in this study to China or Chinese refer specifically to
Nationalist China and the forces under Chiang Kai-shek, and exclude the Communist forces
under MaoTse-tung.
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b. Why Were They Fighting?
In January, 1942, the Japanese, as part of their whirlwind offensive which
launched the Pacific War, invaded Burma and swiftly defeated the defending British,
Indian, and Chinese forces. By securing the British colony, the Japanese accomplished
two objectives: they "cut off China [with whom they had been openly fighting since
1937] completely from surface communication with her allies," and they "seize[d] an
area which could...protect the western approaches to the[ir] Southern Resources Area." 7
Once the initial Japanese onslaught in the Pacific and southeast Asia had run its course,
the British set as their primary goal the recapturing of their most-prized colonial
holdings in the Far East — Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Alternatively, the
United States' principal objective for that theater, as it had been before Pearl Harbor,
was the maintenance of a land route over which to supply China - a route that could
only run through Burma. Thus, the major impetus behind Allied efforts to reconquer
Burma came not from its previous colonial master Great Britain, but from the United
States.
8
Prior to the Japanese conquest, Burma "was China's last remaining land
link to the outside world. Along the so-called 'Burma Road' - 700 miles of primitive dirt
highway connecting Chungking with Burma through the jungles and mountains of
south China - [had] flowed the lend-lease supplies and other outside aid which kept
China in the war."9 Consequently, the United States, anxious to reopen the Road, had
begun planning Burma's liberation almost the moment the Japanese completed their
conquest. 10 Out of this clash of mutually exclusive interests - the Japanese desire to hold
Burma, versus the American desire to seize it - sprang the Allied hybrid campaign of
1943-44.
It is important to note at this point that, unlike the Spanish guerrillas or
the Boer commandos, Burmese citizens did not contribute substantially as combatants.
Most, because they "had been promised Burma's independence from Britain,"
supported the Japanese. 11 But although Burmese rebels "had some success in inciting
minor uprisings against the British and in sabotage behind the British lines" during the
Allied retreat of 1942,n collaborationist Burmese units "were not much use" to the
Japanese for the rest of the conflict. 13 The Burmese's greatest impact was, thanks to their
support of the Japanese, to make the Allied effort to retake Burma an invasion of an
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North Burma, 1944 Figure 9. Northern Burma (from Barbara Tuchman's Stilwell
Ledo Road and Burma Road ===== and the American Experience in China)
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essentially hostile country. 14 This lack of local popular support would significantly
affect the efficiency of the Allied hybrid force, and will be addressed below.
c. What Was the Relative Quality of Each Opponent?
The Japanese "18th Division, veteran of the [the invasion of 1942] and the
conquest of Singapore, [was] considered one of the ablest and best-trained divisions in
the Japanese Army." 15 This reputation is even more impressive when one considers that
by the time the Allied hybrid force invaded Burma in late 1943, the entire Japanese
Army in southeast Asia had earned a reputation as nearly invincible jungle fighters. 16
As further evidence of the high quality of Japanese infantry, three other divisions which
fought elsewhere in Burma during 1944 "never lost cohesion or combat effectiveness"
despite suffering over fifty percent killed and being constantly "harassed from the air
and by pursuing British troops." 17
Stilwell's hybrid force demonstrated no such across-the-board reliability.
Foremost among its weaknesses was the generally poor senior leadership of the Chinese
regulars. Because Chiang Kai-shek was most concerned with preserving his political
power, as opposed to defeating the Japanese, Chinese divisions "were commanded by
officers chosen more for their loyalty to the generalissimo than for their military
prowess." 18 This in turn meant that Stilwell's "physical presence" was often "'the only
thing that would impart real drive to his troops.'" 19
As for the Chinese troops themselves, they displayed a frustrating mix of
deplorable and admirable characteristics. Regarding the former, "measured time was of
no concern to them and no plan based on accurate timing had a hope of success....
Familiar with the absence in the [Chinese] home army of any supply, transport or
medical organization..., they were accustomed to keeping themselves alive by
scavenging and would take or steal any object of any kind that lay loose." 20 More
ominous than any larceny or dilatoriness was their "sense of military inferiority to the
Japanese; they did not believe they could defeat them ...." 21 Not surprisingly, such
troops often performed poorly in combat. As an American officer summarized after
inspecting Chinese troops in 1941, "The will to fight an aggressive action does not yet
exist in the Chinese Army." 22
Before dismissing the Chinese regulars as the equals of the Spanish army
discussed in Chapter III, however, one must know that they could also perform worthy
service. From Barbara Tuchman, one learns that "they were the sturdiest walkers of any
army in the world. They had in large measure... courage, stamina, willingness and an
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eye for the country, and their dominant characteristic, as Wingate* observed, was
cheerfulness. 'Under conditions which would reduce Europeans to gloomy despair,
smiles of pure joy break out constantly over the Chinese face.'" 23 Such unflappable
soldiers had fought well around Shanghai in 1937, and offered "determined resistance"
which "resulted in the bloodiest fighting of the war in China" in mid-1938.24 Moreover,
General Stilwell had established a training center at Ramgarh (in eastern India) for the
Chinese troops who had escaped from Burma in 1942. There, "between 1942 and 1944,
four Chinese divisions [including the 22nd and 38th ] were created and equipped...of an
effectiveness never before known in Chinese history." 25 So, while the Chinese never
completely shed their inadequacies, the quality of their equipment and their fighting in
the early stages of the hybrid campaign would lead the Japanese to recognize "that they
confronted a new enemy." 26
Both of Stilwell irregular contingents, in contrast to the discouraging
inconsistency of the Chinese, were comprised mostly of outstanding leaders and
soldiers. The British Chindits were trained and led by veterans of their first large-scale
infiltration of Burma. During that operation, from February to May, 1943, "the Japanese,
heretofore regarded as invincible jungle fighters, had been bested at their own game.
Wingate' s Chindits had demonstrated that British... soldiers could... live and fight in the
jungle and that, if supplied by air, they could be more mobile than the Japanese."27
Although many of Galahad's soldiers were not equal to the Chindits in quality - the call
for volunteers had brought some "hardened jungle fighters," but "also a good sprinkling
of the bored, the restless, the adventurous, and the 'misfits of half a dozen
divisions,'" 28 - a Chindit supervised training program soon created an aggressive "pride
of unit and daredevil spirit" amongst the Americans.29
3. How Did the Campaign Progress & What Were the Decisive
Events?
Although professionally and personally committed to the ultimate goal of
reopening the land route to China,30 Stilwell established an interim operational objective
for his hybrid offensive: "Myitkyina before the monsoon." 31 Myitkyina's importance
stemmed from the fact that, because the Japanese occupation of Burma had "cut China
off from all overland communications with her allies," "arms and supplies for China
now had to be flown from India across the so-called 'Hump' of the 15,000 foot Himalaya
Mountains in...over-worked transport planes. The pilots flew on oxygen, dodging bad
British Brigadier Orde Wingate, the commander of the Chindits, see below.
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weather and Japanese fighters to bring their cargoes to Kunming in southern China." 32
Seizing that part of Burma which lay between the Indian border and Myitkyina would
not only bring the Allies much closer to reopening the Burma Road, but would also
allow Hump flights "to use the shorter, safer, Myitkyina route." 33 Stilwell's operational
plan to get to Myitkyina, which all other senior Allied leaders thought "could not
succeed in the current combat season," 34
...employed the same hook [strategy] the Japanese had used in [their]
1942 [invasion] combined with the wide end-run envelopment which he
had made his specialty in the [pre-war] maneuvers of 1940-41 [in the
U.S.]. His design was to engage the enemy frontally while launching the
real attack through the jungle from the flank, and at the same time
dispatching an enveloping arm through the hills aimed at a point behind
the enemy with the object of establishing a roadblock to cut off his retreat.
The 18th Division was thus to be netted and annihilated in sections as
NCAC advanced.35
Following this plan resulted in a hybrid campaign which is once again most easily
reviewed in three phases: a conventional offensive; then, a hybrid offensive; and finally,
a primarily conventional siege.
a. Phase I - Conventional Offensive, October, 1943 - February,
1944
Because both irregular units were still preparing for combat, the initial
NCAC attack was launched with only the Chinese regulars. 'The 38th Division pushed
southeastward through the mountain spine of the India-Burma border into the
Hukawng Valley. All supplies were dropped by air." 36 Once into the Hukawng Valley,
lead elements of the 38th Division "were struck by a Japanese counterattack. [Near
Yubang Ga] three battalions were surrounded and the [NCAC] advance came to a
complete halt, though the Japanese were unable to overrun the 3 isolated units, which
were maintained by American air supply." 37 In late December, Stilwell arrived at the
front and "worked out plans for a serious attack on Yubang Ga..., arranged for artillery
barrage and flank attacks and made a speech to the troops saying this was an important
attack that must succeed."38 Soon thereafter, the Chinese "won their first victory over
the Japanese in Southeast Asia. It was not a very big fight, Chinese casualties were high,
and most of the enemy escaped - but it convinced the Chinese soldiers that they were a
match for the Japanese."39
After the Chinese resumed their advance in January, 1944, "effective
resistance by the Japanese...brought the...38th and 22nd divisions to a virtual standstill."40
Hesitant Chinese leadership only enhanced Japanese effectiveness. For example,
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A planned maneuver by the 66th [Regiment of the 38th Division] failed
when the regiment was discovered to be 'way off course' and could not
be located. Liaison officers were bewildered, patrols threshed about in
vain for two days....[Finally] Stilwell set out in person with [a small
party]... to find the missing battalions. Marching by compass in uncertain
proximity to the enemy, over [wretched terrain]., they found the lost 66th
by evening. Stilwell listened to an unacceptable explanation by the
commanding officer, ordered him relieved, [and] instructed his successor
how to reach the objective. . .
.
41
Worse yet for NCAC's pace was the rain. "So far there had been twelve days of rain in
January and there were to be 18 in February, ten in March and ten in April although this
was the 'dry' season. In this of all years an abnormal 175 inches of rain fell in north
Burma." 42 Exasperated by the torpidity of the advance, "in February Stilwell determined
to use the Galahad force, which had now joined him in Burma, to establish a block right
across the Japanese line of withdrawal, trapping them between the Americans and the
advancing Chinese." 43 With American irregulars now in the field with the Chinese, the
NCAC campaign entered its second phase.
b. Phase II - Hybrid Offensive, March through May, 1944
"After a 60-mile trek through the jungle which took them eight days,
Galahad came out to...seize the road at Walawbum [and establish the block]...but were
heavily counterattacked the next day."44 After a fierce five-day engagement, "the
Japanese commander decided to give up his attempt to destroy the Galahad
force....[and] sought to move his division south to safety."45 Although, due to "various
foul-ups and confusions and a too-cautious advance by one Chinese regiment, the main
body of the Japanese got away," they had suffered another defeat.46 "General Merrill
told his tired but exultant commandos: 'Between us and the Chinese, we forced the
Japanese to withdraw farther in the last three days than they have in the last three
months....'"47 This battle established a pattern which NCAC would repeat often during
this hybrid phase of its offensive. Confident in his plan, but disappointed by the
lethargic Chinese advance, Stilwell used his regulars only in frontal or short-range flank
attacks to force a Japanese withdrawal. Galahad, however — a unit he was convinced he
could "count on" — he ordered again and again to infiltrate behind the Japanese to
establish blocking positions, against which Stilwell hoped to smash them.
At the same time ~ early March, 1944 — the Chindits joined the NCAC
offensive. While Stilwell's blocking tactics frequently compelled Merrill's Marauders to
fight from fixed positions like regulars, the Chindits were supposed to fight much more
like guerrillas. "Operating separately [from Stilwell's main advance], but in accordance
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with a coordinated plan/' the air-inserted Chindits were "to cut the Mandalay-
Myitkyina railroad, and generally... disrupt the rear areas of Japanese forces facing
Stilwell's NCAC...." 48 To accomplish this mission, the Chindits' main body "moved to
Mawlu [south of Stilwell's position], where a strong defensive position was established,
blocking the railroad line." Only "a few columns spread out over Japanese rear areas to
create confusion and destroy supplies...." While these dispersed "Chindit columns
continued to harass Japanese rear areas," the Japanese made "a number of determined
local attacks" against the railroad blocking position. 49 Thus, as March came to a close,
Chindit "operations were effectively preventing attack on Stilwell's [southern] flank."50
To the north, after the somewhat encouraging results at Walawbum,
"Stilwell resolved to send the Marauders" on two subsequent blocking position
missions.51 While the Marauders inflicted serious losses on the Japanese each time, the
Chinese regulars could not finish off the remainder of the 18th Division. By this point,
The Galahad survivors had been through two arduous jungle campaigns.
Their ranks were thinned by casualties and disease. The Army K-ration
supplied to rhe[m]...as a routine diet was designed only for short-term
combat situations and did not provide the necessary calories for an active
adult. Among Merrill's men the average weight loss was over twenty
pounds - and these men were already lean and hardened by arduous
marching. According to the usual rules for jungle commando groups,
[they] should have been relieved.52
Their Chindit brethren "were in even worse shape than the Marauders."53 After
Japanese attacks made the first railroad blocking position untenable, the British
withdrew north up the line to establish a second position nearer Stilwell. "This was
soon attacked by strong Japanese forces, and a violent battle raged. The hard-pressed
Chindits, close to exhaustion and having suffered heavy casualties, withdrew again, this
time to the relative safety of the mountains farther west."54
By this point in May, 1944, with the Chinese making only slow progress
and the opening of the monsoon season just a month away, NCAC was still over fifty
miles from "Myitkyina, the great prize and objective of the campaign in northern
Burma." 5 Driven to reach his objective, but finding the Chindits unavailable and the
Chinese unreliable, Stilwell turned to the only "force he could count on to obey orders,"
Galahad. "So the hungry, tired Marauders, weak with disease, set out on their final
mission. They crossed the 6,000-foot Kuman Mountains on an end run to Myitkyina,
accompanied by about 4,000 Chinese troops and several hundred Kachin Rangers. Less
than three weeks later they emerged at Myitkyina and seized the airfield with little
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difficulty from the surprised handful of Japanese defenders." 56 The campaign had
entered its final phase.
c. Phase III - The Siege of Myitkyina, May to August, 1944
While the Allies held the Myitkyina airfield, and quickly flew in more
troops, "the Japanese rushed reinforcements to Myitkyina town; attempts by Chinese
units to take the place ended in fiasco."57 On schedule, "the monsoon rains set in and
the attempt to take Myitkyina settled into a long siege...." 58 To the west, the "Chinese
22nd and 38th Divisions resumed a slow advance down the Mogaung Valley against
Tanaka's continued skillful resistance." 59 On 26 June, with the assistance of "the worn
remnant of the 77th Chindit Brigade" fighting as regulars, the Chinese took Mogaung.60
With its capture, "the NCAC stood at last astride...the entrance to the Irrawaddy valley.
Crippled by 50 percent casualties, the Japanese 18th Division was reduced to a shattered
3,000 who...succeeded in withdrawing toward Mandalay. Except for the short gap
between Mogaung and Myitkyina, north Burma as far as the Irrawaddy was now
regained...."61
While even the sluggish Chinese figured to be able to cross this gap
against weakening Japanese resistance, the outcome at Myitkyina itself was still in
doubt. 'The Japanese, forced to yield ground inch by inch, exacted a heavy price in
Allied casualties." 62 As Stilwell wrote, two days after nearly 1,900 Chinese casualties
were flown out of Myitkyina, "the wear and tear on the nerves continues. Are we
attempting to much? Can they hold us? Is there a surprise ready? Counterattack? Will
our people stick it out? Casualties too heavy? I can tell that I've had nearly enough of
this." 63 "Finally, satisfied that they had imposed sufficient delay on the frustrated Allies,
700 semistarving Japanese survivors...made their way south through the jungles to
rejoin their main force, just as the final Allied assault, without opposition, swept over
the city." 64 Thus, on 3 August Stilwell's hybrid NCAC "successfully completed a
campaign which the British, and many Americans, had deemed impossible." 65
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B. CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS
1. Applying the Hypothesis
a. Did the Hybrid Force Commander coordinate the efforts of his
Force?
Yes, Stilwell consistently and intentionally combined the actions of the
Chinese divisions with the Marauders and Chindits so as to maximize the contributions
of each toward NCAC's objective. Obviously, each of Galahad's blocking missions were
designed to escalate the impact of the Chinese regulars' more traditional assaults.
Furthermore, in a reversal of typical roles, Stilwell utilized his regulars to occupy the
bulk of the enemy while the irregular Marauders directly assaulted the hybrid force's
ultimate objective, Myitkyina. Even the Chin- dits' more loosely controlled operations
were nonetheless "in accordance with a coordinated plan...." 66 Consequently, this
campaign showed deliberate linkages between the operations of the regulars and
irregulars, perhaps to an even greater extent than Allenby's use of the Arabs.
b. Did the Hybrid Commander decentralize the Irregular
Component?
Generally, no. Only the Chindits in their initial operations supporting
NCAC from March to May, 1944, were given great freedom of action. Otherwise,
Stilwell closely directed where and how his irregulars would conduct their operations.
Previous hybrid campaigns examined saw irregulars used to weaken a conventional
opponent by forcing him to disperse to deal with multiple irregular threats. Stilwell, on
the other hand, repeatedly concentrated his irregulars into a single force - such as the
Galahad blocking positions or the Chindit support at Mogaung - to supplement attacks
by his regulars. Far from forcing the enemy to disperse by frequent and extensive
operations in his rear areas, Stilwell's irregulars usually avoided enemy contact or
massed in a single location to await enemy attack. Without yet evaluating the merit of
this method, it is important nevertheless to recognize that Stilwell employed his
irregulars in a manner wholly different from Wellington's or Allenby's.67
c. What level of efficiency would one expect from this Hybrid
Force?
NCAC was a very well coordinated hybrid force which gave little
freedom of action to its irregulars. Therefore, I hypothesize it would not achieve a high




















Figure 10. Expected Efficiency for NCAC Hybrid Force
d. How efficient was the Hybrid Force in actuality?
As with the Boer campaign, the starting point for measuring NCAC's
efficiency occurs well after the opening of the entire campaign. Only after early March,
1944, when the Galahad force fought the battle of Walawbum and the Chindits deployed
into Burma, did Stilwell possess both elements of a hybrid force. Prior to March, the
Chinese regulars had barely fought their way into the first valley of Stilwell's three-
valley "rat hole." From this disappointing start, what costs did NCAC subsequently
inflict on the Japanese?
Without question, Stilwell's hybrid force caused tremendous Japanese
casualties. In addition to the 50% losses suffered by Tanaka's 18th Division, a further
3,000 Japanese died defending Myitkyina.68 Also, in contrast to the near fruitless
advance of the Chinese regulars alone, once the irregulars joined NCAC, the force
achieved an objective most deemed impossible. British Admiral Mountbatten, for
example, Supreme Allied Commander in the Far East, had asserted only a month before
Galahad seized Myitkyina's airfield "that conquest of that area [before the monsoon
season] was 'impossible,' and even if at later date was 'unsound and should not be
attempted.'" 69
Achieving this "impossible" mission inflicted costs on the Japanese
beyond the casualties they suffered. First, "the capture of Myitkyina. . . enabled the air
transports carrying supplies to China to fly the safer, shorter southern route to
Kunming. Delivery rates soared. In all of 1942, the transports had brought a scant 3,700
tons to China. For 1943... 61,000 tons;... [by October, 1944] the figure stood at over
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30,000 tons for a single month."70 Second, NCACs advance, by tying up the enemy's 18th
Division, denied the Japanese the troops they desperately needed to succeed in an attack
on Imphal and the rest of eastern India from western Burma - an attack "that could have
been as devastating in effect as Pearl Harbor...."71 "'If it had not been for NCAC/ in the
opinion of Colonel George Demetriadi, [British] liaison officer with Stilwell, 'the Japs
would have succeeded at Imphal.'" 72
But, in estimating the efficiency of NCAC, one must also recognize that
Stilwell expended tremendous Allied resources to inflict these costs on the Japanese. A
prime example is the fact that "the Allies had more than 5,000 casualties." 73 Specifically,
the near-continuous exposure of the Chindits to the elements and to the Japanese had
"ruin[ed] the fighting effectiveness of 5 fine British brigades." 74 Similarly, Stilwell's
methods destroyed the Marauders. After fighting the blocking position battles, but
before the march on Myitkyina, they were already "down to somewhat less than half
their original strength...."75 The fight for Myitkyina, where Marauders suffered
casualties "at the rate of seventy-five to a hundred a day," finished them off. Even
Stilwell had to admit, at the end of May, that "Galahad is just shot."76 Thus, the hybrid
force completely expended its two specially selected and trained irregular units in
obtaining an interim operational objective. For even though air-delivered tonnage to
China increased, the grievous casualties incurred by the hybrid force were not enough to
open the land route to China. That would require another conventional Allied offensive
in the fall.
In total then, the Allied hybrid force was not highly efficient. While it
inflicted substantial costs on the Japanese, it expended considerable Allied resources to
do so.
e. Was NCACs high degree of coordination, yet minimal
decentralization, responsible for the mediocre efficiency
achieved?
Yes, Stilwell's close coordination of his units, yet tight control of irregular
operations, was wholly responsible for the ratio of costs inflicted by NCAC to resources
expended by it. His unsparing destruction of half of the Marauders in recurrent
blocking force missions, while it may not have eliminated the 18th Division as swiftly as
intended, did progressively weaken Japanese resistance. Similarly, even though the
bulk of the Chindits were chewed up fighting from fixed positions along the Mandalay
railroad, they still drew off Japanese strength which could have otherwise been
engaging Stilwell's regulars. Furthermore, without the employment of the remaining
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Marauders as conventional assault troops at Myitkyina, and the surviving Chindits in
the same role at Mogaung, it is unlikely that either of those important towns would have
fallen to NCAC.
Nevertheless, centralized control of this hybrid force's irregulars did
result in their destruction, which not only reduced the final efficiency of NCAC, but also
the efficiency of any future Allied force in theater which may have benefited from
Galahad or Chindit operations. In view of this extravagant expenditure of friendly
resources - indeed, the destruction of Galahad led to a U.S. Congressional hearing77 —
one is clearly led to ask perhaps the most intriguing question about this hybrid
campaign: could it have been more efficient? Specifically, would greater
decentralization of the irregulars, aimed at forcing the Japanese to face a
dispersion/ concentration dilemma, have cut Allied losses without reducing, or perhaps
even increasing, Allied gains?
Some evidence does indicate that decentralization of the irregulars may
have forced greater Japanese dispersion. After all, the somewhat decentralized Chindit
operations south of Stilwell early in the campaign did tie down Japanese units and
prevent them from concentrating to attack the Chinese regulars' right flank.78 One can
thus reasonably contend that decentralized irregular operations north, east, and west of
Myitkyina might have similarly occupied the Japanese units which were rushed to
reinforce the town after the Allies seized the airfield.79 Without these reinforcements,
there would have been a shorter siege, fewer Allied casualties, and better NCAC
efficiency.
Indeed, in contemplating whether Stilwell could have forced the
dispersion/ concentration dilemma on the Japanese through greater decentralization of
his irregulars, one is struck by the similarities between NCAC's position in Burma and
Wellington's in Iberia. Both campaigns featured a tri-national hybrid force.
Additionally, both commanders sought to drive an occupying enemy from an invaded
country. Also, both forces sallied forth from a semi-secure base along a defined line of
operations to tackle the enemy. While Stilwell had less time than Wellington to
accomplish his objectives, NCAC's objectives were of a correspondingly smaller scale.
One wonders then, if these parallels suggest that Wellington's coordinated,
decentralized campaign offered a better strategy for the fight to reach Myitkyina than
Stilwell's coordinated, yet centralized, approach. A closer examination of the two
preconditions forwarded in Chapter II, however, demonstrates that the two campaigns
are not as comparable as a first glance might indicate.
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First, Wellington's British regulars were, thanks to his own leadership
and the Royal Navy, strategically invulnerable. As Marshal Bessieres, commander of the
French Army of the North after 1811, wrote, the British could accept or refuse battle "as
they please[ed].',8° Could Stilwell exercise the same flexibility with his Chinese regulars?
No, the realities of geography, transportation, and leadership prevented him from doing
so. As for geography, the few passes through the rugged mountains of the India-Burma
border meant that Stilwell could only retreat by the same route he had advanced.
Wellington, on the other hand, could have retreated to numerous ports on the Iberian
coast. Moreover, rapid withdrawal on even the one route open to NCAC was not
possible. It was merely a trace, transformed whenever rain fell into a "quagmire" in
which "even jeeps became stuck." 81 Finally, even a successful retreat out of Burma
might not have preserved Stilwell' s regulars. As it was, a Japanese invasion of eastern
India in the spring of 1944 almost captured the very bases into which NCAC would have
withdrawn. Stilwell was thus continuously concerned about "a Japanese breakthrough
behind him." 82
Neither could Allied transportation assets provide Stilwell' s regulars
with strategic invulnerability. Although the Allies had command of the air,
withdrawing the two Chinese divisions from any potentially disastrous situation in
hostile territory was beyond the aviators' means. Simply airlifting a single British
division from one location in the Allied rear to another, for example, had taken eleven
days!83 Finally, unlike Wellington's regulars, Stilwell's did not unblinkingly comply
with the will of the theater commander. The uncertain response of Chinese
commanders, and the uncertain discipline of Chinese soldiers, made bold advances
risky. Stilwell could not take his regulars deep into enemy territory, as Wellington had,
and count on being able to bring them back out while under enemy pressure. Thus, the
constraints of geography, transportation, and leadership combined to make the Chinese
regulars strategically vulnerable. Consequently, Stilwell, instead of making deep, swift
forays into Burma, had to make a methodical advance which ensured the security of his
single line of communication (LOC).
Second, Stilwell's campaign differed from Wellington's because Stilwell
did not have popular support in the country he was trying to "liberate." Admittedly,
Burmese combatants did not cause serious damage to the Allies during the retreat of
1942. But a hostile Burmese population did deprive them "of reliable intelligence, [and]
threaten their communications..." to such an extent that Stilwell listed a "hostile
population" first in his catalog of reasons for that Allied defeat. 84 Such hostility
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continued throughout the war, with Burmese collaborating with the Japanese
throughout NCAC's offensive.85 Obviously, an unsympathetic local population meant
that NCAC's regulars, unlike Wellington's, could not "rest securely in the midst of a
vigilant peasantry."86 Perhaps more importantly, it meant that Stilwell's irregulars,
operating in hostile territory, were denied not only intelligence, but logistic support and
anonymity as well. The lack of these advantages contributed directly and substantially
to the high attrition rate of both the Chindits and the Marauders.
One now understands that Stilwell's forces enjoyed neither relative
strategic invulnerability nor local popular support. Recognizing these limitations, one
can return to answering the question of whether decentralizing NCAC's irregulars, in an
attempt employ the dispersion/concentration dilemma, would have improved Allied
efficiency. The answer is no, for two reasons.
First, NCAC's irregulars, even if extensively decentralized, could not
have conducted operations compelling greater Japanese dispersion. Faced with hostile
natives, they lacked any source for the pinpoint, real-time intelligence on local enemy
activities which can so enhance guerrilla operations. Also, lack of local subsistence
made the NCAC irregulars dependent on aerial resupply, so they had to find and
defend drop zones. Finally, denied anonymity by a watchful, antagonistic local
populace, they had to traverse exhausting terrain to avoid detection, while remaining
massed to have enough firepower to survive if detected. Thus, instead of fanning out to
conduct widespread raiding, NCAC's irregulars could conduct only an initial set of
raids. They then had to go into static, defensible positions. Such operations obviously
drew Japanese concentration, not dispersion.
Second, even if the Chindits or Marauders had been able to force the
Japanese to spread their forces, Stilwell's Chinese regulars - whose strategic
vulnerability made protecting their own LOC their primary concern - would not have
been able to react swiftly enough to capitalize on such dispersion. As the British
regulars of the Anglo-Arab and Anglo-Iberian hybrid forces demonstrated, swift
exploitation of such enemy dispersion is a crucial component in the
dispersion/concentration dilemma. As General Nathanael Greene - American
Revolutionary hybrid commander who utterly defeated his British opponent in the
Carolinas - wrote about employing regulars in conjunction with guerrillas, "[it was
important to be able to] run as fast forward as backward, to convince the Enemy that we
were like a Crab, that... [could] run either way."87 Consequently, given the limitations on
Stilwell's employment of his regulars, greater decentralization of NCAC's irregulars
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would still not have allowed him to employ the dispersion/ concentration dilemma to
great effect.
In the end, one thus concludes that Stilwell's technique of close
coordination between regulars and irregulars, yet tight control of the irregulars,
probably achieved the best efficiency the situation allowed for his hybrid force. NCAC
inflicted great costs on the Japanese, but a lack of the preconditions introduced in
Chapter II forced him to expend a tremendous amount of friendly resources to do so.
This case therefore emphasizes the importance of those preconditions to achieving the
maximum efficiency possible with a given hybrid force. Because his regulars were
strategically vulnerable, and because he lacked local popular support, Stilwell could not
have improved NCAC's ratio of costs inflicted to resources expended by loosening his
control over the irregulars. If the preconditions had instead favored Stilwell, there was
clear potential for NCAC to have inflicted the same costs with fewer losses, thus
achieving greater efficiency. Consequently, while high degrees of coordination and
decentralization within a hybrid force can produce high efficiency, a hybrid force cannot
extract the maximum benefit from either variable if it cannot first ensure the survival of
its regulars and the support of the local populace.
2. Other Tentative Conclusions Emerging from this Hybrid
Campaign
a. Problems with Multinational Hybrid Forces
In the future, the U.S. may well form more hybrid forces like NCAC,
with U.S. SOF serving as irregulars and a foreign power providing the regulars.
Stilwell's campaign, however, should serve as a cautionary tale about such force
combinations for U.S. political and military leaders. For the drive to Myitkyina
illustrates that when U.S. leaders believe a foreign regime providing regular forces is
geo-politically "indispensable," then that regime's leader, if so inclined, may ruin U.S.
efforts to train and employ his forces. Such was the case with Chiang Kai-shek. Certain
of a post-war fight with the Communists, Chiang's "every action and decision"
throughout the Burma campaign was "molded by the principle of hoarding resources
and waiting until one barbarian [the U.S.] should defeat the other [Japan]."88
Consequently, he repeatedly ordered his NCAC commanders to slow their advance to
limit casualties. Additionally, he agreed only after months of U.S. entreaties to send
reinforcements to Stilwell, and to launch an offensive from western China into Burma to
assist in opening the Burma Road.
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Since the [entire Burma] campaign was designed to lift the siege of China
and since the [troops of the western China offensive] had been American-
equipped for that very purpose, the obvious course in view of Chiang's
unwillingness to assist in his own rescue would have been to call off the
effort. This, however, the United States was not prepared to do because
of the need for China in American strategy and the persistent fear of a
Chinese collapse.89
Chiang was well aware of the value the U.S. placed on China, and he "did not believe
that the United States would ever take the risk of withdrawing support from him."90
Thus, as Barbara Tuchman sardonically summarizes, occasionally "the United States
thrashed about in the Chinese cobweb" by threatening to cut Chiang off, but invariably
"the threads held." 91
Two of NCAC's most serious deficiencies stemmed from Chiang's
realization that the United States' was trapped in such a "cobweb." First, it was directly
responsible for the lethargic Chinese advance. Despite the fact that American advisors
had invested almost two years at the Ramgarh training center to create four divisions of
adequate Chinese soldiers, Chiang's leverage over their commanders largely nullified
this effort. Clearly, U.S. leaders planning future multinational hybrid efforts should be
aware of the fact that training indigenous personnel to become disciplined regulars is a
lengthy process,92 but one which may be completely undone by politically-motivated
indigenous commanders. Second, Chiang's stubborn refusal to commit his regular
forces in turn contributed substantially to Stilwell's decision to employ his irregulars in
the operations which eventually destroyed them. Might not a future U.S. commander in
Stilwell's position be driven in frustration to the same decision? And if so, would the
U.S. public tolerate the virtual destruction of the equivalent of a contemporary Army
Special Forces Group? Just as importantly, how would such a significant loss of SOF
personnel affect the U.S. defense posture?
b. Irregular Operations in Hostile Terrain
The Burma campaign of 1943-44 also highlights the difficulty of
sustaining irregulars in hostile terrain. Lacking local popular support, both the Chindits
and the Marauders were forced to rely on aerial resupply.93 Although both groups were
usually able to retrieve air-dropped supplies, surviving on such supplies weakened their
soldiers and left them vulnerable to disease. Moreover, the lack of helicopters for aerial
extraction meant that any non-ambulatory casualties became POWs.94 Also, traversing
inhospitable terrain in order to avoid detection extracted an additional toll. Even given
the plentiful helicopter assets available today, U.S. leaders would do well to consider
these difficulties before committing SOF to sustained operations in hostile territory.
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Weather, particularly around the inhospitable terrain which even current SOF would
use to avoid an unsympathetic local populace, can be adverse enough to prevent
helicopter operations. This would leave modern SOF in hostile territory no better off
than their Chindit or Galahad predecessors, and subject to the same attritional liabilities.
c. Importance of Cultural Awareness for the Hybrid Commander
NCAC would have been even less efficient were it not for General
Stilwell's understanding of the Chinese. A fluent Chinese speaker who, as already
mentioned, had served in China for ten years before WWII, Stilwell sincerely wanted to
prove the worth of the Chinese foot soldier by having Chinese regulars succeed in
Burma. Thus dedicated to NCAC's success, Stilwell spent the great majority of the
campaign living at the front,
...in a basha or bamboo hut or sometimes a tent, with an underground
dugout for a shelter, a packing case for a desk and only the luxury of two
wicker chairs as a concession to rank. Here he slept on a cot or in a
hammock stretched between two trees, shaved and washed from a
helmet, stood in line for chow and ate C-rations from a mess kit.95
Not surprisingly, "Stilwell's presence at the front and his living close to the men made a
strong impression on Chinese officers." 96 So too did his concern for Chinese welfare.
Medical reforms implemented by Stilwell,
...reduced the death rate from wounds, ordinarily a limitless figure in the
Chinese Army, to 3.5 percent. Chinese soldiers were not afraid of being
killed in battle, they used to say, but only of being left wounded on the
battlefield to die, which was the usual fate in China for those who could
not walk away from combat. The feeling that they were being looked out
for in NCAC gave the soldiers a new-found pride and confidence.97
This evident concern for Chinese soldiers, along with Stilwell's ability to
communicate directly to Chinese subordinates without an interpreter, led to most
Chinese commanders coming to believe that what Stilwell did, he did for China.98
Consequently, in spite of Chiang's unmistakable efforts to undermine NCAC's progress,
Stilwell was usually able to keep the Chinese advancing, albeit often at a snail's pace.
And unlike 1942, they never retreated. It is likely that a hybrid force commander less
schooled in Chinese culture would have failed to maintain even the slow advance which
Stilwell achieved. In a campaign as close run as this, where the last irregular units were
effectively wiped out in the drive for the final objective, such a failure with the regulars
could have been decisive.
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At least three factors account for Stilwell's centralization of irregular operations. First, the
absolute commitment to capture of Myitkyina. For Stilwell, seizing the allegedly impossible
objective of Myitkyina would validate almost a lifetime of work with Chinese soldiers. Having
served in China "as [a] language officer from 1920 to 1923 in the time of the warlords, as officer of
the 15th Infantry in Tientsin from 1926 to 1929 at the time of the rise...of Chiang Kai-shek, [and] as
Military Attache from 1935 to 1939 at the time of the Japanese invasion," Stilwell had developed
"a genuine respect for the much-abused Chinese soldier"(Tuchman, p. xi and Spector, p. 338). '"If
I can prove the Chinese soldier is as good as any Allied soldier,' he told a correspondent, 'I'll die
happy'"(Tuchman, p. 3). The campaign for Myitkyina gave him a chance to prove just that, even
if Chinese soldiers played a less than satisfactory role. As one Marauder bitterly opined, "Stilwell
had determined to make a record for the Chinese 'if necessary at the expense of the one American
infantry unit in the theater.'"
Stilwell was nearly consumed with capturing Myitkyina for at least two other reasons.
First, doing so would help to erase the memory of the Allied retreat from Burma in 1942, which
he found "'humiliating as hell'" (Jhe Stilwell Papers, p. 106). Second, it would prove an
embarrassment to the British who, not only felt Myitkyina was an impossible goal, but also,
according to Stilwell, had continuously undermined his efforts to train the Chinese and win in
Burma. His contempt for the British is evident in his diary entry written immediately after
learning that the Marauders had seized Myitkyina's airfield: "WILL THIS BURN UP THE
LIMEYS" (The Stilwell Papers, p. 296).
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Second, Stilwell centrally controlled his irregulars because he felt compelled by political
pressure to keep the Marauders engaged in high profile conventional combat (as opposed to
obscure guerrilla operations) during the final phase of the campaign. As Ronald Spector notes,
during the siege of Myitkyina,
Stilwell had little choice. He had repeatedly demanded that the British keep the
tired Chindits, with their hundreds of sick and wounded in the field; he was
constantly pressuring Chiang for more Chinese units to commit to the campaign.
Under these circumstances the American general could hardly afford to place
himself in a position where he appeared to be overly sparing of his own troops.
"While Americans were in the battle, the expenditure of Chinese troops at
Myitkyina could not be challenged. And while he continued to fight at
Myitkyina, the need for the British below Mogaung could be demonstrated" (p.
360).
Finally, Stilwell's personality made it almost inevitable that any reliable unit, regardless of
the use for which it was best suited, would become his shock troops. Intolerant of "do-nothing"
attitudes, Stilwell's politically-motivated Chinese commanders nevertheless meant that he,
"alone of all commanders, Allied or enemy in any theater on any front,...could not count on field
commanders who would carry out his directions as a matter of course" (Tuchman, p. 425 and
443). As "a practical man whose motivating principle was 'get on with it,'" Stilwell was thus
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worse than useless (Tuchman, p. 453). Accordingly, it is not surprising that such a personality,
"given the delays and slowdowns" of the Chinese, and their "several failures to eliminate the 18th
Division in battle," would overcontrol other units which he believed "would 'get things
done'"(Tuchman, p. 444 and 433).
68 Tuchman, p. 453 and Dupuy, p. 1276
69 Tuchman, p. 446.
70 Spector, p. 370, emphasis added.
71 Tuchman, p. 437.
72 Tuchman, p. 442.
73 Dupuy, p. 1276.
74 Dupuy, p. 1275.
75 Spector, p. 359.
76 The Stilwell Papers, p. 301.
77 Tuchman, p. 433.
78 Tuchman, p. 442.
79 Tuchman, p. 449.
80 Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, Volume I, New York: Doubleday,
1975, p. 146.
81 Tuchman, p. 434.
82 Tuchman, p. 438-441 and The Stilwell Papers, p. 285.
83 Spector, p. 361.
84 Spector, p. 331, and Stilwell's diary entry of 10 May 1942, cited in Romanus and Sunderland, p.
148. One wonders if this first sour exposure to the Burmese did not deter Stilwell from future
efforts at cultivating their support for the Allied cause.
85 Tuchman, p. 418.
86 John Tone, The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain,
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994, p. 5.
95
87 General Nathanael Greene in a letter to General Henry Knox, 17 July 1781, in The Papers of
General Nathanael Greene, Volume VIII, Ed. Richard K. Showman and Dennis M. Conrad, Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
88 Tuchman, p. 490.
89 Tuchman, p. 427, emphasis added.
90 Tuchman, p. 460-461.
91 Tuchman, p. 461.
92 One will recall that it took Beresford a year to create acceptable Portuguese regular formations
for Wellington. See Chapter HL
93 Spector, p. 347 and 355, and Dupuy, p. 1275.
94 Spector, p. 348.
95 Tuchman, p. 421.
96 Tuchman, p. 421
97 Tuchman, p. 422.
98 Tuchman, p. 507.
96
VI. PRINCIPLES OF HYBRID WARFARE
A. UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS IS HYBRID WAR BEST
EMPLOYED?
The campaigns examined in this research indicate that the hybrid approach is
best employed in situations where a hybrid force enjoys local popular support and
minimum strategic vulnerability for its regulars. These preconditions create the best
situation for employing hybrid forces because only when possessing local popular
support and minimum strategic vulnerability does a hybrid force have the potential to
achieve its maximum efficiency. Whether a hybrid force favored by both preconditions
actually achieves its maximum efficiency is determined by how skillfully that force is
employed. But, given two similarly sized hybrid forces with comparable leadership, the
hybrid force lacking the preconditions - no matter how well employed - will be less
efficient than the corresponding force favored by them. In fact, the experiences of the
Boer commandos and Stilwell's NCAC indicate that the very survival of hybrid forces
lacking these preconditions is doubtful over the long term.
1. Local Popular Support
T.E. Lawrence's assertion that "irregular warfare...must have a...population...
sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy" provides an
initial description of what I mean by "local popular support." 1 The cases examined
here, however, further clarify how this term applies to hybrid forces. First, "local
popular support" describes a situation in which a sizable portion of the indigenous
citizenry will not only not betray the movements of the hybrid force to the enemy, but in
which it will also not actively oppose the movement of the hybrid force, either through
direct force of arms or through sabotage. Additionally, "local popular support" means
that natives will sell or give supplies to the hybrid force. Perhaps most importantly,
"local popular support" implies sustained allegiance to the hybrid force - the civilians in
the contested theater must remain unwilling to betray or resist the movements of the
hybrid force, and willing to provide supplies, while subject to tremendous hardship or
violent reprisals.
Having defined the minimum criteria for the precondition of local popular
support, it is also important to note that as such support increases beyond the minimum
level, the maximum possible efficiency for the hybrid force also increases. If a local
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population, already willing to not betray or oppose the movements of the hybrid force,
is also willing to report on the movements of the enemy, a hybrid force can increase the
costs inflicted on the enemy and decrease friendly losses. Wellington, for instance,
benefited from a sympathetic Spanish population which left him "rarely short of the
latest news of French movements and strengths." 2 Such news formed the basis for his
complex campaigns of maneuver which culminated in the stunning victories of
Salamanca and Vitoria. Similarly, if a local populace will not oppose the movements of
a hybrid force, but will actively oppose the movements of the conventional enemy, this
also increases the potential costs the former may inflict on the latter. General Allenby's
regulars benefited from this during their offensive in the fall of 1917, when Arab peasant
resistance to Turkish forces became so effective that "the British forces advancing
towards Jerusalem found themselves fighting in a friendly country, while the Turks who
were defending their own territory found themselves fighting in the midst of a decidedly
hostile population." 3
The importance of local popular support to maximizing the efficiency of hybrid
forces also suggests a caution for U.S. employment of this approach. Namely, when
engaged in an overseas conflict, the U.S. has often been reluctant to cultivate close ties
with a local population for fear of the political ramifications of the relationship after the
conflict's conclusion. Such fears precluded meaningful cooperation between U.S. forces
and the Chinese Communists against the Japanese in World War II. Such fears also
prevented active support of the "marsh" Arabs in their ill-fated uprising against
Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War. Consequently, given the critical importance of local
popular support to an efficient hybrid campaign - and the assumption outlined in
Chapter I that resource constraints make it foolish for the U.S. to prosecute war
inefficiently - the U.S. should not seek to employ hybrid warfare in future situations
similar to China in the 1940s or southern Iraq in the 1990s - anywhere, in other words,
where it has reservations about closely supporting the indigenous population.
2. Minimizing Strategic Vulnerability of the Hybrid Regulars
While the impacts of minimizing, and failing to minimize, the strategic
vulnerability of a hybrid force's regular component have been analyzed in each of the
campaigns studied, two closing comments are in order. First, the Duke of Wellington
(positively) and various Boer commanders (negatively) all highlighted the crucial role of
the theater commander in preserving his regular forces. Simply put, a hybrid commander
cannot afford to "gamble" with his regulars ("gamble" here being defined as a chance
taken from which, if it fails, recovery is impossible). 4 For if a hybrid commander loses a
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large amount of his often outnumbered regulars through ill-advised maneuvers, like Boer
Generals Cronje and Prinsloo, the remainder of his force is almost certainly doomed.
Even hybrid commanders blessed with initial numerical superiority, like Generals
Allenby and Snlwell, are often denied replacements for losses, and thus must also
design campaign plans to minimize their regulars' strategic vulnerability.
Second, it is worth noting that geography and transportation assets can combine
to create "sanctuaries" where hybrid regulars are essentially invulnerable. For example,
control of the sea, easy access to multiple ports, and appropriate naval assets can allow
regulars to be evacuated whenever seriously threatened. This was the case with the
British in the Peninsular War and, with careful planning and plentiful aviation assets,
might be duplicated by contemporary hybrid regulars lacking access to, or command of,
the sea. Alternately, hybrid regulars may be able to withdraw into terrain which their
conventional opponents cannot, or will not, penetrate. American General Greene, for
example, hybrid commander in the Revolutionary South, evaded a superior British army
under General Cornwallis by retreating from North Carolina into Virginia. Cornwallis
did not possess adequate resources to establish a line of communication that far inland,
so Greene's regulars were effectively invulnerable. Two centuries later, American forces
found themselves in Cornwallis' position when fighting the Vietnamese Communist
hybrid force. In that case, U.S. government refusal to authorize extensive operations in
Cambodia or North Vietnam created a region where the Communist regulars were
effectively invulnerable. Consequently, U.S. defense planners contemplating hybrid
warfare should recognize that there are several methods for minimizing the strategic
vulnerability of hybrid regulars.
3. Likelihood of Encountering the Preconditions
If it is true that hybrid forces can only achieve their maximum efficiency if they
enjoy these two preconditions, then U.S. defense planners should ask if those conditions
will exist regularly for our forces in the future. For, "assumptions [preconditions] that
never hold give rise to theories that operate only in an imaginary world, and
[which]... cannot...generate policy prescriptions. The most useful theories are those
whose [preconditions] match reality in at least some important cases." 5 If recent works
like former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's The Next War and the Rand
Corporation's Sources of Conflict in the 21
st Century are any indication, hybrid warfare
should be a very "useful" theory for the United States. Both books suggest that the U.S.
will not lack for opportunities in the near future to employ a hybrid force where it could
expect to enjoy both local popular support and minimal strategic vulnerability.6 Thus,
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the U.S. should not be denied the opportunity to employ the highly efficient hybrid
approach because of a dearth of situations offering the necessary preconditions.
B. WHATMAKES HYBRID FORCES MOST EFFICIENT?
1. Relationship Between Independent and Dependent Variables
The hybrid campaigns presented in this research demonstrate a clear correlation
between the independent variables - coordination of efforts and decentralization of the
irregulars - and the dependent variable - hybrid force efficiency. A high degree of both
independent variables, as demonstrated by the Anglo-Iberians under Wellington and the
Anglo-Arabs under Allenby, produced high force efficiency. A high degree of
decentralization, but a limited degree of coordination, as illustrated by the Boers,
produced limited force efficiency. Similarly, a high degree of coordination, but a limited
degree of decentralization, as represented by NCAC under Stilwell, also produced only
limited efficiency. Finally, limited degrees of both coordination and decentralization, as
shown by the Anglo-Arabs during Murray's command, produced limited efficiency.
Thus, it appears the most efficient hybrid force is one which maximizes coordination of
efforts between its two components and decentralizes the operations of its irregulars.
This finding results in a change to the hypothesis matrix utilized up to this point.
Based on the above, only a hybrid force which is integrated and gives great freedom of
action to its irregulars could be expected to achieve high efficiency. Such a force could be
called complementary, for its two components interact to create a force stronger than the
sum of its parts. Any other combination of coordination and decentralization would be
expected to produce limited efficiency. These hybrid forces could be labeled as
supplementary, for their two components do not combine to create a force significantly

























Figure 11. Revised Hypothesis Matrix
> HIGH =
"Integrated'
2. What Makes Complementary Hybrid Forces So Efficient?
Why specifically did highly coordinated and highly decentralized hybrid forces
achieve such a high ratio of costs inflicted to resources expended? They achieved high
efficiency because they presented their conventional opponents with a dilemma over
whether to disperse or concentrate their forces. This dilemma was the key mechanism
by which successful hybrid commanders - like Greene, Wellington, Allenby, and Giap -
employed their dual-natured force to inflict the greatest costs on an often numerically
and technologically superior opponent. Perhaps less obviously, but just as importantly,
the same dilemma also reduced the costs incurred by these complementary hybrid
forces. In short, the dispersion/ concentration dilemma increased enemy costs and
reduced friendly costs, thus producing tremendous efficiency
How did a complementary hybrid force create the dispersion/ concentration
dilemma? First, by closely coordinating the efforts of two components, it compelled the
conventional opponent to deal with both threats on the least favorable terms, and often
nearly simultaneously. Second, by allowing great freedom of action to its irregulars
through decentralizing their operations, the complementary hybrid force created two
distinctly different types of threat for the conventional opponent: a regular threat which
compelled him to concentrate conventional force 'for traditional engagements; and an
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irregular threat - "an intangible web of guerrilla bands" which did not present a
"vulnerable military target" - which could be neutralized only through widespread
dispersion. 7
a. Inflicting Costs on the Conventional Opponent
How does the dispersion/ concentration dilemma thus created by the
complementary hybrid force inflict costs on the conventional opponent? This may be
best explained by Andrew Mack, who, in considering the campaigns of Communist
hybrid forces in China and Vietnam, wrote that,
Mao and Giap have repeatedly emphasized that the principal
contradiction which the... [conventional] army must confront on the
ground derives from the fact that forces dispersed to control territory
become spread so thinly that they are vulnerable to attack. If forces are
concentrated to overcome this weakness, other areas are left
unguarded....Any attempt to resolve one contradiction will magnify the
other. 8
Thus, an integrated hybrid force which gives great freedom of action to its irregulars will
inflict costs on the conventional opponent both when he is dispersed and when he
concentrates. If he disperses, the hybrid regulars will be able to engage now-reduced
concentrations of enemy regulars, or advance farther into territory which is now not as
strongly defended. If the opponent instead concentrates, the hybrid irregulars can gain
political and military control of the areas from which the conventional opponent
withdraws his troops to concentrate them elsewhere. Since the conventional opponent
can hardly avoid both concentrating and dispersing, the complementary hybrid force is
actually inflicting costs on him regardless ofwhat he does. This was the situation thrust on
the French by Wellington and on the Turks by Allenby.
It is important to note that a supplementary hybrid force cannot inflict a
comparable level of costs on its conventional opponent. If the hybrid force lacks
coordination, like the Boers or the Anglo-Arabs before Allenby, the conventional
opponent will not face regular and irregular operations timed to be the most inopportune
for him. The conventional opponent is therefore often able to transfer his forces so as to
defeat these sequential, not simultaneous, threats. If the hybrid force centralizes its
irregulars, like NCAC or the Arabs before Allenby, the conventional opponent faces an
almost uniformly conventional threat. This makes hybrid force actions more predictable
and limits the conventional opponent7s requirement to disperse. Thus, as Figures 12 and
13 illustrate, a major key to the higher efficiency of complementary hybrid forces, in
comparison to their supplementary counterparts, is that the dispersion /concentration








Conventional opponent concentrated against a
complementary hybrid force (integrated
irregulars rapidly exert politico-military
control over territory which conventional
opponent vacates & frequently attack smaller
outposts)
Conventional opponent concentrated
against a supplementary hybrid force
(irregulars are either not coordinated for,
or restricted from, effective operations in
areas enemy vacates)
Time
Figure 12. Costs of Concentration to the Conventional Opponent
(above & beyond those incurred in traditional engagements with hybrid regulars)
Conventional opponent dispersed against a
complementary hybrid force (hybrid force regulars
maneuver to defeat smaller conventional







Conventional opponent dispersed against a
supplementary hybrid threat (does not have
to disperse as often, nor on as extensive a
scale)
Time
Figure 13. Costs of Dispersion to the Conventional Opponent
b. Reducing Costs Suffered by the Complementary Hybrid Force
The other major key to the higher efficiency of complementary hybrid
forces is that employing the dispersion/ concentration dilemma also lowers the costs
incurred by the hybrid force. As depicted in figures 14 and 15, a conventional opponent
fully occupied with simultaneous requirements to disperse and concentrate is much less
able to damage either component of his hybrid enemy than if that conventional







Regular forces operating in a supplementary
hybrid force (i.e. limited irregular threat
often does not distract the conventional
opponent)
Regular forces operating in a
complementary hybrid force
(irregulars often keep conventional
opponent dispersed, thus lowering
cost curve)
Time
Figure 14. Benefits of the Dispersion/Concentration Dilemma to a
Complementary Hybrid Force's Regulars
Irregular forces operating in a supplementary
hybrid force (costs of action/ exposing
themselves often high for an irregulars if
enemy does not face simultaneous regular
threat, e.g. Lawrence's concerns for Arabs in





Irregular forces operating in a
complementary hybrid force




Figure 15. Benefits of the Dispersion/Concentration Dilemma to a
Complementary Hybrid Force's Irregulars
c. What Makes Hybrid Forces Most Efficient, A Summation
To close this discussion on what makes hybrid forces efficient, it is now
clear that complementary hybrid forces, by exploiting the dispersion /concentration
dilemma, inflict higher costs on the enemy, and suffer lower costs themselves, than do
supplementary hybrid forces. Obviously, this maximization of costs inflicted on the
enemy, and minimization of friendly resources expended, is what makes complementary
hybrid forces the most efficient. This conclusion, so far depicted in Figures 12 through





Figure 16. Efficiencies of Various Hybrid Forces
"CC" = Combat Capabilities Curve. Each curve represents an efficiency ratio which
a given size hybrid force could achieve through differing combinations of
decentralization and coordination.
• CCj represents greater efficiency than CQ and so on.
• Convexity of the Combat Capabilities Curves represents the fact that for producing
efficiency, additional coordination cannot substitute for a lack of decentralization,
and vice versa. See below
= Supplementary force which is overcontrolled.
A hybrid force could try to substitute coordination for decentralization, but
efficiency would begin to fall. An overcontrolled but highly coordinated
force would present the opponent with a threat which did not compel great
dispersion. This happened to NCAC, and to the Arabs before Allenby.
— — — — • = Supplementary force which is segregated.
A hybrid force could try to substitute decentralization for coordination, but
efficiency would again suffer. A force giving great freedom of action to the
irregulars, but not coordinating efforts, would give its opponent the benefit
of facing sequential, not simultaneous threats. The Boers are an example.
~
~
—~ = Complementary hybrid force.
Complementary hybrid force exploits dispersion/concentration dilemma to
increase enemy costs and decrease friendly costs.
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C. HYBRID FORCE EFFICIENCY & OPERATIONAL SUCCESS
One can now turn to linking the preceding findings about the efficiency of hybrid
forces to the original purpose of this research - determining how a hybrid commander
should employ his force to achieve the highest probability for operational success. As a
first step, one recalls that operational success results from inflicting intolerable costs on
the enemy force before he can do the same to friendly units. Next, one understands that
a complementary hybrid force inflicts the highest costs on the enemy, yet minimizes the
costs it incurs itself. Consequently, a complementary hybrid force - because it is most
efficient - accomplishes the very tasks which would give it the greatest probability of
achieving operational success. A hybrid commander pursuing operational success
would thus be best served by coordinating and decentralizing his force.
Just because a complementary hybrid force has the highest probability of
operational success, however, does not mean that any hybrid force which is coordinated
and decentralized will win. Indeed, many other factors besides force efficiency have a
role in determinmg the theater victor. A lack of logistical support, or the opponent's
overwhelming numerical superiority, for example, may condemn the hybrid force to
defeat no matter how well it is employed. But a complementary hybrid force, operating
with favorable preconditions, will always inflict the greatest costs on the enemy for a
given amount of friendly resources. And sometimes these greater costs resulting from a
complementary, efficient hybrid approach - versus those inflicted by a supplementary,
inefficient hybrid approach - can in fact be decisive.
This relationship between hybrid force efficiency and operational success can be
represented graphically. To do so, one accepts that any given conflict between a hybrid
force and a conventional opponent could be characterized in only one of three ways: the
conventional opponent could possess so much combat power" compared to the hybrid
force that it was assured of victory; or, each of the two forces could possess enough
combat power relative to each other that the outcome would be in doubt; or, the hybrid
force could possess so much combat power compared to the conventional opponent that
it was assured of victory. From the perspective of the hybrid force, these situations are
illustrated below:
*
"Combat power is created by combining the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and
leadership." FM 100-5, p. 2-9
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Ratio of conventional opponent's combat power & hybrid force's combat power
*/i x " ? / 1
o
Hybrid Force j Hybrid Force j Hybrid Force
Cannot Win May Win Will Win
Figure 17. Possible Outcomes for a Hybrid Force
The left end of the diagram denotes that the conventional opponent possesses
infinitely more combat power than the hybrid force. As one moves right, the former's
combat power advantage over the latter steadily decreases to some ratio (x/1) where
the hybrid force is finally strong enough to have a chance at victory (represented by the
line at x/1). This region symbolizes any hybrid conflict where the conventional
opponent maintains such overwhelming combat power superiority that the hybrid force,
no matter how well employed, cannot win. Thus, the hypothetical hybrid force with the
crippling logistics problems just mentioned would be placed here.
The next region begins at the point where the hybrid force has its first chance to
win (x/1), and continues to the point where the conventional opponent's combat power
has decreased so much compared to the hybrid force's that the conventional opponent,
no matter how well employed, no longer has a chance to win (represented by the line at
x-?/l). In this region would be placed the hybrid conflicts where either side has a
chance to win. One would assume that the conventional opponent would be favored in
conflicts tending toward the left of this region, since he would have a better ratio of
combat power there. Conversely, one would assume that a hybrid force would be
favored to win as one drew closer to the right side of this region. In the far right region,
the situation is the exact reverse of the first region: the hybrid force's combat power is
sufficient to ensure it will win.
A hybrid commander who employs his force efficiently can move it to the right
on this graph, giving it a better chance for victory, or perhaps even a chance at victory
where none was thought possible. Essentially, then, efficiency can directly increase
combat power. A brief analysis of an historical hybrid campaign can demonstrate this
relationship.
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I think it is safe to assume that most military analysts would have placed
Wellington's Anglo-Iberian hybrid force in the leftmost region of this graph when the
Peninsular War began. After all, the Duke faced between three and four hundred
thousand troops of the finest army in the world with only 40,000 British regulars and
perhaps 40,000 far flung guerrillas. Even factoring in the unquestioned superiority of the
Royal Navy, one would have to put the combat ratio between the two powers at about
4:1 in favor of the French. With half of Wellington's force being untested civilians,
perhaps even this ratio is too low. But whether the ratio was 4:1, or greater, in favor of
the French, it certainly seemed high enough to guarantee them success. Wellington's force
consequently seemed so weak as to be assured of defeat, as depicted in the graph
below:
Ratio of 4:1 or greater in
favor of French falls along











Figure 18. Initial Expected Outcome for the Anglo-Iberian Hybrid Force
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By forging a complementary hybrid force, however, Wellington ensured, as
previously mentioned, "that the Allies never faced the bulk of Napoleon's armies." 9
Instead, the guerrillas operated against smaller French formations, keeping the overall
French force continuously off balance. Wellington's smaller regular force was thus
repeatedly able to operate at a local advantage, as at Salamanca, where "he had 70
percent of the total Allied regulars in the Peninsula on [the]...battlefield], [yet the French
commander] Marmont had barely 20 percent of his overall French forces present." 10
Consequently, efficient operations transformed an overall ratio of combat power which
appeared to doom the hybrid force to defeat into local ratios which instead favored the
hybrid force. Over time, these recurrent local advantages so weakened the French that
the overall ratio swung in favor of the Allies.
Graphically, Wellington had moved his hybrid force out of the region where it
had no chance to win and into the region where it did have a chance by employing it
efficiently. Thus, the Anglo-Iberian campaign illustrates how efficiency expands the
region where a hybrid force has a chance to win. In effect, efficiency moves the initial
point on the graph where the hybrid force first has a chance to win to the left.* That
region lying between the point where an adequately employed hybrid force would first
have a chance at victory, and the point where an efficiently employed hybrid force
would first have a chance at victory (shown on the following page with diagonal hash
marks) is the "gain" that efficiency "buys" a hybrid force. While increasing costs
inflicted on the enemy, and minimizing friendly resources expended to do so, is always
of value, in this region it makes the difference between certain defeat and a chance at
victory. One finds it difficult to imagine that any soldier would willingly forgo such a
priceless opportunity. Thus, achieving efficiency should be among the foremost concerns
of any hybrid commander.
* Perhaps just as importantly, an efficient hybrid force moves the initial point on the graph
















Figure 19. Marginal Increase in the Probability of Victory
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D. OTHER OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HYBRID FORCES
1. Preserving the Irregular Component
While it is critical for the hybrid commander to preserve his regular component
by minimizing its strategic vulnerability, it is equally imperative that he preserve his
irregulars. The obvious reason for doing so is that one cannot have a hybrid force
without having both regulars and irregulars. An equally important reason is the fact that
if the hybrid force is outnumbered to begin with, it is unlikely that either its regulars or
irregulars could long survive on their own. Both the Anglo-Iberian and Boer cases
highlight this unforgiving reality, but they are not the only campaigns which do. As John
Richard Allen writes of General Greene's hybrid campaign in the American
Revolutionary south,
It is clear that the patriots of the lower South, although they might have
been able to continue guerrilla fighting indefinitely, could hardly have
dealt effectively with the British and their Tory allies without the
assistance of the regulars from the upper South and Delaware. C)n the
other hand, Greene['s regulars] could hardly have kept the field without
the aid of Marion, Sumter, Pickens, Clarke, Huger, and the partisans. 11
So, if the hybrid force wants to maintain resistance over the long term, it must
preserve both its regular and irregular components. While the regulars are preserved
through minimizing their strategic vulnerability, the irregulars are usually preserved
through stealth and anonymity, provided in large measure by a sympathetic local
population. The Chindits demonstrated the frightful losses irregulars can suffer without
such support. But, because hybrid irregulars have often enjoyed anonymity from a
supportive local populace, preserving them has usually not been an issue of protecting
them from enemy attack. Rather, preserving the irregulars has usually been an issue of
attitude of command - of allowing them to operate "irregularly."
Often, as in the case of the Arabs before Allenby, the hybrid command structure
has sought to "regularize" the irregulars - to train and direct them to fight as regulars. 12
But as that campaign demonstrated (as well as the Peninsular War and, to some extent,
the U.S. experience training the Chinese in WWII), creating disciplined regular formations
out of indigenous personnel is not a simple nor swift process. It took Beresford more
than a year to forge effective conventional units out of Portuguese conscripts during the
Peninsular War, and even two years of American supervision at the Ramgarh training
center could not produce consistently reliable Chinese divisions for the campaign in
Burma. Hybrid commanders facing an active enemy threat may not always have the
luxury of such time.
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Moreover, it is important to note that regularizing indigenous manpower can be
less efficient than using them as irregulars. On the one hand, fighting as conventional
troops may run counter to the natives' character. This was certainly true of the Spanish
guerrillas in the Peninsular War and of the Arabs in WWI. On the other hand, converting
irregulars into regulars robs the hybrid force of its dual nature, making it much less
troublesome for the conventional opponent. Consequently, future hybrid commanders,
and their superiors in the national security community, would do well to remember that:
indigenous personnel are often most effective fighting as irregulars; and that preserving
irregulars is usually not up to the actions of the enemy, but to the attitude of the hybrid
command.
2. Importance of Cultural Awareness
The hybrid campaigns examined here demonstrated that cultural awareness is
highly beneficial to the hybrid commander for at least two reasons: cultivating and / or
maintaining local popular support for the hybrid force; and improving the relationship
with foreign irregulars. Additionally, cultural awareness is just as critical for the
conventional opponent seeking to defeat a hybrid enemy
a. Cultivating and/or Maintaining Local Popular Support
Since the importance of local popular support to a hybrid force has
already been established, this section will discuss how a hybrid commander might
establish and preserve such support. Foremost among his tools for doing this is cultural
awareness. The Duke of Wellington provides an outstanding example of how a
culturally conscious commander can build and sustain local popular support.
In Wellington's first combat deployment in 1794, "he saw the effects
of.. .local inhabitants who preferred the enemy to their allies...." 13 Having, he later wrote,
"learnt [from that campaign] what one ought not to do," 14 in both "[his campaigns in]
India and the Peninsula, he sought to retain the goodwill of the locals." 15 In the former,
he demanded that "[n]ative customs. ..always. ..be respected," and as a consequence,
"[t]he 'native inhabitants'... regard[ed] his justice and fairness with 'wonder.'" 16
Wellington converted such amazement into tangible benefits in the form of outstanding
local intelligence and logistics support. He continued this emphasis in Spain where,
upon assuming command, he lamented that '"I should begin immediately but I cannot
venture to stir without money.'" 17 Unlike Napoleon, whose "armies lived off the
country, by forcible requisitioning amounting to robbery," Wellington refused to launch
an offensive until he could purchase supplies from the locals with cash. 18 Only through
essentially honest dealings with Spanish and Portuguese inhabitants could he maintain
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their support, which, he knew from Flanders and India, was indispensable to his
eventual success.
Similarly, the Arab Revolt demonstrates the importance of cultural
awareness in just launching a successful hybrid campaign. For prior to the Revolt,
cultural ignorance almost lost the British the benefits of an Arab uprising before it ever
began. This occurred when the senior Arab leader, Sharif Hussein, responded to British
calls for an alliance by respectfully demanding to know whether the British would
support an independent Arab nation. 19 Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in
Cairo, underestimated the importance of this issue to Hussein, and almost responded to
him with vague promises. Had McMahon done so, it is likely that Hussein would have
recognized the worthlessness of such assurances and ended the negotiations.
Fortunately, for the British, an Arab deserter from the Turkish Army,
Muhammad Faruqi, gained the confidence of McMahon and his staff. After Faruqi
explained the crucial role that Arab nationalism would have to play in precipitating and
sustaining an Arab movement against the Turks, "McMahon and his advisers had
enough knowledge of the background [of Hussein's request] to...[evaluate] it with a fuller
understanding. The note which McMahon [then] dispatched in reply....contains the
pledges which brought the Arabs into the War, openly on the side of the Allies."20
b. Improving the Relationship with Foreign Irregular Combatants
From the above examples, it is evident that cultural awareness can play a
major role in obtaining and sustaining the support of a local population for a hybrid
campaign. Such awareness similarly loomed large, in the Anglo-Iberian and Anglo-Arab
campaigns, in maximizing the contributions of the foreign irregulars once they joined the
fight. Wellington, for example, "proved capable of cooperating with the most diverse
guerrilla leaders." 21 His willingness to let them fight their war, their way - even to the
point of paying for the still "gruesomely bloodstained" French dispatches which they
brought him - undoubtedly endeared them to him. One also recalls the earlier
discussion about the role that T.E. Lawrence's understanding of Arab culture played in
transforming the performance of the Arab tribesmen. It is worth repeating that had men
like Major Garland - who thought it "quite useless for the Britisher to endeavor to
introduce military ideas" to the Arabs - continued to supervise their fighting, the Anglo-
Arab force would likely not have advanced out of Palestine and Arabia. 22 It is also hard
to imagine a more potent recommendation for the value of cultural awareness.
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c. Role of Cultural Awareness in Defeating a Hybrid Force
Finally, the role which a lack of popular support played in limiting the
efficiency of both the Boers and NCAC is a point U.S. commanders should keep in mind
if apposing a hybrid force. The U.S. may not always find itself fortunate enough to be in
the role of the Japanese in Burma - fighting a hybrid force which the local population
voluntarily opposes. Cultural awareness on the part of a conventional commander,
however, manifested through astute interaction with the local population, can limit their
support for an opposing hybrid force.
The British effort to deny popular support to the Boer commandos, for
example, was not entirely a story of herding civilians into disease-ridden, overcrowded
concentration camps. The British also weakened popular support for the rebels "by
setting up an effective administrative machine and an efficient police organization, and
by financing reconstruction." 23 Much more well-managed population relocation
programs also contributed substantially to the defeat of Communist irregulars in Malay
during the 1950s, and in Guatemala in the 1980s. Some of the best guidance on swaying
the allegiance of the local population away from indigenous combatants comes from the
words of French "General Joseph Simon Gallieni, who made his name [fighting guerrillas]
in Indochina and Madagascar at the end of the last century,"
Every time that the necessities of war force one of our... [units] to take
action against a village or an inhabited center, [the commanding officer's]
first concern, once submission of the inhabitants has been achieved,
should be the reconstruction of the village, creation of a market, and
establishment of a school.24
Thus, if seeking to defeat a future hybrid opponent by eliminating one of his most
significant assets - local popular support - U.S. commanders would do well to
remen . er that, if shaped by a reasonable concern for the native culture, population
control does not always have to be unpopular.
Of course the opposite is also true; a conventional commander with no
appreciation nor regard for local culture can create support for a hybrid opponent. The
southern campaign of the American Revolution, for instance, clearly illustrates the
ramifications of a lack of cultural awareness on the part of a conventional commander.
In that campaign, General Sir Henry Clinton, the British theater commander, completely
misinterpreted southern colonial sentiments after the overwhelming British victory at
Charleston in May, 1780. As historian Paul Smith observes,
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The fall of Charleston...shattered American resistance in the South.
Within three weeks the last organized groups in arms...accepted
terms;....Undoubtedly convinced that further resistance was impossible,
the.. .rebels acknowledged their defenselessness and everywhere appeared
ready to accept the return of royal government.25
While the senior British civilian official in the south, sensing this Patriot disheartenment,
wanted to establish a Royal civilian regime as quickly as possible, Clinton refused. As a
military commander, he "was reluctant to restore civil authority.. .quickly.. ..Self
government was a blessing too great to be bestowed at once: 'It will intoxicate,' he
declared."26
Consequently, acting on his guarded outlook, Clinton issued a
proclamation declaring that anyone who "failed to take an oath of allegiance to His
Majesty's government would be considered in rebellion and treated accordingly. 'This
proclamation was the point upon which the continuance of the Revolution in South
Carolina turned....'" 27 The reason is summarized by Russell Weigley: "this compulsion
of a clear choice between loyalty and a return to rebellion, when many would have
preferred a neutrality which might have served Clinton just as well, perversely helped drive
men back into rebellion."28 As Lord Rawdon, one of Clinton's subordinate commanders,
sardonically summarized at the time,
That unfortunate Proclamation...has had very unfavorable consequences.
The majority of the Inhabitants in the Frontier Districts, tho' ill disposed
to us, from circumstances were not [previously] actually in arms against
us:... freed [by the Proclamation] from the Paroles [which would have
excused them from fighting]...nine out of ten of them are now embodied
on the part of the Rebels....
Undoubtedly, a better understanding of colonial attitudes on Clinton's
part could have dramatically altered the outcome of this hybrid campaign in the British
favor. Although accepting this clear implication, contemporary U.S. commanders might
still be tempted to dismiss Clinton's mistake as one that they, being more globally
aware, would never make. But as Larry Cable warns, even the American military has
recently followed in Clinton's footsteps:
Viewing British actions in the southern colonies, the popular perception of
provocation is obvious. Far from coercing the almost passive southern
population, the actions of [the British]...like the U.S. use of airpower in
Vietnam (1965) and the Israeli security forces in the Occupied Territories,
incited a profoundly hostile response from the target population.30
In conclusion, one may question such an extensive discussion regarding
cultural awareness. But at least three factors justify its serious consideration in an
analysis of hybrid campaigns. First, the absolute indispensability of cultural awareness
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in grooming an effective hybrid force ought to now be unquestionable. Second, and of
specific concern to Americans, is the fact that many foreigners view them as having "a
'superiority complex,' which expresses itself.. .and displeases foreigners." 31 Possessing
sufficient cultural awareness will go a long way toward minimizing those traits with
which Americans so alienate their possible allies. Finally, even given these benefits,
cultivating and maintaining cultural awareness is often disregarded by conventional
military commanders until after the crisis requiring it has erupted. By then, it is
obviously too late.
E. IMPLICATIONS
1. Hybrid Warfare is a Costly Form of War
It is clear that hybrid warfare is often costly in terms of both physical
devastation and time. As for the former, the contested theater is usually ravaged, and
non-combatants frequently become targets for reprisals. Often, serving as irregulars,
they also become combatant casualties. In the cases of the Iberians and the Arabs, as
well as many other historical hybrid campaigns, nationalism was a motivating factor for
enduring such hardships. Nationalism, however, will not motivate foreign regulars, or
foreign SOF fighting as irregulars, serving in a multinational hybrid force. Foreign
military commanders in such cases would need troops with the disciplined willingness
of Wellington's regulars, Merrill's Marauders, or the Chindits.
Hybrid warfare is also costly in terms of the time it takes to reach a conclusion.
As Liddell-Hart noted when analyzing the Anglo-Arab hybrid campaign, "if national
conditions make a quick issue imperative," hybrid warfare is not the approach to take. 32
Consequently, the local populace in the contested theater which supports a hybrid force
must be willing to maintain that support over a lengthy period. Similarly, the
population of any foreign country which is providing troops for a hybrid force must not
strongly oppose a long-term involvement for those troops.
This last point seems particularly applicable to the U.S. Is the American public
willing to support U.S. military participation in a lengthy hybrid campaign? The U.S.
Army's own doctrine seems to indicate that they will not: "The American people expect
decisive victory.... They prefer quick resolution of conflicts and reserve the right to
reconsider their support should any of these conditions not be met." 33 Might this
characteristic of the American public make U.S. military forces participating in a typical
hybrid campaign - which will not be resolved swiftly - vulnerable to loss of support
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back home? With substantial public support as the sine qua non of U.S. military
commitments since Vietnam, this issue should be thoroughly addressed before
introducing U.S. forces to a hybrid campaign.
2. Increasing a Hybrid Force's Degree of Coordination or
Decentralization
Given that coordination and decentralization are the keys to creating the most
efficient hybrid force, how can a hybrid commander improve these two variables within
his force? As future hybrid commanders consider this, it may be useful to remember
that most hybrid forces which were inefficient became that way through a lack of
coordination. Consequently, a hybrid commander should concentrate first on improving
his force's coordination. Improving cultural awareness would seem a useful avenue for
increasing the coordination in a multinational hybrid force. Unfortunately, however,
cultural awareness cannot be enhanced "overnight."
But while improving coordination may be a long term, effort-intensive process,
problems with too much centralization in a hybrid force might be repaired much more
quickly. After all, a hybrid commander could give greater freedom of action to his
irregulars simply by decree. But as some of the campaigns analyzed here clearly show,
hybrid commanders can be loathe to issue such a decree.
3. Hybrid Warfare and 21 st Century Weaponry
Some may be tempted to claim that modern military technology, by overmatching
less sophisticated opponents, will paralyze indigenous irregular forces and make hybrid
warfare obsolete. As Lewis Gann wrote of the Boer hybrid force,
The Boers had the good fortune to fight at a time just before the
combustion engine had revolutionized the art of war. Had the Boer War
broken out twenty years later, armored cars and aircraft, supported by
motorized infantry and mechanized supply services, would swiftly have
put an end to the depredations of horsemen on the open veldt.34
Are irregular forces without access to the latest technology as vulnerable today as the
Boers would have been fighting against armored cars and aircraft? Contemporary
conflicts suggest otherwise. Vietnamese Communist irregulars maintained bitter
resistance against the best of French and American technology. And while the
Vietnamese benefited from tremendous cover and concealment provided by jungle
foliage, irregular resistance to modern technology is also possible in more open terrain.
As James Dunnigan and Albert Nofi observe,
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Afghan resistance fighters....fought a guerrilla war in an area where
guerrilla war was thought (by outsiders) to be impossible, or at least very
difficult. Afghanistan is largely devoid of forests, or cover of any kind.
But the Soviets found out that the traditional Afghan costume of dark-
colored clothing made people invisible from the air whenever they simply
lay down on the ground and remained still. They made maximum use of
whatever cover was available. When Afghan fighters moved with
munitions-laden pack animals, they either moved only at night, or always
stayed near whatever cover there was, and listened carefully for any low-
flying aircraft or helicopters.35
Thus it appears that the potential for determined opposition by "low tech" irregulars
will continue for some years to come, and with it the viability of hybrid warfare.
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Vn. HYBRID WAR IN THE INFORMATION AGE
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Typology
"'We live in an age that is driven by information. Technological
breakthroughs...are changing the face of war and how we prepare for war." 1 If this
claim by former Secretary of Defense Perry is valid, then the importance of any
conclusions drawn about the conduct of war today depends upon their continued
relevance in the Information Age. Thus, to ensure the preceding explication and analysis
of conducting and winning hybrid campaigns is worth the reader's consideration as more
than just historical explanation, this chapter will consider how the future might affect
such campaigns. Specifically, this chapter hypothesizes that while Information Age
technologies (IAT) may substantially transform the appearance of hybrid campaigns,
they will not affect the key to victory in those campaigns: effective combination of the
regular and irregular components through coordination and decentralization.
In considering the impact of the Information Age on hybrid campaigns, this
chapter will seek to reduce an almost infinite array of possibilities into a manageable
portion through a simple typology — those impacts which would be most evident from a
political/ cultural frame of reference versus those impacts which would be most evident
from a military frame of reference. The first category corresponds roughly to all of the
strategic level of war, and some of the operational level of war. The second category
would include the remainder of the operational level of war and all of the tactical level
of war. 2 Within the first category, the political /cultural grouping, IAT could
significantly alter the use and impact of propaganda on hybrid campaigns, as well as
the acquisition of the cultural awareness which has often been critical to forging efficient
hybrid campaigns. Within the military frame of reference, IAT may materially transform
the application of three of the four components of combat power: maneuver, firepower,
and leadership.3
2. Caveats
Before examining these specific impacts on hybrid war, it is important to address
two caveats. First, although most of the historical examples cited below come from past
hybrid campaigns, some points are most aptly illustrated with anecdotes from non-
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hybrid campaigns. One should not infer, however, that a point illustrated with a story
from a non-hybrid campaign does not apply to hybrid warfare.
Secondly, one must understand that logical clarity dictates that only one impact
of IAT can be addressed at a time. Given the almost limitless number of applications
for IAT which can be imagined, and the many which have already been demonstrated to
have reasonable validity, this "one at time" approach could leave one open to a charge
of failing to appreciate the revolutionary impact which the Information Age could have
across all phases of military operations. Nothing could be farther from the truth. I
readily agree that today's prognosticators may not even begin to understand the changes
IAT will make. Moreover, I understand that I cannot imagine all the implications of IAT
on even just hybrid war, and even just in the areas I have chosen to emphasize. Thus,
the reader should keep in mind that the postulations given below do not imply that only
the IATs discussed for a given area could be used in that area. Moreover, just because a
given IAT is discussed in only one area does not mean that it could not have
applications in other areas. In other words, what follows is meant to be credible and
informative, not exhaustive and definitive.
B. HOW IATMAY IMPACT HYBRID WARPOLITICALLY
1. Propaganda
At least two potential applications for combining propaganda with IAT present
themselves as useful to both a hybrid force and its opposition: influencing international
opinion and increasing popular support within the contested nation. Before
investigating these applications, however, it is necessary to first define "propaganda."
This chapter will adopt the definition forwarded by Jacques Ellul in his work,
Propaganda:
Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that
wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a
mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological
manipulations and incorporated in an organization.4
One anticipates that recent and future IATs, like wider access to television and
the Internet, and the near real-time broadcast of events by both mediums, could
significantly improve the capability of "an organized group" to "psychologically
manipulate" a "mass of individuals." With public support so crucial to either
sustaining or thwarting a hybrid campaign, improvements in so manipulating masses of
individuals might have tremendous impact. Keeping in mind propaganda as defined by
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Ellul, and the importance of public support to hybrid campaigns, one can move to
exploring how IAT might improve the former's influence on the latter. The first area
considered will be utilizing propaganda to influence international opinion.
a. Influencing International Opinion
(1) Hybrid Forces Seeking Tangible Aid. A brief review of past
uses of propaganda by hybrid forces trying to sway international opinion reveals at
least two potential future applications: seeking tangible aid and moral deterrence.
Colonial envoys to France during the American Revolution, for example, sought to
manipulate the French into providing tangible aid by portraying only the most promising
aspects of the American cause. Their presentation of Gates' victory at Saratoga in 1777,
despite significant defeats in the same year for Washington, convinced the French to
commit money, equipment, and troops to the Americans. 5 One wonders if IAT would
not allow future "colonial envoys" to manipulate future equivalents of France even more
insistently. Will the tools exist to create a "Saratoga" out of a much more minor
victory? At the same time, could simultaneous defeats be "doctored" to appear
instead as stalemates or even victories? One has to believe that such tasks have already
been researched and gamed by professional firms such as Hill & Knowlton, who so
aggressively sought "to mobilize American support for... [the Kuwaiti] cause and to
channel it into military action..." after the 1990 Iraqi invasion.6
Other hybrid forces have also employed propaganda in their
pursuit of tangible aid internationally. But neither the Confederate States of America, in
courting primarily the British and French, nor the Boers of South Africa, in courting all of
continental Europe, received any aid approaching the French support of the American
colonists.
7
(2) Hybrid Forces Seeking Moral Deterrence. The Boer case,
however, reveals a second type of assistance hybrid forces can seek through
international propaganda: moral deterrence. For "although [British] commanders. . .did
not have to deal with televised images of the battlefield transmitted home, plenty of
journalists and war protesters were prepared to recount the brutality of colonial
warfare...."
8 Thus, by disseminating propaganda about British "farm burnings and
concentration camps,... [the Boers made the war] a moral issue in Britain and throughout
the world....Now being labeled as child killers and oppressors, British government
leaders sought for a way out...." 9 The Boers, through international propaganda, sought
to create enough moral outrage over British conduct of the war to deter the latter from
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continuing. Although the widespread revulsion of the British which ensued did not end
up securing victory for the Boers, the technique was nonetheless established.
Americans in particular are bitterly familiar with the effects of
using international propaganda to create moral deterrence. The Communist Vietnamese,
although defeated repeatedly in conventional engagements, reaped tremendous returns
from propaganda in the United States about the war. Recognizing sometime after the
Tet Offensive that "U.S. domestic public pressure was pushing for an end to U.S.
involvement and for a withdrawal of U.S. forces," 10 the North Vietnamese modified
their strategy accordingly. They clearly recognized the value of extending the struggle
while their propaganda, enhanced by independent media reports favorable to their
cause, manipulated American public opinion into opposing the war. While the Boers
succeeded at labeling the British "child killers," but failed to secure strategic victory, the
North Vietnamese used propaganda to stir domestic discontent in the homeland of their
enemy and then adapted their campaign plan to "wait out" the effects of that
propaganda. As Maurice Tugwell observes,
By portraying the National Liberation Front as nationalist and
independent, [the North Vietnamese] undermined the [American ability
to label them as an] evil enemy...; by depicting the U.S. military effort as
genocide and institutionalized brutality, they weakened the [American
ability to label themselves as] good...; and by denying the United States a
quick victory...they eroded hope that victory could ever be won. In the
United States...two end-the-war movements [consequently resulted]: an
intellectual and patriotic lobby that accepted that the war should be
ended because victory was not in sight, and a disloyal, radical movement
that painted the North Vietnamese as the good guys and the Americans
as the evil enemy. The second group [those convinced that America's
efforts were morally incorrect,] extended the conflict into the United
States in full revolutionary manner. 11
One again muses over the potential for this type of propaganda
strategy in the information age. Would not emerging IATs allow future "Boers" or "Viet
Cong" to appeal much more directly and with more impact to a large international
audience? Similarly, could that audience, once roused, be manipulated much more
directly by operatives of the hybrid force itself? "Recent events in Mexico during the
Chiapas rebellion provide a concrete example of how the Internet can be exploited to
mobilize both media attention and political support within Mexico and the rest of North
America for political and economic goals...." 12 In light of the Chiapas scenario, one
wonders what the effect of Internet sites run by the North Vietnamese would have been
on American anti-war sentiments. Ho Chi Minh himself could have appeared "on line"
to bond with, and rally, international supporters. Having been victimized by a
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propaganda strategy of moral deterrence in the past, U.S. decision makers ought to
conduct a more than casual analysis to ascertain the United States' current vulnerability
to this strategy before committing the nation to either side of a future hybrid campaign.
(3) Conventional Opponents Seeking Moral Deterrence. At
the same time, the Information Age improvements which will allow more effective
propaganda campaigns by hybrid forces will also be available to their conventional
opponents. Widespread availability of media outlets such as television and the Internet
appears to create the perfect conduit for propaganda seeking to turn moral deterrence
right back against the proponents of a hybrid campaign.
A first example might be found in an alternate French response to
the violent Spanish resistance of 1808 to 1814. Might not Napoleon, if equipped with
IATs, have unhinged the hybrid combination of Wellington's regulars and the Spanish
guerrillas through manipulating the sensibilities of the British masses? One has little
trouble imagining that repeated daily images of the mutilated corpses of French soldiers
held aloft by celebratory Spanish villagers would turn the stomachs of average
Britishers. It is not a stretch to envision the British rapidly accepting the notion that the
Spanish were nothing more than "terrorists." As Brian Jenkins writes, "use of the term
[terrorist] implies a moral judgment; and if one party can successfully attach the label
'terrorisf to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral
viewpoint. Terrorism is what the bad guys do." 13 Given such a propaganda campaign,
could Britain have provided 50,000 regular soldiers and significant funding for a six-
year hybrid campaign, as it did historically?14
A second potential technique for the conventional opponent to
utilize international propaganda in creating moral deterrence against a hybrid force
would be to portray one of the hybrid partners as a "foreign aggressor." Recalling that
future scenarios might find American regular forces fighting alongside foreign irregulars in
a hybrid coalition (see Chapter VI, note 6), could not the conventional opponent claim
that American "imperialists" were interfering with "internal" or "regional" affairs just
like "the colonial powers of the last century"? One imagines that IAT would improve
the conventional opponent7s ability to proclaim the "anti-imperialist" message both
within the contested theater and around the world. With this improved ability, might
the United States, as a hybrid partner supplying a smaller regular contingent, receive less
support from the undecided population within the theater, and more international
pressure to pull its forces out?
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Having twice mentioned a possible American vulnerability to IAT-
enhanced propaganda campaigns aimed at morally deterring her from either supporting
or opposing a hybrid campaign, it is probably appropriate to briefly assess the degree of
that vulnerability. Eric V. Larson's four bases of American public support for military
operations - perceived benefits, prospects for success, costs, and consensus support
from political leaders - might be a useful place to start this assessment. 15 A first glance
at two of these bases indicates that America's vulnerability to moral deterrence is only
increased by IAT. First, hybrid campaigns are generally lengthy and the prospects for
success are usually not evident early in the campaign. If the chances for failure could be
amplified early with the American public through IAT, the U.S. might never be able to
marshal enough public support to enter the fray. Second, Americans have recently
viewed with skepticism the perceived benefits of extended military involvements. They
viewed horrific images from Rwanda and Bosnia (in that case for years) without
supporting any initiative for deploying U.S. troops - presumably because they remained
unconvinced of any compelling benefits from American involvement. In the case where
America did conduct an extended involvement, Somalia, 57% of the American public
disapproved of the U.S. presence abroad within ten months of the initial deployment
(before the bloody firefight of 3 October 1993). These examples suggest that an IAT-
based propaganda campaign seeking to morally deter American involvement could find
a ready source of discontent in the American public's disdain for extended military
involvements. Any LAT-enhanced propaganda playing on this discontent, as well as
amplifying the dim prospects for early success, would appear to have a reasonable
chance of discouraging American involvement in supporting or opposing a hybrid
campaign. It would thus probably not be wise for current American decision makers to
discount the impact of a future Ho Chi Minh "on line."
To review, IAT may increase the impact on hybrid campaigns of
internationally-focused propaganda efforts in at least three ways: tangible aid might
flow more quickly to a less successful hybrid force, moral deterrence might cause a
conventional opponent to break off the fight, or the same deterrence might cause one of
the hybrid partners to drop out. Having considered potential international effects of
propaganda during the Information Age, one can move to examining propaganda effects
at the level of the contested nation itself.
b. Increasing Popular Support Within the Contested Nation
Within the contested nation itself, the targeted "mass" would be the
populace who could become irregular combatants and /or their supporters, and the
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sentiment to be manipulated would be their allegiance. A useful example is the launching
of the Arab Revolt, which of course ended up producing the irregulars for the Anglo-
Arab hybrid force. Reviewing the events preceding the outbreak of the Revolt, and the
difficulties of sustaining it, will reveal a multitude of opportunities for the employment
of propaganda.
As previously discussed, the British negotiated for almost a year and a
half trying to convince the Arab tribesmen to turn upon their Turkish masters. British
agents relied heavily on psychologically unifying the Arabs through a purported British
commitment to an independent Arab nation. Arab nationalism was a fertile avenue for
manipulation because, in the words of Sharif Hussein, whether the Arabs would revolt
or not depended "'solely upon whether you [the British, would] reject or admit the
proposed frontiers [for a new Arab nation].'" 16 Indeed, many Arab tribal chiefs initially
resisted participating in a revolt on the grounds that defeat of the Turks would only see
the British and French installed as new colonial masters.
Opposing the British, the Turks sought to drive both the Arabs Muslims
in Ottoman territory, as well as those in Egypt and Sudan, to rise up against the
"infidel" Europeans in a holy war. In the end, the propaganda of nationalism overcame
the appeals to religious unity and the Arabs joined the British cause.
Even after the outbreak of the Revolt, however, propaganda assaults
upon the allegiances of Arab tribesmen and peasants continued. A striking example
was the release in late 1917, by the new Communist rulers of Russia, of the previously
secret Sykes-Picot Agreement. This was the agreement discussed in Chapter II, wherein
the French and British, at the same time that the latter were manipulating Arab
nationalist sentiments, divided the Arab lands into sectors to be ruled by the European
partners. When Czarist Russian government copies of this document were forwarded by
the Bolsheviks to the Turks, the latter wasted no time in disseminating the news
throughout the Arab provinces. This news "work[ed] havoc with the Anglo-Arab
alliance...."
17 Soon the British generated propaganda to counter this potentially
crippling blow. Assuring the Arabs "that Great Britain had been...and would continue
to work for the liberation of [Arab] countries from Turkish rule [and]. ..also for their
freedom and independence," the announcement also pledged "...that no regime would be
set up in any [Arab countries] that was not acceptable to their populations." 18 Not
surprisingly, "a wave of jubilation swept the Arab world as the contents of the [British]
statement became known." 19
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This scenario clearly demonstrates potent uses for propaganda at the
national level in a hybrid campaign. While the hybrid side will seek to rally the local
population to its side to fight as irregulars, or at least to passively support those
combatants, the conventional opponent will seek to discredit the motives of the
"outside" power and discourage any local support. Such a competition will doubtless
occur in any future hybrid campaign. IAT would allow a widespread release of a
complete, or appropriately edited, version of future equivalents of Sykes-Picot
agreements. Mass media forums would allow outside (i.e. British), indigenous (Arab),
and conventional (Turkish) leaders to communicate directly with the contested
population almost without interruption.
Another possible use of IAT-enabled propaganda to manipulate local
civilian support in favor of a hybrid force is suggested colonial General Greene's hybrid
southern campaign. Greene did not win any tactical victories with his regular
component during the first six months of his command. During that same period,
however, "British power in the Carolinas had been broken, their entire chain of posts
had been swept away, and they securely held only the area immediately around
Charleston." 20 One analysts suggests that Greene's ability to sustain his resistance to
the British and rapidly triumph, despite such disappointments in conventional battles,
had much to do with propaganda:
...[The Americans] particularly the revolutionary hardcore, understood
that the... struggle was far more political and psychological in nature than
military. Ultimately, the Americans relied upon reinforcing domestic
perceptions of legitimacy and thus the political will to continue the war....
As a result, the British military operations were co-opted by the
[Americans], as both defeats and victories could be manipulated by
appropriate psychological operations to reinforce the domestic
consensus....
21
Might IAT make similar efforts to remind a population of their political goals, or to
diminish the disappointment their conventional defeats, even easier in the future?
Would the ability to get information rapidly into all but the most remote locations make
it easier to repeatedly rally a local population without whom a "fight, get beat, rise, and
fight again" strategy like Greene's is doomed to fail?
Where might these potential international and national applications of
propaganda lead the Information Age protagonists or opponents of hybrid war? At
least two points emerging from the historical scenarios considered above may begin to
answer that question.
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c. Considerations for Using Propaganda in Information Age
Hybrid Campaigns
First, propaganda is a weapon available to both sides. This may seem an
obvious point, but it is important to emphasize. While the French in the example of the
Spanish uprising might have manipulated the sensibilities of the English populace, the
English could have simultaneously released information of countless French atrocities as
well. None of the examples above, by focusing only on the actions of the hybrid or
conventional side, are meant to imply that a given use of propaganda precludes a
countering response, or even an unrelated initiative, by the opponent. Indeed, as the
Arab Revolt demonstrated, the Turks lost the first propaganda "battle" over who the
Arabs would support, but were later able to respond with a potentially crippling
"counterattack" against the Anglo-Arab alliance in the form of the Sykes-Picot
Agreement. Thus, opponents in future hybrid campaigns must remember that
propaganda planning, to be effective in manipulating populations, ought to assume an
enemy who will respond intelligently and attack unexpectedly.
Second, propaganda as a means for gaining the support of the indigenous
population appears to be an essential consideration for any force seeking to prosecute a
hybrid campaign. Simply put, one half of the campaign's combat power rests with an
irregular force. Indigenous peoples may become those combatants. Additionally, a
sizable portion of those who do not fight must be supportive enough to not betray the
irregulars to the conventional opponent. Even if foreign SOF fulfill the first role (of
irregulars), the native population must still fulfill the second (of supporting them).
Consequently, winning and holding the allegiance of the contested population is
essential. Propaganda could be a very useful tool for doing so. Thus, the hybrid
campaigner ought to closely examine the effectiveness of propaganda in shaping popular
preferences.
When considering such shaping, one would be wise to again consult Ellul.
For in shaping popular preferences to support irregular combatants, one is essentially
attempting to motivate, or agitate, a population. Propaganda designed to agitate "is
particularly suited for use among..." those populations who are "less educated and
informed...." 22 For any future hybrid campaigns fought in the Third World, Ellul's
evaluation thus appears as an advantage. But planners should remember that many
lesser developed, lesser educated peoples are tribalistic. These tribal loyalties can be
fierce impediments to any attempts at unifying population groups containing more than
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one tribe. As George Antonius notes, such tribal loyalties dogged the expansion of the
Arab Revolt from the moment it was launched:
The attribute of disunion...between one tribe and another, was inherent in
the structure of the Arabian society with its clannish organization and
numerous divisions and fractions... .[N]o...bond united one tribe to the
other, and the resulting dissociation was rendered still more pronounced
by the stringent codes governing blood feuds, the laws of retaliation and
the rights of way....[The Revolt's leaders] could see before [them]. ..an
interminable jungle of feuds and antagonisms, of old scores to be paid, of
debts to be written off in blood.23
Is propaganda consequently useless for agitating such tribal peoples, even
if there are "less educated?" No, for as Dr. Anna Simons has pointed out, moral
authority can trump tribal loyalty.24 Thus, the agitation propaganda (agitprop) should
be targeted to manipulate the leaders whom a tribe feels morally compelled to obey, and
these leaders would then influence the tribes. When such leaders exist in a society, this
can be effective, as it was key Moslem leaders whom the British first co-opted in the
Revolt.
But what if a hybrid campaign is to be fought in the developed world,
and a sophisticated population is asked to support the irregular component? Ellul
again provides appropriate counsel in noting that "propaganda will turn a normal
feeling of patriotism into a raging nationalism. It not only reflects myths and
suppositions, it hardens them, sharpens them, invests them with the power of shock and
action." 25 Regardless of economic development then, nationalism would appear to be a
ready-made conduit toward which to direct IAT-enhanced agitation propaganda. Given
the success nationalism has had in motivating populations to endure tremendous
hardship while supporting irregular efforts (the Boers, the European resistance of World
War II, etc.), this makes intuitive sense.
Finally, one should not conclude considering the implications of using
agitprop in the Information Age without remembering four important cautions about
such use. First, agitprop, despite the increasing reliability of ever more invasive IATs,
cannot be used continuously. As Ellul notes, "a people or party cannot be kept too long
at the highest level of sacrifice, conviction, and devotion." 26 The hybrid force should
thus not count too often on the effects of agitation to compensate for actual military
progress.
Second, although "it is extremely easy to launch a revolutionary
movement based on hatred of a particular enemy," 27 it may not be easy to keep such a
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movement within accepted levels of violence. A hybrid force relying on agitprop should
be wary of the potential for violent excesses on the part of its irregulars.
Third, the embarrassing position of the British government upon the
release of the Sykes-Picot Agreement points out the caution a foreign power involved
with a hybrid campaign must exercise in implementing agitation. Any agitation
produced by false promises is liable to collapse when such duplicity is revealed.
Finally, although IAT may enhance the effectiveness or reach of agitprop,
neither side in a hybrid campaign should feel advantaged in using such propaganda just
because its opponent is technologically-deficient. Returning again to Ellul,
In order to make propaganda of agitation, it is not necessary to have the
mass media of communication at one's disposal, for such propaganda
feeds on itself, and each person seized by it becomes in turn a
propagandist....Any statement whatever, no matter how stupid, any 'tall
tale' will be believed once it enters into the passionate current of hatred.28
Thus, while agitprop may become a better tool in the hands of an Information Age-sawy
practitioner, its powerful potential will always remain available to rally even the most
"backward" of peoples.
2. Cultural Awareness
A second impact for IAT on hybrid campaigns that would be evident from a
cultural /political frame of reference would be improving cultural awareness. The
previous chapter stressed the necessity of local popular support to forging an efficient
hybrid fight, and the critical role which cultural awareness can play in obtaining such
support. Ellul further highlights the importance of cultural awareness when he notes
that, in order to make the propaganda suggested above effective, one "must know the
sentiments and opinions, the current tendencies and the stereotypes among the public he
is trying to reach." 29 Given the undisputed importance of cultural awareness, this
section will postulate on not only how IAT may make such awareness easier to obtain,
but also on several points worth considering before using IAT to do so.
a. Using IAT to Improve Acquisition of Cultural Awareness
How could IATs help in acquiring cultural awareness? Perhaps in three
straightforward applications. First, the key to understanding and accessing any culture
is its language. Existing technologies like recordable compact discs and portable disc
players make high-quality elementary foreign language education less expensive and
more available to military members than ever before. Second, the proliferation of
videocassette tapes and laser discs have created a perfect medium to rapidly introduce
military members to the sights and sounds of foreign culture. "Do's" and "don'ts"
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which before had to be painstakingly described by the written word can now be visually
demonstrated to thousands of soldiers. Finally, rugged data collection networks make
the "overnight" polling of even rural populations entirely possible. One wonders if a few
days' worth of such polling data might not have changed General Clinton's mind before
he issued his ill-fated proclamation to Carolina colonials.
Fine, one might then concede, cultural awareness is important and IATs
might make acquiring it, at least at a rudimentary level, simpler and quicker. At this
point it seems a rather basic point. Is there anything else to consider? Yes, there are at
least three points to keep in mind before reducing cultural awareness to a travel movie
and language tapes.
b. Implications of Using IAT to Acquire Cultural Awareness
First, cultural awareness is not something acquired in a single session, like
an inoculation, prior to deploying to a theater. Those who received the greatest benefit
from foreign populations, Wellington and Lawrence, continually exercised and improved
their understanding of the culture in which they were operating, and from which they
needed assistance. Future leaders of hybrid campaigns seeking to maximize the benefits
of cultural awareness should look for ways in which IAT could develop that awareness
once soldiers were in a theater, not just prior to deploying.
Second, cultural awareness is as important to smooth cooperation
between junior soldiers of different nationalities as it is to that between generals and
statesmen. While the British Ffigh Commissioner for Egypt, Henry McMahon, needed to
make the right decision to get the Arabs into the conflict, independently operating junior
officers like Lawrence had to translate that participation into combat power. Too many
Major Garlands at the tactical level and even the wisdom of a Wellington at the
operational level could be wasted. Thus, IATs for enhancing cultural awareness ought to
be envisioned as widely distributed assets, not limited numbers of sophisticated
solutions.
Third, even the most effective IATs could never, and should never be
designed to, replace in-country experience. Although this point may be obvious, one is
not reluctant to highlight it for fear of sounding ingenuous, but for fear of giving senior
leaders a justification for not taking the marriage of IAT to cultural awareness seriously.
For if the "best" cultural awareness can only be acquired "in country," than those
leaders who are prone to dismiss its importance in the first place may be doubly
skeptical of directing any Information Age resources toward acquiring or teaching it. But
to me, such a marriage appears to promise a low-cost, high-payoff prospect imminently
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worthwhile of IAT. Cultural awareness simply has too much demonstrated military
worth, particularly in hybrid campaigns, to be neglected.
C. HOW IATMAY IMPACT HYBRID WARMILITARILY
Viewed from a military frame of reference, properly employed IATs could
certainly weight the balance of combat power toward whichever force best exploits
them. According to FM 100-5, Operations, "combat power... [is] the ability to
fight....[which] decide[s] the outcome of campaigns, major operations, battles, and
engagements."30 Combat power achieves decisiveness by "combining the elements of
maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership," and bringing them violently "to bear
quickly, giving the enemy no opportunity to respond with coordinated or effective
opposition."31 With tremendous potential to impact the exercise of maneuver, firepower,
and leadership, IATs figure to significantly affect the combat power applied in hybrid
campaigns.
1. Maneuver
In the maneuver component of combat power, IAT could alter the conduct of
hybrid campaigns through the opposing concepts of dispersion and concentration. IAT-
enhanced efforts at manipulating the enemy's dilemma over whether to disperse or
concentrate could magnify the hybrid force's combat power.
a. Forcing the Conventional Opponent to Concentrate
Take, for example, a hybrid force possessing a relatively weak irregular
component. It could be to that force's advantage to drive its opponent to concentrate.
This could give the weaker irregular component greater relative combat power (than
before) in the areas which the conventional opponent vacates while concentrating. The
irregulars would then have a greater chance of success at recruiting new members or
conducting combat operations against a now-reduced conventional contingent. How
might a conventional opponent be "informationally" forced to so concentrate?
One method could be to update the centuries-old concept of a
demonstration - "a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought."32 "Physical"
information, in the form of decoys, could force the enemy to concentrate. An early
example of using IAT to do this is the Israeli air raid on the Bekaa Valley of central
Lebanon in June, 1982. Here, "a wave of remotely piloted vehicles [used] as decoys..."
captured the Syrians' attention and led them to take actions which left them unprepared
for the subsequent attack by manned Israeli aircraft.33 Could not a similar application
133
of alternative technologies force a conventional ground opponent to focus on the wrong
threat just as the Syrians did? Perhaps an actual small regular component of the hybrid
force could be augmented with robotic decoys or signal makers to focus the enemy's
attention away from upcoming irregular activities. Perhaps this effort could be
enhanced with other IAT, like holograms.
One can clearly argue that an enemy would not be deceived for long by
this, and thus would not concentrate much of his force in response. Such a contention,
however, does not invalidate informationally-enhanced demonstrations as a potential
tool for the hybrid force. Instead, the contention might highlight such demonstrations as
more effective in convincing an opponent to disperse, rather than to concentrate.
Dispersal, of course, would not favor a hybrid force seeking to decrease the combat
power arrayed against its widespread irregular component. Rather, dispersing the
conventional opponent would aid a hybrid force's usually outnumbered regular
component.
b. Forcing the Conventional Opponent to Disperse
How might IAT encourage dispersion? One method might be to utilize
the exact same steps described above - an information operation encouraging the
opponent to concentrate. Accepting the contention that such an operation could not
deceive the opponent for long would be the key to this method's success. Imagine a
series of informationally-enhanced "demonstrations" against a conventional opponent,
encouraging concentration and employed over time, which the hybrid commander knew
would fail. Eventually, might not the conventional commander come to disregard all
signals indicating a need for him to concentrate, even those which were legitimate! Then,
like Porus' Indians who were lulled by Alexander's daily visits to the River Hydaspes,
the conventional commander might not be able to concentrate his forces quickly enough
when he finally recognized a genuine need.34 The conventional force would thus be at a
combat power disadvantage.
Similarly, a host of spatially dispersed but simultaneous information
signals, all indicating a pressing need to disperse, might lead a conventional opponent to
dissipate his combat power just prior to an offensive by the hybrid's regulars. While a
conventional opponent might quickly see through one large-scale deceptive effort aimed
at forcing his concentration, it might be much more difficult to discern the dissembling
nature of this multitude of signals clamoring for dispersion.
In closing this consideration of using IAT to affect the maneuver
component of a conventional force's combat power, the primary point emphasized is
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that IAT may offer new ways to aggravate an age-old dilemma: to disperse or to
concentrate. I am not arguing that IAT makes "demonstrations" invincible, but that the
former may make the latter much more effective in enhancing the combat power of a
hybrid force.
Finally, it is important to note that although this section has focused on
techniques to be used against a conventional force, IAT could also be well utilized by it
to hamper the maneuver of a hybrid force. Information operations indicating an
enhanced monitoring capability on the part of the conventional force could compel the
hybrid's irregulars to limit or cease their operations in certain sectors for fear of
counterstrikes. Conversely, one can imagine numerous information operations designed
to lure the hybrid's crucial, but small, regular force into battle on terms wholly favorable
to the conventional opponent. Thus, just as with the uses of propaganda, success
involves planning for an intelligent, aggressive opponent.
2. Firepower
In addition to reducing conventional opponent's combat power by manipulating
its maneuver component, IAT could be used to increase a second component of the
hybrid force's combat power - firepower. This analysis envisions accomplishing such an
increase in firepower through offensive applications of IAT in attacks which complement
the effects of direct fire weapons. While one could probably conceive of an almost
limitless variety of offensive applications for IAT, this discussion will narrow the focus
to command and control warfare attacks. Given the importance of coordination to a
hybrid force, and to the force opposing one, such attacks would appear to be high
payoff endeavors.
For this discussion, command and control warfare attacks include offensive
information operations directed against the enemy through any or all of five
components: "operations security [OPSEC], military deception, psychological
operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction...." 35 While these components
might not have been known by their current names to historical hybrid commanders,
their desired effect - to "degrade, or destroy [an] adversary ['s] C2 capabilities" - is
certainly not new.36 Consequently, this section will first look at historical examples of
attacks on an enemy's C2 system. It will then hypothesize how current and future
information advancements might modify such attacks.
a. Historical Hybrid Attacks on the Opponent's C2 System
One area of command and control warfare where several hybrid
campaigns have succeeded is in restricting or preventing the conventional opponent's
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information flow. The Peninsular Campaign of 1808-1814 provides a striking example.
"As [Spanish] guerrilla activity intensified [in 1809]. ..the French had to revert to sending
two or three copies [of a dispatch] to ensure that one got through...."37 But as the
conflict grew more bloody and the guerrillas more bold, by 1813 "an escort of [1000]
cavalry was required to guarantee a dispatch getting through." 38 As a French cavalry
officer later wrote, "the daily loss of the French, in many parts of Spain, in their
attempts to...keep up their communications, were at least equal to any they could have
sustained if they had had to struggle with an enemy who could have met them in open
battle."
39 A century later, the Turks in Palestine encountered a similar experience, as
evidenced by their commander Liman von Sanders's comment, cited in the last chapter,
that "the Turks who were defending their own territory found themselves fighting in the
midst of a decidedly hostile population."40
b. IAT-Enhanced C2 Warfare by Hybrid Forces
Applying these historical examples to information age hybrid campaigns
might begin with considering the electronic warfare component of command and control
warfare. For both these historical examples and electronic warfare center around
denying the enemy the means to transmit information. Previously, this meant physically
impeding the progress of a messenger. Today, and in the future, it will mean denying or
controlling the enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum.41 But a revolutionary
change in the medium may not invalidate the highly effective tactics of old.
Both the French and the Turks, due to the actions of Spanish and Arab
irregulars, had to expend significant resources just to maintain the flow of information
necessary for command and control. Any resources so expended were unavailable for
other offensive or defensive actions against the hybrid opponent. Such a result would be
just as beneficial to future hybrid campaigns.
But could a modem hybrid force hope to hamper its opponent's
command and control with hordes of dagger-wielding guerrillas seeking to ambush pony-
mounted couriers? Certainly not, but modern information technologies might be applied
in a similar fashion. Jamming or destruction of transmitters by directed energy weapons,
for example, could force a hybrid's conventional opponent to expend extra resources in
protecting his information just to ensure that it "got through." Computer viruses might
have a similar or even more damaging effect.
None of these techniques, one could argue, would cost the conventional
commander actual troop losses, as suffered by the French or Turks. While this
contention might be true if one only counted deaths of combat troops caused directly by
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electronic warfare weapons, on at least two other levels it is false. It is false first
because a commander facing an aggressive and continuous electromagnetic attack would
almost certainly have to devote the energies of extra troops to defeating that attack.
These troops, although probably not be pulled from front line combat units, would still
be unavailable for other uses, some of which might be as damaging to the hybrid force as
a conventional attack by front line troops. Second, a contention that modern electronic
warfare would not cause losses akin to those suffered by the French or Turks is false
because it fails to see that electronic warfare methods can lead to, or enhance, the effects
of two other components of command and control warfare: deception and physical
destruction.
Deception consists of those "actions which mislead the enemy and induce
him to do something counter to his interests."42 If viewed in this perspective, electronic
warfare operations conducted through IAT could damage a conventional opponent just
as severely as Spanish and Arab guerrillas did theirs. Electronic warfare attacks could
induce the enemy to spend his time and energy just trying to maintain his command and
control. And a conventional opponent expending resources as important as time and
concentration trying to defeat a hybrid's electronic warfare attack will be left much more
vulnerable to attacks causing physical destruction. The recent exercises by U.S.
government-sanctioned computer "hackers," which temporarily paralyzed the U.S.
Pacific Command, would be a clear example.
Although this section is focusing on command and control warfare, the
physical destruction which could be visited upon such a distracted conventional
opponent would not have to be limited to his command and control network. Certainly,
this could be one option. But the destruction could be much more devastating. With
ever more lethal firepower being packaged in ever smaller delivery systems, and
accuracy ever less dependent on range, even a small hybrid force could cause
tremendous destruction to the regular formations of a conventional opponent occupied
with just maintaining basic command and control functions.
It may be important to note that such a combination of three of the
components of command and control warfare - electronic warfare, deception, and
physical destruction - could be effective in spite of recent and anticipated advances in a
fourth, OPSEC. In other words, the recognition that computer-aided encryption may
result in a truly "unbreakable" code does not invalidate attempts to hamper enemy
command and control. A hybrid force completely unable to "read" the conventional
opponent's transmissions could still seek to slow or prevent their delivery. Such delay
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or denial of information would still allow the deception and destruction postulated
above.
3. Leadership — Coordination
Finally, in combination with constricting the maneuver of the conventional,
opponent and increasing the firepower of the hybrid force, IAT could enhance a third
component of combat power - leadership. The particular dimension of leadership
envisioned here would be the coordinated response of a hybrid force to the intent of a
visionary commander. New communication systems such as low earth orbit satellite-
based cellular phone networks will make it possible to command and control multiple,
simultaneous, widely dispersed military forces. In the specific case of hybrid forces, this
could exaggerate the dispersion/ concentration dilemma for a conventional force.
Whereas before conventional forces faced hybrid ones operating on orders days or even
weeks old, in the future, regulars and irregulars will be able to coordinate their
operations in near real time.
Past campaigns again provide good illustrations of the possible of future
technologies. The telegraph, for example, was as new to American Civil War
commanders in the 1860's as the cellular systems described above are to today's
generals. While the telegraph revolutionized the coordination of conventional military
efforts across different geographical regions, an application where the telegraph was not
utilized to its maximum potential reveals how future technologies might be used to their
most devastating effect.
Specifically, the Confederacy failed to coordinate the efforts of their horse-
mounted raiders with the operations of their conventional forces. Although sent well
into the Union rear and wreaking much havoc, the raiders actions were never designed to
closely complement conventional operations.43 Imagine if the succession of Confederate
commanders in the West had directed the efforts of irregular cavalry leaders toward
acting in concert with the Southern conventional armies. Given the success of irregular
leaders like Nathan Bedford Forrest, the number of Confederate irregular units available
in theater, and the tenacity of Southern conventional forces in combat, one wonders if
exploiting the technology existing at the time to coordinate these elements might not have
made the Union advance to Atlanta so difficult as to be abandoned.44
Another missed opportunity occurred almost a century later in the Sino-
American war against the Japanese in China.45 As alluded to earlier, Chiang Kai-shek
refused to extensively arm the Chinese population for fear of internal political
ramifications, and the U.S. leaders refused to force Chiang to efficiently mobilize China
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for fear of losing the only remaining "democratic" leader in Asia. These refusals resulted
in a complete failure to tap the potential of a Chinese irregular campaign. Just utilizing
the radio and telephone technologies of the 1940's, the possibilities for tormenting the
Japanese seem almost infinite if one imagines that Chinese irregular forces - perhaps
guided, advised, and supplemented by forces like Merrill's Marauders and the SACO
"Pirates" - had been fielded. The increase in Allied combat power resulting from a
coordinated campaign prosecuted by a small number of American regulars under Stilwell,
Chenaulfs 14th Air Force,46 and hundreds of thousands of Chinese irregulars, might very
well have defeated the Japanese in China without the problematic aid of the Soviets
which was employed historically.
These two counterfactual scenarios highlight the already proven benefits of
coordination for the combat power of a hybrid force. If these scenarios point out great
returns which could have been reaped from coordination enabled by existing technology,
one can only imagine the returns from IAT-enhanced coordination. With communications
systems capable of transmitting information in real time, regardless of the terrain
occupied by the sender or receiver, a hybrid commander could exaggerate the
dispersion/concentration dilemma faced by his conventional counterpart to a degree
never before imagined.
A future hybrid force, for example, may be able to order and coordinate theater-
wide irregular attacks upon its conventional opponent almost immediately after the
latter shows any signs of concentration. Such attacks could effectively pin the
conventional force down in a dispersed mode, vulnerable to successive piecemeal
attacks by the small regular component of the hybrid force - a "death by a thousand
cuts" scenario. Conversely, the hybrid force could use IAT to coordinate its actions so
closely as to force the conventional opponent to almost always remain concentrated.
This could be particularly useful for allowing irregular forces a respite, or a freer hand to
build up support in territory previously dominated by the conventionals.
At least four noteworthy implications emerge when one considers the
improvements to coordination bestowed on a future hybrid force by IAT. First, future
hybrid force commanders who exploit the value of coordination may be able to
substantially reduce the size of their regular component. After all, better coordination of
irregulars would increase not only their effectiveness, but the effectiveness of the regular
forces supporting them. One presumes that increased effectiveness would allow a
smaller regular component to accomplish the same mission. Such a consequence of
coordination would appear to be nothing but welcome in an era where shrinking budgets
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are constraining the number of professional, conventional combat units available for
deployment. And the smaller the regular force deployed, the less casualties it could
incur - significant in light of the recent reluctance of Western political leaders to commit
their militaries to scenarios with large casualty forecasts.
Second, improvements in coordination could fundamentally alter the sustainment
of irregulars. Real-time information links, combined with air assets, may allow the use
of the "just-in-time" (JIT) logistics systems for irregulars. A JIT system would reduce the
amount of equipment, ammunition, and resources which irregulars would have to carry,
perhaps making them even more nimble in comparison to their conventional opponent.
Additionally, a JIT system might reduce the amount of supplies that irregulars would
have to acquire from, or store with, the local population. This would have a host of
benefits. A local population which did not have to give as much to the irregulars, for
instance, might be more supportive. And for those local civilians who did support the
irregulars, not having to store equipment or resources for the combatants would leave
them less afraid of searches by the conventional power and less prone to being the target
of reprisals. Of course, JIT logistics systems are critically dependent on stable
communications. Any interruption of communications could leave JIT-supported
irregulars cut off and vulnerable. Moreover, the experience of the Chindits - who
essentially relied on a JIT logistics system in Burma - demonstrates that JIT logistics
systems can be woefully inadequate in regions where irregulars possess no local popular
support.
Third, improvements in coordination could certainly lead to overcontrol of either
or both components of a hybrid force. This consequence could be more likely for the
American military, which has a history of being as tightly controlled as the technology
will allow. As H.R. McMaster notes, during the 1960's,
the desire to control military operations more closely at the civilian level
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and in the White House
coincided with advances in communications technology that made
possible the detailed monitoring of military activities in faraway theaters.
During the Cuban missile crisis, communications equipment established in
the White House after the Bay of Pigs incident allowed the president to
monitor and control military operations from his desk in the Oval
Office.47
The trend continued into the 1970's, as evidenced by Secretary of State Kissinger giving
verbal instructions from the White House to helicopter pilots participating halfway
around the globe in the Mayaguez rescue mission.48 Although a rekindled respect for
allowing the military to "run their own show" began with President Carter's lack of
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interference during the attempted rescue of the Iranian hostages, and later produced the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, one wonders if decreased civilian interference will continue to
be the norm. Moreover, one asks if improving communications technology will not allow
senior American military leaders to supplant their civilian masters as mavens of
overcontrol. As one Marine analysis postulates, helmet mounted cameras and real time
voice communications may allow battalion commanders to tell platoon leaders which
tree to hide behind.49
The point here is simply that the same technology which enables increased
combat power through better coordination will also allow overcontrol - and the theater
of a hybrid campaign appears particularly ripe for such interference. Requiring as they
do great interaction with foreign civilian populaces, hybrid campaigns may have daily or
weekly political ramifications. These ramifications may reawaken the American civilian
leadership's past tendency to overcontrol, and technology will only enhance their ability
to do so. This same technology will also improve the ability of a hybrid force
commander, or his superiors in Washington, to tightly control American advisors
working with irregular forces. And, as Chapter VI explained, centralization of irregulars
will reduce the efficiency of a hybrid force.
Fourth, and last, one must again remember that the same IAT which will enable
better coordination on the part of the hybrid force may also give advantages to the
conventional opponent. It may well become easier for a conventional opponent to get a
clearer picture of the location, intensity, and design of a set of widely dispersed irregular
efforts. One imagines that this would make a coordinated and more effective response
well within the grasp of the conventional commander.
D. CAUTIONS ON THE USE OF IATIN HYBRID CAMPAIGNS
The intent of sections B and C has been to demonstrate the potential effects of
IAT on future hybrid campaigns. From a political /cultural perspective, IAT may enable
much more effective programs for employing propaganda or developing cultural
awareness. From a military viewpoint, IAT could significantly alter the relative balance
of combat power between a hybrid force and its conventional opponent through the
components of maneuver, firepower, and leadership. In closing, two final issues loom
over any use of IAT in these campaigns.
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1. Over-reliance on IAT
First, one can probably not stress enough the potential pitfalls of an over-reliance
upon new technologies. Although IATs promise to fundamentally change, if not
revolutionize, all of warfare, they should not be viewed as a panacea. Any force which
places too much emphasis on the utilization of IAT would weaken themselves in two
ways. First, a force counting heavily on IAT-enabled strategies would be crippled if
such technologies failed. Since current IATs have not demonstrated a high degree of
survivability, not planning for their failure appears unwise. Consequently, I would
recommend that developing strategies for the use of IAT should be accompanied by
techniques, tactics, and procedures for operating without them.
A second vulnerability created by over-reliance could be a loss of "doctrinal"
surprise. Developing strategies for using IATs to achieve military victory is still very
much in the conceptual stage. When such strategies are eventually employed, they will
no doubt unbalance their victims psychologically as well as militarily. But such effects
are not long lasting, and the force which relies on them repeatedly does so at its own
peril. While German airborne operations achieved brilliant success in their initial use in
the spring of 1940, a year later non-elite Allied troops on Crete fought the fallschirmjager
almost to a standstill. Early opponents had been temporarily paralyzed by the mere
concept of an infantry opponent descending from the sky. Later opponents were not
only not paralyzed, but took descending paratroopers under fire. This episode should
be instructive to those recommending repeated use of closely related IAT strategies over
the course of a protracted campaign.
Both of the weaknesses inherent in over-reliance on IATs would appear
particularly troubling for a hybrid force. Facing, as they usually do, greater conventional
combat power, hybrid forces would seem even less able to afford a heavy dependence
on plans built around "finicky" technology. Neither Greene nor Wellington nor Lawrence
counted on advanced technology as the key to their success. Their approach offers a
lesson.
2. Indirect Effects on Civilian Populations
A second and final concern over the use of any IATs in hybrid campaigns is their
potential effect on the civilian population in the contested country. Hybrid forces
cannot survive without a sizable base of non-combatant support. IAT strategies could
endanger that support.
A specific example could be offensive information operations targeted
against the conventional opponent which might also affect civilians in the surrounding
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area - an attempt to shut down the power at an opposition military base for instance.
One would have to carefully discriminate which power sources were affected, so as not
to deny a valued commodity of life to the local civilians. A less direct consequence of
equal concern would be the prospect of reprisals. Reprisals against both the lives and
property of civilians in a contested theater have often been a distinguishing feature of
historical hybrid campaigns. Thus, one feels safe in assuming that a conventional
opponent to a future hybrid force could attempt to deter information operations through
the threat of reprisals. In either case, the hybrid force leaders would have to carefully
consider the targeting and consequences of offensive information operations.
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